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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines Hawaiian sovereignty in history, law, and activism.
The project tracks Indigenous claims, negotiations, and articulations of sovereignty in
Hawai‘i. Using a critically Indigenous approach to Hawaiian studies, I advance two main
theses. First, Kānaka Maoli (Native Hawaiians) are discussed as a community divided on
Hawaiian sovereignty. However, I contend that Kānaka Maoli exercise a diversity of
strategies and tactics for Hawaiian sovereignty. I show how Kānaka Maoli practice
multiple modalities of sovereignty that cumulatively produce the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi
(Indigenous Hawaiian) politics of ea (life and sovereignty). Second, the historical
development of settler colonial capitalism operationalized the US settler-state in Hawai‘i
and fuels its management of Kānaka Maoli in contemporary struggles with federal
recognition, nation-building, and astronomy industry development. Yet, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi
artists and activists engage in geontologies of aloha ‘āina—a geographic way of being in
the ‘āina (land and that which feeds)—that seek to overturn settler colonial capitalism
and its champion the US settler-state. I argue that these practices issue gifts that
disidentify with dominant ideologies of sovereignty as a way of reimagining ea for a
decolonized then and deoccupied there. Therefore, my project explains the nefarious
ways that the settler-state attempts to cohere territorial control to juridical authority and
how Kānaka Maoli antagonize and disrupt the precariousness of settler sovereignty in
Hawai‘i. Intervening into Indigenous Studies, Hawaiian Studies, and critical theories, the
study offers new insights on the complex relationship between settler colonial capitalism
and Hawaiian sovereignty.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“As a hoʻokupu, or gift, to the Hawaiian people,
it will guide future discussions about sovereignty.”
—Haunani-Kay Trask1
This project commences with a pair of stories and theses. I want to start with a
personal mo‘olelo or story. On January 31, 2019, Cecily Hilleary, a journalist from
Washington, DC covering Indigenous issues for the Voice of America, approached me
over social media with questions about the Hawaiian sovereignty movement. Conveying
that Voice of America lacked coverage on Native Hawaiians, Hilleary told me that she
was writing an article about US federal recognition. Her particular interest was in the
federal government’s legal process, through the Department of the Interior’s
administrative rule in 2016, to re-establish a government-to-government relationship with
the Native Hawaiian community. Claiming expertise on the Hawaiian sovereignty
movement, Hilleary was not concerned about my thoughts but, instead, finding Native
Hawaiian proponents of federal recognition. She said, “[I]’ve been desperately looking
for someone who can speak in favor of federal recognition.” I was struck by how Hilleary
easily found Kanaka Maoli (Native Hawaiian) opponents of federal recognition, who
seek nothing less than full independence, and could not locate “the side,” as she put it,
desiring federal recognition. Hilleary then asked me for recommendations on where to
look. “Most Kānaka Maoli [Native Hawaiians] are not in favor of federal recognition,

1

Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in
Hawai‘i (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999), 78, original emphasis.
1

period,” I responded. “It appears,” I went on, “that the desperation to find a Kanaka
Maoli that favors federal recognition vividly illustrates the lāhui’s [people and nation’s]
opposition. We don’t need recognition; we know who we are.” Hilleary immediately
asked me to shift what was a public discussion into the private sphere, perhaps out of
discomfort with accountability. I refused to comply. Seizing her request, I offered three
specific recommendations:
Recommendation 1:
Looking for two sides of the “Native story” reifies the colonial narrative that
Indigenous communities are divided & disorganized. It’s offensive. The Hawaiian
sovereignty movement has engaged in a diversity of strategies that represent our
collective unity.
Recommendation 2:
Media seem to be including more stories on Indigenous struggles into their
“binders full of Natives.” Even progressive media. This reeks of liberal
multiculturalism. It’s self-serving and dangerous, especially when a media outlet
is funded by the US government.
Recommendation 3:
So much is available on this, from public testimony against federal recognition to
‘Ōiwi [Indigenous Hawaiian] research showing it’s a bad deal. Alas, our
opposition, our overwhelming opposition, is less important than journalistic
objectivity. We do our homework. Others should too.
Hilleary thanked me for my input. She also expressed gratitude for my skepticism. It is
true; I was incredibly skeptical after being approached by her, especially since Voice of
America is part of the US Agency for Global Media and funded by Congress.2
Nonetheless, she claimed to be fair and impartial. Hilleary explained that she sought, as
an individual endeavor funded by the federal government from what I gathered, to
empower Indigenous voices in mainstream news and dominant history. My skepticism

2

“Mission and Values of VOA – Voice of America English News,” VOA,
accessed March 12, 2019, http://www.insidevoa.com/p/5831.html
2

swelled. Concluding our conversation, she joked to me, “[A]s one Mohawk journalist I
know once quipped, after finally recognizing in me an ally, ‘When VOA calls for an
interview, it’s like the FBI knocking at the door.’” I did not respond. Exactly one week
later on February 7, 2019, with a skewed sensibility of what it means to be an ally,
Hilleary published her article with the title: “Native Hawaiians Divided on Federal
Recognition.”3
Kānaka Maoli are discussed as a community divided on Hawaiian sovereignty.
However, Kānaka Maoli engage in a diversity of strategies and tactics for Hawaiian
sovereignty. This is the first thesis in my dissertation. Popular representations in local,
national, and international news media habitually suggest that the Kānaka Maoli are
fragmented in leadership, vision, and specific issues related to sovereignty. In her article
“Do We Really Know Who We Are Anymore?” Trisha Kehaulani Waston writes bluntly
that ʻŌiwi leaders in Hawai‘i are “frail and divided.”4 Others describe the modern
Hawaiian sovereignty movement as conflicted on vision.5 Reporting on new efforts to
reorganize a Native Hawaiian government, Brittany Lyte says there is a “glaring fissure
dividing Native Hawaiians on the issues of what sovereignty should look like, how it
should be achieved and who, if anyone, outside the Native community should have a

3

Cecily Hilleary, “Native Hawaiians Divided on Federal Recognition,” VOA,
February 7, 2019, http://www.voanews.com.
4
Trisha Kehaulani Watson, “Do We Really Know Who We Are Anymore?” Civil
Beat, February 20, 2019, http://www.civilbeat.org/2019/02/trisha-kehaulani-watson-dowe-really-know-who-we-are-anymore.
5
Mark ‘Umi Perkins, “CONFLICTING VISIONS OF HAWAIIAN
SOVEREIGNTY,” Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine, March 2000,
http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/conflictingvisions-hawaiian-sovereignty.
3

hand in it.”6 The fissure has supposedly produced opposing camps in self-governance and
activism.7 For example, coverage on a recent election for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
identifies that candidates were split on the whether or not the Thirty Meter Telescope
should be built atop Mauna Kea, a sacred mountain on the island of Hawai‘i.8 Some
argue that Kānaka Maoli are patently separated on the development project, between
those who approve of it and those protesting against it.9 These narratives produce a
discourse that Kānaka Maoli are divided and incapable of organizing, agreeing, or acting
as a collective polity, which serves to obscure and disarm Hawaiian sovereignty. But, in
each chapter of this dissertation, I chart the diverse ways in which Kānaka ‘Ōiwi
(Indigenous Hawaiians) claim, negotiate, and articulate sovereignty. These Kanaka ‘Ōiwi
claims, negotiations, and articulations of sovereignty throughout history, law, and
activism are not singular or monolithic, nor are they universal or absolute. They are
particular, paradoxical, and extremely complicated. Whether under the rubric of national
sovereignty, tribal sovereignty, Indigenous sovereignty, or something entirely different,
Kānaka Maoli have fought for our land, lives, autonomy, and independence. These
struggles over Hawaiian sovereignty are cumulative, which is precisely what the

6

Brittany Lyte, “First steps toward Native Hawaiian sovereignty get tripped up,”
Al Jazeera, December 5, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/12/5/first-stepstoward-native-hawaiian-sovereignty-get-tripped-up.
7
Casey Tolan, “Why some Native Hawaiians want to declare independence from
the U.S.,” Splinter, March 9, 2016, http://splinternews.com/why-some-native-hawaiianswant-to-declare-independence-1793855248.
8
Chelsea Davis, “Native Hawaiians divided over Thirty Meter Telescope ruling,”
Hawaii News Now, October 31, 2018,
http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/2018/10/31/native-hawaiians-divided-over-thirty-metertelescope-ruling.
9
“Hawaii Supreme Court gives the go-ahead to controversial Thirty Meter
Telescope,” CBC News, October 31, 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/thirtymeter-telescope-1.4886136.
4

discourse of division functions to undermine and eliminate. In each chapter, I explore this
struggle over what I refer to as the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea. The word ea translates
from ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i (Hawaiian language) to English as breath, life, to rise, and also
sovereignty. As such, my project investigates how Kānaka Maoli breathe life into the
meanings and consequences of sovereignty for the lāhui, a nation rising.10
I want to share a second mo‘olelo. On January 24, 2019, Clare E. Connors, the
Attorney General for the State of Hawai‘i, requested that the State of Hawai‘i’s
legislature allocate $2.5 million for “state security operations.”11 Connors’ request was a
new iteration of an ongoing initiative from the Department of the Attorney General.
Previous attorney generals—Douglas S. Chin and Russell A. Suzuki—were unsuccessful
in acquiring $2.5 million from the legislature to fund what they named “state security
operations.” Like Chin and Suzuki, Connors suggested that the purpose of state security
operations would pivot on financially bolstering law enforcement to assist construction of
the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT), which is an enormous telescope complex funded by
$1.5 billion from an international consortium of astronomy and science organizations,
public universities, and national governments. The TMT is attempting to be built on
Mauna Kea, a mountain on the island of Hawai‘i also known as Mauna a Wākea that is
sacred to Kānaka Maoli. Mauna a Wākea is part of the national lands stolen from the
Hawaiian Kingdom in the late 19th century. Refusing desecration and destruction, Kānaka

10

See Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, introduction to A Nation Rising: Hawaiian
Movements for Life, Land, and Sovereignty, ed. Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, Ikaika
Hussey, and Erin Kahunawaika‘ala Wright (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014).
11
Timothy Hurley, “Planning for Thirty Meter Telescope protest conflict begins,”
Honolulu Star-Advertiser, January 25, 2019,
http://www.staradvertiser.com/2019/01/25/hawaii-news/planning-for-tmt-protestconflict-begins.
5

Maoli, and non-Kanaka Maoli allies, that identify as kia‘i (guardians and protectors) of
the mountain have stopped all attempts to build the TMT. In 2015, Chin claimed that
kia‘i, who blockaded construction crews from ascending to the northern plateau of
Mauna a Wākea to begin development of TMT, were an “imminent peril to public health,
safety, and morality.”12 Represented as threats of violence, he compared kia‘i to the
fascist white supremacists that marched in 2017 on Charlottesville, Virginia for the Unite
the Right rally to demand $2.5 million from the legislature for state security operations
that could “respond to potential mass violence or civil disobedience, possibly atop Mauna
a Wākea.”13 Connors echoed this need for capital from the State of Hawai‘i, a US settlerstate in Hawai‘i, to quell opposing protest and support construction of TMT. During a
committee meeting in the Senate, Senator Kai Kahele told Connors, “We just want to
ensure that we don’t have a Standing Rock situation on Mauna Kea.”14 On one hand,
Kānaka Maoli protecting Mauna a Wākea were analogized to neo-nazi white nationalists
to secure capital in the service of exercising settler-state authorization of TMT. On the
other hand, the symbol of Indigenous resistance and police intervention on the territory of
the Standing Rock Sioux Nation analogized the Dakota Access Pipeline, a $3.78 billion
project for transferring crude oil, to the TMT. This is a story of settler capital and its
system of settler colonial capitalism. Through settler-state financial appropriation of
capital for policing and a scientific project for astronomy development, settler colonial

12

See “BLNR Meeting – July 10, 2015 – Testimonies,” ‘Ōiwi TV, July 15, 2015,
http://oiwi.tv/maunakea/blnr-meeting-july-10-2015-testimonies.
13
Nanea Kalani, “Attorney general seeks $2.5 million for security,” Honolulu
Star-Advertiser, January 11, 2018, http://www.staradvertiser.com/2018/01/11/hawaiinews/attorney-general-seeks-2-5-million-for-security.
14
Hurley, “Planning for Thirty Meter Telescope protest conflict begins.”
6

capitalism has worked to suppress Kānaka ‘Ōiwi, the defense of sacred land, and
sovereign relations with it. As a structure proliferating in Hawaiʻi, settler colonial
capitalism developed to subjugate Hawaiian sovereignty.
The historical formation of settler colonial capitalism operationalized US settler
sovereignty in Hawai‘i, and it fuels the US settler-state’s management of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi
in current struggles over federal recognition, nation-building, and astronomy industry
development. But, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi artists and activists engage in geontologies of aloha
ʻāina (love of land) to overturn settler colonial capitalism and its champion the US settlerstate, which present gifts that disidentify with sovereignty to reimagine the politics of ea
for decolonizing and deoccupying Hawai‘i. This is the second thesis in my dissertation.
The proceeding chapters mine the myriad ways that settler colonial capitalism has
developed and persists. In Chapter 1, I track how colonial capitalism settled in the early
1840s, through the institutionalization of monetary currency and animal taxes in the
Hawaiian Kingdom, opening up territorial and juridical conditions of possibility for
settler sovereignty in Hawaiʻi. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the ways in which settler
capitalism empowers the US settler-state and its federal and state initatives for colonial
dispossession. In Chapter 4, I explore the political economy of the TMT, as a
development project for the astronomy industry, and how the US settler-state attempts to
exercise territorial and juridical sovereignty over Hawaiʻi through it. These chapters
concomitantly trace the many ways that Kānaka Maoli resist, reject, and refuse settler
colonial capitalism and the settler-state constituted by it. The Indigenous resurgence and
refusal that I investigate illustrate geographic ways of being in the ‘āina of Hawai‘i that
are mobilized for anti-colonial and anti-capitalist resistance. These geontologies of aloha

7

‘āina—translating to a deep love and genuine care of land, water, earth, and country—
produce what I call gifts of sovereignty. Gifts of sovereignty confer responsibility and
obligation to balance relationships with the ‘āina of Hawaiʻi. In doing so, the gifts
disidentify with sovereignty and reimagine the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea as an active
practice for decolonization as well as deoccupation. Each chapter discusses unique yet
interdependent gifts that work on and against dominant ideologies of sovereignty while
simultaneously desiring, envisioning, and practicing other possibilities. In such a spirit, I
share this dissertation as my own gift to envisage alternative futures in Hawai‘i that
surpass settler colonial capitalism and the US settler-state.
With this pair of stories and theses in mind, the introduction advances in two
ways. I first elaborate gifts and then explicate sovereignty. The initial section on gifts
describes the nuts and bolts of this dissertation. I sketch out methodological frameworks
and their interventions, methods of analysis, and sources of data that underpin my study
of settler colonial capitalism and the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea. This section presents
the dissertation as a critically Indigenous project of Hawaiian Studies, which provides
new insights in Hawaiian Studies, Indigenous Studies, and critical theory. The next
section traces literature from the fields of Indigenous Studies and Hawaiian Studies in
order to conceptualize sovereignty. I turn to Queer of Color Studies and Queer
Indigenous Studies to bridge the diffuse understandings of sovereignty. Doing so, I
theorize how performances of Hawaiian sovereignty disidentify with sovereignty and
produce a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea. Disidentification offers a necessary alternative to
reading Hawaiian sovereignty, and the modern Hawaiian sovereignty movement, beyond
the violence of the normative.

8

Gifts
The methodology in Gifts of Sovereignty is double-layered. My methodological
framework emerges from a mélange of scholarly orientations and a particular theoretical
lens. I want to start with my orientations because they inform the specific lens that I am
forging. To begin, Hawaiian Studies is the central frame for my analysis of the Kanaka
‘Ōiwi politics of ea. Looking at the rise of Hawaiian Studies in the 21st century, Noelani
Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua suggests that it is “a dynamic, interdisciplinary field that is
constituted by practitioners in a range of diverse locations but who maintain some shared
commitments and driving questions.”15 Troubling the bifurcation of research and cultural
practice, she says the field consists of researchers that are practitioners of ‘ike Hawai‘i
(Hawaiian knowledge). Scholars engaged in Hawaiian Studies are situated in an array of

15

Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, “Reproducing the Ropes of Resistance: Hawaiian
Studies Methodologies,” in Kanaka ‘Ōiwi Methodologies: Mo‘olelo and Metaphor, ed.
Katrina-Ann R. Kapā‘anaokalāokeola Nākoa Oliveira and Erin Kahunawaika‘ala Wright
(Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2016), 1.
9

disciplines like history,16 literature,17 geography,18 anthropology,19 political science,20
law,21 and American studies,22 while sharing a core set of dedications for inquiry. In this
sense, the field is interdisciplinary but rooted in the study of ‘ike Hawai‘i. While the field
is capacious and selectively appropriates theoretical tools for analysis from other
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disciplines, ‘ike Hawai‘i remains a primary object of analysis. I closely follow this
orientation to knowledge production within Hawaiian Studies, which is unified through
some fundamental commitments. In Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua’s reflection, she charts four key
principles that hold together and make up this large, growing field. She writes, “We can
think about lāhui (collective identity and self-definition), ea (sovereignty and leadership),
kuleana (positionality and obligations), and pono (harmonious relationships, justice, and
healing) as central commitments and lines of inquiry that are hallmarks of Hawaiian
studies research.”23 Each concept provides a vital principle that when woven together, as
methodological ropes for research and resurgence,24 offers an approach to studying ‘ike
Hawai‘i grounded in our own unique ways of being and knowing. Each chapter in this
dissertation considers how the lāhui claims, negotiates, and articulates ea with kuleana to
maintain pono relationships with the ‘āina of Hawai‘i. The chapters employ Kanaka
Maoli ontologies and epistemologies as ‘Ōiwi methodologies and methods, answering
Katrina-Ann R. Kapā‘anaokalāokeola Nākoa Oliveira and Erin Kahunawaika‘ala
Wright’s call,25 for my political analysis of sovereignty. “What distinguishes Hawaiian
studies from studies of Hawaiian topics is a commitment to revitalizing the collective
ability of Kanaka Hawai‘i [Hawaiian people] to exercise our ea in healthy, respectful, and
productive ways,” according to Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, “Hawaiian studies methodologies
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support the revitalization of vessels that promote a robust flow of ea.”26 In my analysis,
material culture, public testimony, activist coalitions, direct-action blockades, and even
lawsuits emerge as vessels overflowing with ea. Investigating these, I aspire to “make
sense of otherwise unnoticed pieces of our collective experience,” which GoodyearKa‘ōpua notes, “can project our ea in directions that affect our shared futures.”27 As a
Hawaiian Studies project, my hope is that this dissertation names and nurtures the potent
power of our ea.
The dissertation is also galvanized by Indigenous Studies. “One of the duties of a
Hawaiian studies scholar then is to know and critically engage with the body of published
work by Kānaka,” Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua contends, “lest we unwittingly participate in their
silencing and marginalization.”28 Although I pursue this important duty by centering
Kanaka Maoli scholars of Hawaiian Studies, this body of scholarship is not categorically
engaged in Indigenous Studies. This may come as a shock to some. Not all Hawaiian
Studies research is represented as Indigenous Studies. Some work in Hawaiian Studies
has actually turned away from Indigenous Studies and also criticized Hawaiian Studies
research that engages Indigenous Studies. For example, Hawaiian legal studies have
honed an argument about sovereignty, which I explain in the proceeding section, that
renders “Hawaiian” to be a marker of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s nation-state (i.e.,
Hawaiian nation-state) and national citizenship of the Hawaiian Kingdom (i.e., Hawaiian
citizen-subject).29 Premised upon the juridical doctrine of international law, the argument
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disassociates sovereignty from Indigeneity. In turn, research in Hawaiian Studies that
considers scholarship on sovereignty from Indigenous Studies has been condemned as
illegitimate for affiliating with US legal frameworks rather than an international legal
perspective.30 Regrettably, this analysis has seeped into other arenas. Some Hawaiian
historical research denounces Indigenous critiques of colonialism in Hawai‘i as inquiry
performed through a colonial gaze.31 Indigenous critique of colonization gets coded as
colonial. Rather than reifying this methodological border and relational foreclosure, my
dissertation centers Hawaiian Studies while unapologetically drawing on the field of
Indigenous Studies. This orientation aids me in analyzing the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea
as well as settler colonial capitalism. On one hand, Indigenous Studies examines the ways
in which Indigenous people and nations exercise sovereignty, authority, and governance
outside of settler-states and their legal apparatuses.32 It is a genealogy that frames how ea
is articulated beyond the US settler-state and its law. On the other hand, Indigenous
Studies theorizes the intersection of settler colonialism and capitalism.33 These theories
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assist me in understanding the specific consolidation of settler colonial capital in Hawai‘i.
However, this methodological integration is not absent of concern. Without careful
attention to the specificities that constitute it, Hawaiian Studies can appear simply as a
subfield of Indigenous Studies. The homogenization risks flattening out Hawaiian Studies
to maximize the diversity and internationalism of Indigenous Studies, which may
unintentionally mirror the liberal multiculturalism weaponized by institutions and
individuals to erase the ontological density of Indigeneity.34 However, Hawaiian Studies
scholars have developed incredibly genuine and generative relations with Indigenous
Studies.35 Following their methodological foci, I cultivate a project engaged with
Indigenous Studies that is squarely centered in Hawaiian Studies.
As a methodological intervention of the dissertation, I establish a critically
Indigenous framework for Hawaiian Studies.36 In Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua’s highlighting of
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methodologies in Hawaiian Studies, she identifies a critical approach within Hawaiian
studies.37 Critical approaches in the field have “interrogated the ways that Hawaiian
subjectivities (our sense of who we are, as shaped within larger relations of power) are
affected and inhabited through introduced notions or categories of race, class, and
gender.”38 This orientation is keenly concerned with power and how techniques of power,
like race, class, and gender, to name a few, produce subjectivities and normalize subjects.
Scholars practicing in this genealogy “point toward the importance of Hawaiian studies
methodologies that give us the ability to negotiate discrepant relations of power and
authority embedded within different ways of defining and mobilizing Hawaiian
identity.”39 A critical Hawaiian Studies turns toward Kanaka ‘Ōiwi ways of being and
knowing to interrogate and interrupt power. Hawaiian Studies critique therein takes
seriously the material consequences of politics and power. Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua suggests
that legal analysis fits into this approach. Agreeing with this point, I believe that
Hawaiian legal studies indeed helps us to think through the political status and legal
claims of Kānaka Maoli. Within this standpoint, however, the law itself can appear
neutral and omniscient, which effectively reproduces power. Law in Hawaiian legal
studies can be cast without criticism and held up as a coherent domain of universal truth.
Although we can read this research as interrogating relations of power, like the
relationship between the US federal government and Kānaka Maoli, some of these
critical approaches disavow Indigeneity, Indigenous Studies, and even colonial critique.
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In my project, I balance the critical approach in Hawaiian Studies together with
Indigenous Studies and its understandings of Indigeneity and criticisms of colonialism.
This is the first part of my critically Indigenous intervention into Hawaiian Studies.
I intervene secondarily into Hawaiian Studies by employing Indigenous critical
theories. Charting the move away from 20th century Indigenous Studies that was “largely
the knowledge/power domain of non-Indigenous scholars,”40 Aileen Moreton-Robinson
explores the emergence of Critical Indigenous Studies and its flourishment in the 21st
century. She writes that it is transforming into a discipline, or knowledge/power domain,
with distinct work that is created, taught, and shared by Indigenous scholars.41 The
“critical” in Critical Indigenous Studies therein flags a separation between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous analytics. Moreton-Robinson posits that research in Critical
Indigenous Studies mobilizes Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies in the service of
producing knowledge about intersecting forms of colonial power. As such, Jodi A.
Byrd’s articulation of Indigenous critical theory in their groundbreaking work The
Transit of Empire has revolutionized the field. “Indigenous scholars engaged in
indigenous critical theories that draw on the intellectual traditions of their own histories
and communities to contravene in, respond to, and redirect European philosophies,” Byrd
remarks, “can offer crucial new ways of conceptualizing an after to empire that does not
reside within the obliteration of indigenous lives, resources, and lands.”42 I apply this lens
in each chapter by putting Kanaka Maoli intellectual traditions in conversation with non-
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Kanaka Maoli philosophies to imagine a space and time that does not sacrifice Kānaka
Maoli and the ‘āina of Hawai‘i. Kim TallBear says, “We must agree to be promiscuous
disciplinary travelers and radical experimental surgeons, reattaching knowledges one to
another in our approaches to the problems we tackle.”43 The problems that we face, as
Indigenous scholars and communities, are diverse and it is certainly an appropriate
strategy to address them with a diversity of tactics. Therefore, I utilize an Indigenous,
critical, and Indigenous critical orientation to Hawaiian Studies. This is what I refer to as
a critically Indigenous approach for Hawaiian Studies. The approach assists me in
examining settler colonial capitalism and the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea, especially from
our own ‘ōlelo makuahine (mother tongue) and modalities of knowing and being. My
analysis is “committed to and dependent on local specificity within a broader network of
relationships,” as Daniel Heath Justice phrases, “a responsible but not unreflective
obligation to community, a fierce commitment to truth, a robust insistence on multiplicity
and complexity, and just action toward our human and other-than-human kin.”44 From
this focus, each chapter of the dissertation utilizes and repurposes an assortment of
critical theories. Chapter 1 engages theories of settler colonialism and racial capitalism to
analyze the historical development of settler colonial capitalism in Hawai‘i. Chapter 2
maps out a theory of biopower that intersects with geopolitics in order to criticize US
federal recognition of Kānaka Maoli. Chapter 3 turns to theories of geontology to
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interpret state-determined nation-building for Native Hawaiians and Kanaka Maoli
alternatives to it. Chapter 4 unpacks theories on liberalism to probe the political
economies of the Thirty Meter Telescope at Mauna a Wākea.
As the second layer in this dissertation’s methodology, the gift offers me a
specific theoretical lens for analysis. In Mimi Thi Nguyen’s The Gift of Freedom, she
theorizes the gift as a critical methodology for her study of US liberal empire.45 Her
conceptualization of the gift is instructive for my theorizing about gifts. Admitting there
is a mass corpus on the gift that has engrossed anthropologists, linguists, and
philosophers,46 Nguyen draws on Jacques Derrida to conceive the aporia of giving.47
Derrida described that the gift fashions an economy of exchange and obligation. Based on
his work, Nguyen claims, “The gift as the transfer of possession from one to another
shapes a relation between giver and recipient that engenders a debt, which is to say that
the gift belongs to an economy that voids an openhanded nature.”48 A genuine gift, a
possession transferred in an openhanded nature, should not be recognized by the giver,
nor should the giver be known to the recipient, she alleges. The gift is not gratuitous but
an aporia, which produces conditions of possibility and impossibility that, in turn,
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exercise powers of domination and debt. The gift then is an alibi for power. In Nguyen’s
research, she contends that freedom is the smokescreen of this alibi. For instance, the
liberal US gift of freedom, bestowed onto subjects like the refugee, conceals and
rationalizes original conditions that make the subject “unfree” and simultaneously
generates debt over time for American empire’s “freeing” of the subject. This
poststructuralist conceptualization of the gift is indexed through state power. Derrida
suggested that to give a gift is akin to giving a blow, giving life, and giving death.49
Registering through theories on biopolitics, Nguyen discusses how gifts are given via
state techniques and instruments of power, particularly for presenting symbolic forms of
freedom as a way to engender material indebtedness. The import of the gift, in her
methodology, is state power over subjects and its endurance to shape the desires,
movements, and futures of subjects over time.50 With this in mind, I make a few
adaptations to carve out my theory of gifts.
The importance of gifts, in my methodology, is the power to present obligations
for balancing relationships over time and space. This adapted theory offers a heuristic to
interpret the giving and issuance of responsibility in Kanaka Maoli claims, negotiations,
and articulations of sovereignty. Reiterating Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua’s four guiding concepts
for research in Hawaiian Studies, this configures a structure for interpretation of how the
lāhui imagines and practices ea in ways that offer kuleana to cultivate pono relations
across the ‘āina. A gifts framework directs my main argument in the project. It thus
functions dually as both a theoretical lens and argument. I argue in the dissertation that
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the diverse claims, negotiations, and articulations of Hawaiian sovereignty engage in
geontologies of aloha ‘āina for overturning settler colonial capitalism and the US settlerstate, which present gifts that disidentify with sovereignty for envisioning and practicing
the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea to decolonize and deoccupy Hawai‘i. To develop this
argument, I need to adapt Nguyen’s notion of the gift in three ways. First, gifts can be
exchanged outside capital’s logic of possessive individualism. In Chapter 1, I highlight a
mat that was woven from makaloa sedge with a textual message and given in 1874, as a
literal gift, to the monarch of the Hawaiian Kingdom, demanding that settler capital be
overturned in Hawai‘i. Instead of an individual transference of property, the mat was an
assemblage of human labor and more-than-human materiality that issued a collective
obligation rather than title for possessive ownership. Second, gifts can engender
responsibility instead of debt. The makaloa mat administered a complex responsibility to
reconsider governance in the Hawaiian Kingdom for defending and bolstering the lāhui’s
national and Indigenous sovereignty. That gift called to reshape relationships between
commoners and rulers to balance relations between Kānaka ‘Ōiwi and the ‘āina of
Hawai‘i. Third, gifts can be forms of power beyond the state. While Nguyen views the
gift as an alibi for state power, gifts are not only extended from institutions down to
populations below. They also bubble up and ascend from the depths. In the proceeding
chapters, I look at how Kanaka Maoli artists and activists present gifts that work on and
against sovereignty to disrupt and destabilize settler-state power. In Chapter 2, mo‘olelo
of opposition during public testimony against federal recognition expose a settler state of
exception in Hawai‘i. In Chapter 3, an extra-legal, non-statist project for Kanaka Maoli
nation-building provides an alternative to state-determined processes for nation-building
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that are tied to federal recognition. In Chapter 4, legal activism coupled with direct-action
blockades to protect Mauna a Wākea create a neoliberal financial crisis for the Thirty
Meter Telescope and US settler-state of Hawai‘i. In my analysis, the state is not the
arbiter of what constitutes a gift. These chapters demonstrate that gifts of sovereignty
exercise power from the bottom-up, from Kānaka Maoli to the settler-state, providing
kuleana to cultivate pono relationships in Hawai‘i. This critically Indigenous
methodology in Hawaiian Studies, which I apply through the particular theoretical lens of
gifts, contributes new insight to philosophies of the gift. I also intervene into Indigenous
Studies by forging a new theory about sovereignty from this methodological approach
and the specific geopolitical context of Hawaiʻi.
With the dissertation’s methodology and methodological interventions in mind,
each chapter specifies diverse approaches to methods for analyzing various sources. In
Chapter 1, I utilize mo‘olelo (story, history, account) as a methodology and kaona
(hidden meaning) as a reading device for historical analysis. I analyze a makaloa sedge
mat, archival materials from the Bishop Museum, Hawaiian-language newspapers from
the 19th century, Hawaiian Kingdom laws, and an ethnological study. Chapter 2 employs
mo‘olelo as an approach to closely read official transcripts of public testimony on the
Department of the Interior’s Advanced Notice for Proposed Rulemaking in 2014. This
chapter uses a biopolitical theory of settler colonialism to critique the offer of US federal
recognition. In doing so, I conduct a discursive analysis of federal law to interrogate an
executive rulemaking procedure and its administrative rule—the Advanced Notice for
Proposed Rulemaking in 2014, Notice for Proposed Rulemaking in 2015, and Final Rule
in 2016. In Chapter 3, I turn to an analysis of state legislation and law. This chapter looks
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at State of Hawai‘i legislation and law that fashioned a legal process for Native Hawaiian
nation-building. In particular, I analyze Act 195, Act 77, and Hawai‘i Revised Statutes
10H. I complement this with an analysis of the nonprofit Na‘i Aupuni’s bylaws,
contracts, and constitution, as well as a federal lawsuit against Na‘i Aupuni. Chapter 3
further examines an alternative project for Kanaka Maoli nation-building, ‘Aha Aloha
‘Āina, by analyzing its governing documents. Lastly, Chapter 4 begins with a framework
on liberalism to investigate the political economies of the Thirty Meter Telescope. I mine
social relations for rationalizing the project, analyzing public relations documents,
management plans, a petition, and news articles that attempt to sell the Thirty Meter
Telescope. Additionally, I analyze legal activisms and direct-action blockades that have
thrown the development project and settler-state into a neoliberal financial crisis. In
summary, the dissertation engages in historical, legal, discursive, and textual analyses of
primary sources from history, law, and activism.
Sovereignty
In this section, I review conceptualizations of sovereignty from the fields of
Indigenous Studies and Hawaiian Studies. I also look to Queer of Color Studies and
Queer Indigenous Studies to consider non-normative theorizations of sovereignty. This is
by no means an exhaustive survey. I investigate current scholarship in these fields to
contribute to understanding this object of study, especially because sovereignty
undergirds my exploration of settler colonial capitalism and the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of
ea. But it is a slippery idea, complicated category, and multidimensional theory.
Therefore, I discuss sovereignty’s complexity in three parts. The first part looks at

22

sovereignty as a legal construct. The second part examines sovereignty as a practice.
Finally, the third part explores sovereignty as a disidentification.
Although it is a ubiquitous concept that pervades Indigenous Studies and
Hawaiian Studies, sovereignty has been hotly contested for its legal construction. I start
tracking sovereignty for how it is discussed as a legal construct not to center juridical
terminologies but to demonstrate its dominant frames of reference before elaborating on
other orientations. In the edited collection Native Studies Keywords, sovereignty is the
opening entry.51 In it, US law has contrived sovereignty to distinguish Indigenous people
as a political community with a particular relationship to the federal government. This
form of sovereignty, or political authority, was manufactured by the US Supreme Court
in the early 19th century. In Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), the Supreme Court ruled that
individual citizens could not purchase land from Native Americans. Although this court
established aboriginal title to be an inalienable right, the aboriginal right to land was
based on the principle that Native American tribes merely maintained a right of
occupancy upon land that was possessed by the federal government through discovery,
conquest, and acquisition. The conferral of territorial sovereignty to tribes, through a
confirmation of settler sovereignty via the doctrine of discovery, gave way to rights for
self-governance. In The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), Chief Justice John Marshall,
who penned the majority opinion in the former case, ruled that the Cherokee tribe
constitutes a sovereign nation that is authorized to govern themselves. However, the
decision attempted to regulate the Cherokee Nation as a domestic dependent nation and
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ward of the state, rather than a foreign nation with rights to state sovereignty. Tribal
sovereignty formed in this restrictive settler-state recognition of tribal authority over
territory and self-governance. Lastly, in Worcester v. Georgia (1832), Marshall ruled that
the State of Georgia did not have jurisdiction to enforce law on the Cherokee Nation’s
territory because it is a separate political entity with its own rule of law that the federal
government, through a special trust relationship, has authority over vis-à-vis a nation-tonation relationship. While this tried to shield tribal nations from state jurisdiction, the
decision constituted tribal sovereignty as a distinct form of political authority over
territory and self-governance fashioned by the Supreme Court and regulated by Congress,
according to its plenary power from the US Constitution’s Commerce Clause. There is
much more to be said about the structure of tribal sovereignty in federal law, as well as
how it gets exercised within tribal governance.52 Nevertheless, these Supreme Court
decisions—known as the Marshall Trilogy—shape US legal constructions of sovereignty.
Scholars in the field of Indigenous Studies have debated the meaning and
importance of sovereignty as constructed in US law. Some claim that Native Studies, a
branch of Indigenous Studies, should focus on the study and proliferation of tribal
sovereignty.53 In her investigation of sexual violence in Native America, for example,
Sarah Deer argues that “for tribal nations, defining and adjudicating gendered crimes is
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the purest form of sovereignty.”54 Elizabeth Cook-Lynn identifies that Native American
Studies developed as an academic discipline to preserve tribal nations, nationhood, and
sovereignty.55 Cook-Lynn posits that the field can support and bolster sovereignty by
centering Indigenous people as the scholars of Indigenous Studies. In this sense, the legal
category of sovereignty influences intellectual autonomy: “Self-determination entails not
only tribal self-governance but intellectual self-determination.”56 However, this view can
be mobilized in opposition to attempts to explore and promote sovereignty by engaging
other academic fields. In this logic, engagement with other fields, like ethnic studies, runs
the risk of diminishing the distinct import of sovereignty for Indigenous people and tribal
nations, by classifying Indigenous communities as an ethnic or racial minority within the
citizenry of the US nation-state, for instance. Although Indigenous peoples have been
racialized as an ethnic minority for the colonization of their territories, this defense of
sovereignty isolates Indigenous people away from meaningful relations with other
populations that are racialized differently through US law, which consequently shuts
down coalitional possibilities with other racialized peoples and fields of study. Yet,
Indigenous social movements have aligned with other movements for liberation without
subjugating the specificities of tribal sovereignty. For example, the Red Power movement
learned and grew from the Black Power movement.57 Vine Deloria Jr. expanded this
solidarity. He asserted that the concept of sovereignty could be adopted and adapted by

54

Sarah Deer, The Beginning and End of Rape, xvii.
Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, “Who Stole Native American Studies?” Wicazo Sa
Review 12, no. 1 (1997): 9-28.
56
Teves, Smith, and Raheja, “Sovereignty,” 5.
57
Ibid.
55

25

other marginalized communities.58 As a concept that reshaped US legal constructions,
Deloria suggested that sovereignty offers a critical framework to build power and
autonomy for liberation from oppression through collective understandings of
responsibility. As such, sovereignty does not have to signify a zero-sum game of being or
nothingness.59 One is not simply with or without sovereignty. Nevertheless, law has
rendered it to be something possessed or not. Conceptualizations of sovereignty from this
genealogy illustrate that “demands for Native sovereignty exist within a larger global
context in which the term sovereignty has a prior history within Western
jurisprudence.”60 Sovereignty has indeed been constructed via US law but it is organized
through a global context of western jurisprudence.
Sovereignty is a legal category created through a global matrix of imperial and
colonial power. In his decision in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall argued
that tribal nations “are weak and in need of protection of a stronger state.” In support of
this racist and paternalistic argument, Marshall utilized the international legal theory of
Emer de Vattel. In The Law of Nations, Vattel claimed that the European legal and
political system of treaties and common law should govern a framework for modern
international relations between nation-states.61 Vattel’s theorization in the 18th century
built upon the 17th century doctrines of state equality, territorial sovereignty, and national
independence, which were established by the treaties of Westphalia signed in 1648. The
Westphalian treaties purported to facilitate peace in Europe after the Thirty Years’ War
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took place in Central Europe. Notably, the treaties institutionalized a legal structure
premised on state sovereignty whereby modern nations possess a right of noninterference within their domestic jurisdiction and affairs. This principle of state
sovereignty, crafting the supreme power to control internal matters free from interference
by other nation-states, exported globally through European imperialism and colonialism,
and eventually American imperialism and colonialism, for the consolidation of a
worldwide economic order. “Westphalian peace, as an incipient international system,”
according to Douglas Howland and Luise White, “served to coordinate the rise of the
global economy and, in particular, its legal and colonial institutions.”62 Vattel’s argument
about international law expanded Westphalian sovereignty, and Marshall’s ruling applied
these arguments to legitimate US settler-state sovereignty through the calculated
subordination of tribal sovereignty. Exploring the influence of The Law of Nations in
Georgia and New South Wales in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, Lisa Ford
contends, “Vattel’s dismissal of indigenous property rights and indigenous sovereignty
joined territory with sovereignty with new clarity—a new clarity that Anglophone settler
courts read, after 1820, as an injunction to exercise jurisdiction over indigenous crime in
colonial peripheries.”63 Eurocentric theories of sovereignty traveled across the Atlantic
Ocean to America, and elsewhere to locales like Hawai‘i, and functioned within state
operations to legally construct settler sovereignty by managing Indigenous polities.
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Locating its origin in an imperial and colonial genealogy, Indigenous Studies
scholars suggest that sovereignty is inappropriate for Indigenous political theory and
material struggles. Analyzing the Marshall Trilogy, Robert Williams asserts that legal
arrangements of sovereignty for Indigenous people depend upon white supremacist
constructions of Indigeneity that serve to limit, contain, and incorporate Indigenous
communities within a colonial juridical order.64 An example of this is how Marshall
described tribes as weaker nations that require protection and safety from stronger
nations. Aileen Moreton-Robinson refers to the logic and structure of this construction as
patriarchal white possessiveness.65 In such an order, the legal position of “Native
sovereignty is not necessarily an oppositional stance in relation to the settler state”
because this form is recognized and granted through the allegedly supreme political
authority of settler nation-states.66 This demonstrates “the limitations of the settler state’s
recognition of indigenous sovereignty—this recognition constrains people’s exercise of
sovereignty and limits their self-determination to those forms deemed permissible by
federal courts and government agencies.”67 In response, some have argued that
sovereignty is an incongruous construct for Indigenous liberation. Articulating
Indigenous political struggles through settler-state constructions and acknowledgements
of sovereignty can be “co-opted by oppressive forms of governance that reproduce
Western models of statehood.”68 Phrasing it differently, “To frame the struggle to achieve
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justice in terms of indigenous ‘claims’ against the state is implicitly to accept the fiction
of state sovereignty.”69 Belief that political authority is bestowed by the settler-state onto
Indigenous people, in this argument’s logic, is to believe in the state sovereignty of
settler-nations and be complicit in manifesting it. “[T]he colonized will begin to identify
with ‘white liberty and white justice,’” Glen Sean Coulthard argues.70 Turning away from
settler-state apprehension of Indigenous sovereignty, Coulthard recommends a rejection
of the colonial politics of recognition and encourages resurgence of specific, local, and
holistic theories of Indigenous political authority.
The debates on sovereignty in Indigenous Studies are reflected in Hawaiian
Studies. Hawaiian legal studies is incredibly illustrative of this. David Keanu Sai’s
comprehensive legal research on Hawaiian sovereignty has become a dominant fixture in
the field.71 His thesis is that the Hawaiian Kingdom’s state sovereignty persists. For Sai,
sovereignty is an international legal construct, associated with Vattel’s extension of
Westphalian sovereignty, that defines the supreme administration of internal jurisdiction
over a demarcated territory, which constitutes a legitimate nation-state when recognized
by other nation-states. Hawaiian sovereignty in this estimation is a national expression of
Hawaiian state sovereignty. Sai’s argument effectively calls into question and unsettles
US jurisdiction in Hawai‘i. When the Hawaiian Kingdom’s government was overthrown
on January 17, 1893, instantiating a formal occupation of the Hawaiian state’s territory, it
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did not extinguish the Hawaiian Kingdom’s national sovereignty. Instead, he argues that
the Hawaiian nation-state continues to exist in continuity but under an illegal, prolonged,
and belligerent US military occupation. For him, international law is the legal terrain for
properly comprehending and exercising Hawaiian sovereignty. Employing international
legal theories of classical realism and reverse power differential, he suggests that the
Hawaiian state still possesses and asserts national sovereignty in three primary ways:
international treaties that the Hawaiian Kingdom entered into throughout the 19th century
recognize Hawaiian state sovereignty;72 Hawaiian state sovereignty has not been
extinguished but come under illegal occupation by the US military;73 an acting
government of the Hawaiian state has asserted sovereignty, and been recognized, in
international courts.74 Undoubtedly, Sai’s extensive work aids me in understanding
Hawaiian national sovereignty for my analysis of the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea.
Claiming national sovereignty of the Hawaiian state continues, Sai criticizes
perspectives on Indigeneity and Indigenous sovereignty in Hawaiian Studies. In his terse
reading of Sally Engle Merry’s Colonizing Hawai‘i, Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo‘ole
Osorio’s Dismembering Lāhui, and Noenoe K. Silva’s Aloha Betrayed, Sai contends that
their scholarship naturalizes a colonial and postcolonial interpretation of Hawaiian
sovereignty in history.75 The view renders the Hawaiian Kingdom to be a “vanquished
aspirant that ultimately succumbed to U.S. power through colonization and superior
force…A failed experiment that could not compete with nor survive against dominant
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structures of western power.”76 This view, which he calls paradigmatic, centers Kānaka
Maoli in historical analysis of Hawaiian sovereignty. Sai flags the centering of Kānaka
Maoli to be ethnocentric because the Hawaiian state is not only comprised of Kanaka
Maoli citizens. The problem for him is that historical research on colonization in Hawai‘i
subordinates the legal construction of state sovereignty in place for those on Indigenous
sovereignty. Therefore, Sai provocatively writes:
These views only serve to bolster a history of domination by the United States
that further relegates the native Hawaiian, as an indigenous group of people, to a
position of inferiority and at the same time elevates the United States to a position
of political and legal superiority, notwithstanding the United States’ recognition
of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a co-equal sovereign State and a subject of
international law. Indigenous sovereignty, being a subject of United States
domestic law, had become the lens through which Hawai’i’s [sic] legal and
political history is filtered.77
He contends that discourse on colonialism and postcolonialism in Hawaiian Studies
highlights the Indigeneity of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi. In it, ‘Ōiwi Indigeneity is positioned as a
condition of inferiority. That is, to identify as an Indigenous person is to be made inferior
to citizen-subjects of the nation-state. ‘Ōiwi Indigeneity is further inferiorized through the
supremacy of the US nation-state and its legal and political framework on Indigenous
rights to tribal sovereignty. As a result, he argues that Kanaka Maoli claims to
Indigeneity and Indigenous sovereignty hinder the national sovereignty of the Hawaiian
state. Moving from Hawaiian Studies to the Hawaiian sovereignty movement in the late
20th century, Sai suggests that Kanaka Maoli activists found parallels with Indigenous
struggles across the globe because of shared histories in colonialism.78 The historical
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convergence on Indigenous struggles for sovereignty came into preeminence at this time
when the United Nations fashioned rights to self-determination and decolonization after
World War II. State sovereignty and international law then appeared as colonial
instruments for snuffing out Indigenous political authority. As though unbecoming, Sai
reflects, “It became common practice for Native Hawaiians to associate themselves with
the plight of Native Americans and other ethnic minorities throughout the world who had
been colonized and dominated by Europe or the United States.”79 Sharing histories of
political struggle, he posits, muddied legal distinctions. Representations of Kānaka Maoli
as Indigenous people with claims to sovereignty and self-determination became
incorporated into US state and federal law and mobilized for UN rights.80 According to
Sai, these political maneuvers have swindled Hawaiian Studies and the Hawaiian
sovereignty movement into legitimating Indigenous sovereignty for Kānaka Maoli at the
expense of Hawaiian national sovereignty. In his condemnation, Indigeneity forecloses
state sovereignty and Indigenous sovereignty is antithetical to national sovereignty.
The international legal approach to sovereignty, made paradigmatic by Sai, forges
a Hawaiian state exceptionalism. In this form of exceptionalism, the national sovereignty
of the Hawaiian state persists in the 21st century and shapes a legal basis for the continued
existence of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Other constructions and claims of sovereignty are
inappropriate, incompetent, and inferior. According to the international legal doctrines
and laws of occupation that Sai champions, Hawaiian state sovereignty is superior to
tribal and Indigenous expressions of sovereignty. This ideology of state nationalism has
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been wielded in nefarious ways. In Sai’s research, he contends that some Kanaka Maoli
scholars and activists have relied on US and UN frameworks of Indigenous rights to
sovereignty and self-determination. “At both these levels,” he writes, “indigenous
peoples were not viewed as sovereign states, but rather ‘any stateless group’ residing
within the territorial dominions of existing sovereign states.”81 Indigeneity is a political
category equated to legal statelessness. In contrast, Hawaiian state sovereignty focuses on
self-governance, independence, possession of sovereignty, multi-ethnic citizenship,
international laws of occupation, and protocols for deoccupation. Indigeneity disparages
and taints Kānaka Maoli as non-self-governing, dependent on the US government,
seeking sovereignty, ethnocentric, colonized, and appealing for decolonization.82 One
consequence of the bifurcation is that Native American tribes and Indigenous peoples
across the globe who claim Indigenous sovereignty become universalized as incapable of
self-governance, domestic dependent wards of states, dispossessed of sovereign political
authority, exclusive through ethnocentrism, naturally colonized, and legally inferior.
“The emphasis in international law on nation-state formations predicates that indigenous
peoples,” Byrd writes, “remain still colonized liminally within and beside the established
geopolitical and biopolitical borders and institutions of (post)colonial governance as
stateless entities.”83 Sai’s analysis, permeating Hawaiian legal studies on sovereignty,
abjects Indigeneity, Indigenous people, and tribal nations while propping up the national
sovereignty of the Hawaiian state. In the subsequent chapters, my analysis pays attention
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to legal claims to Hawaiian national sovereignty and how they can produce relations of
power steeped in state nationalism and Hawaiian exceptionalism.
For the next part of this section, I turn to think about sovereignty as a practice.
While sovereignty is unabashedly a legal concept that animates state authority,
governance, and power, it is much more. Sovereignty is a multifaceted practice that
Indigenous people and nations engage. In this sense, “many Native peoples have not
rejected the term sovereignty but have redefined it to distinguish indigenous sovereignty
from state power.”84 Indigenous sovereignty signifies an expression of power that
wrestles legal constructions away from the command and operations of state power.
Therefore, Indigenous sovereignty is a practice of Indigenous power. In her commentary
on sovereignty as an articulation, Frances Negrón-Muntaner contends, “Political
communities subject to settler- and/or colonial state authority have often drawn from
alternative epistemologies and infused the notion of sovereignty with different meanings
and practices, as they pose a challenge to the very legitimacy, logic, and foundations of
settler-state sovereign power.”85 With historical, political, and legal baggage, Indigenous
people have mobilized sovereignty in innovative ways that reshape its substance and
implication for Indigenous communities as well as the settler-state. The appropriation
imparts sovereignty with particular ways of knowing and being from communities
articulating it. “It is also often an epistemological and ontological concept,” NegrónMuntaner notes, “an affirmation of indigenous political traditions and governance
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systems and a critique of power that has converted (legal) acts of indigenous
dispossession into acts of resistance, creativity, and/or refusal.”86 In this section, I look at
literature on Indigenous politics in Hawaiian Studies for discussions of ea, a unique
Kanaka ‘Ōiwi practice of sovereignty. While I am interested in investigating the various
legal frameworks on sovereignty and Kanaka Maoli claims to it within them, this
dissertation also explores how Kanaka Maoli artists and activists articulate sovereignty
beyond law and the settler-state. Meaning breath, life, to rise, as well as independence,
autonomy, and sovereignty in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i, ea is an enunciation that surpasses settlerstate power and its legal technologies. I follow Negrón-Muntaner’s call “to think about
sovereignty in the contemporary juncture requires an awareness of what can be called
geographies of sovereignty, the diverse geopolitical and discursive locations in (and
through) which the concept of sovereignty is called on to imagine, enact, or limit certain
political possibilities.”87 Attending to this, I acknowledge the legal epistemes of
sovereignty while carving out methodological and analytical space to (make) sense (of)
sovereignty otherwise. Indigenous sovereignty matters in law and policy as well as
history, writing, bodies, and much more.88
Emerging from ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i, ea describes an active set of practices that signify
diverse forms of sovereignty. In her groundbreaking study of mele (songs) about the lāhui
Hawai‘i (people and nation of Hawai‘i), Leilani Basham suggests that ea holds a
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multiplicity of meanings in its articulation.89 The word, organized through Kanaka ‘Ōiwi
epistemology and ontology, does not translate tidily from ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i to English as
sovereignty. Instead, ea has come to symbolize sovereignty. Although it means breath,
life, and to rise, these meanings have been infused with political and legal notions of
autonomy, independence, and sovereignty. In A Nation Rising, Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua argues
that ea is “an active state of being.”90 It is an embodied practice, evolving over time and
space, for “the mutual interdependence of all life forms and forces.”91 This is an
expansive conceptualization of sovereignty that is centered on interdependent
independence. The sovereignty of the people and nation depends upon the sovereignty of
the land, and vice versa. “Like breathing,” Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua says, “ea cannot be
achieved or possessed; it requires constant action day after day, generation after
generation.”92 Passed through genealogical successions, it has emerged as a philosophy
and ethic that undergirds Kanaka Maoli movements for life, land, and sovereignty. In this
dissertation, I examine how diverse practices of sovereignty, which collectively work on
and against dominant notions of sovereignty, produce a unified Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of
ea. My hope in this endeavor is to shift the conceptual register in Hawaiian Studies, and
the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, away from sovereignty’s normative strivings.93 As
a guiding philosophy and ethic, ea is distinctively equipped to do so.
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Although the national sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom has overdetermined
ea, it has been practiced as an Indigenous form of sovereignty for Kānaka Maoli. After a
foreign incursion that threatened to seize the national sovereignty of the Hawaiian
government came to close in 1843, Kauikeaouli, the third Mō‘ī (monarch and ruler) of
the Hawaiian Kingdom, proclaimed: ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i ka pono. The common
translation of this phrase is: the life and sovereignty of the land is perpetuated in
righteousness. Kauikeaouli’s proclamation became the official motto of the Hawaiian
Kingdom, which was recognized as an independent nation-state by Britain and France in
the Anglo-French Proclamation, only a few months later. The Anglo-French
Proclamation is the foundational international treaty that Hawaiian legal scholars
reference to claim the persistence of Hawaiian state sovereignty. This interpretation,
however, has overdetermined ea through state nationalism. According to J. Kēhaulani
Kauanui, “In the Kanaka context, Indigenous sovereignty has yet to be properly
documented let alone theorized because the legacy of the kingdom overwhelms Hawaiian
political genealogies.”94 Rethinking the Hawaiian Kingdom’s state nationalism, Kauanui
examines the film Hawai‘i: A Voice for Sovereignty. She tracks an important revision to
the common interpretation of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s official motto. Captured in the
film, during a community event to celebrate the international recognition of the Hawaiian
Kingdom’s national sovereignty, scholar and activist Kaleikoa Ka‘eo reflected on
Kauikeaouli’s proclamation. He says, “What’s important here in the Hawaiian concept:
ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina. Ke ea o ka ‘āina, the life of the land, the sovereignty of the land
is that very place.” Ka‘eo reiterates the translation of ea and highlights that the Kanaka
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‘Ōiwi understanding of life and sovereignty is linked to land. This tilts the index from
state power toward Indigeneity. Criticizing constructs of state sovereignty from western
jurisprudence and law, he observes, “Hawaiians don’t see that their sovereignty comes
from a particular king. Our sovereignty does not come from a constitution. The
sovereignty doesn’t come from the gun. The sovereignty doesn’t come from arms.”
Ka‘eo suggests that ea does not emanate from Kauikeaouli, his constitution and
monarchical government, or militaristic force. “Sovereignty comes from the land,” he
argues. “So even according to our own cultural understandings,” Ka‘eo concludes, “the
land itself is our sovereignty.” His remarks are reminiscent of the ‘ōlelo no‘eau (wise
saying): he ali‘i ka ‘āina; he kauwā ke kanaka (the ‘āina is ruler; the kanaka are its
servants).95 Ka‘eo demonstrates ea as a Kanaka Maoli practice to cultivate human life,
independence, and sovereignty by maintaining pono or balanced relationships with the
‘āina, which translates not just to land but also that which feeds. In summary of this
reinterpretation, Kauanui claims, “Here we see the potential of Kanaka Maoli indigeneity
to undermine notions of Western state power with a nonproprietary relationship to the
land as the foundation.”96 Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua has also invoked Ka‘eo’s reinterpretation,
which Basham shares further,97 through ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i and Kanaka Maoli epistemology
and ontology. Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua writes that this “has called our attention to the fact that
the king did not reaffirm the sovereignty of the government (ke ea o ke aupuni) but rather
the sovereignty of the life of the land itself (ke ea o ka ‘āina), to which Kanaka are
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inextricably connected.”98 Ea came to represent national sovereignty of the Hawaiian
state in the 1840s when Kanaka Maoli leaders, like Kauikeaouli and many others, sought
to protect political autonomy in Hawai‘i by selectively appropriating western ideas and
tools of statecraft.99 But, the Indigenous Hawaiian practice of ea, which Ka‘eo and
Basham establish and Kauanui and Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua analyze, predates the Hawaiian
Kingdom’s constitutional monarchy and statist expression of sovereignty. It is a practice
that supplants the spatialized temporality of state power in the Hawaiian Kingdom and
US settler-state of Hawai‘i.
Ea exists outside of Eurocentric constructs of sovereignty, the nation-state, and
law, and refers to active Kanaka Maoli practices that signify diverse enunciations of
sovereignty. For instance, Kanaka Maoli sovereignty takes shape from the ea of the ‘āina.
Looking at an article from August 12, 1871 in Ka Nupepa Kuokoa, a 19th century
Hawaiian-language newspaper, Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua highlights the published speech of an
‘Ōiwi orator who questioned the import of ea. In his speech, Davida K. Kahalemaile—
whose name I am proud to share—queried his audience about the day that Kauikeaouli
uttered his famous proclamation, which became known as Lā Ho‘iho‘i Ea (Sovereignty
Restoration Day). Kahalemaile asked, “Heaha la ke ano o ia hopunaolelo, ‘Ka la i
hoihoiia mai ai ke Ea o ko Hawaii Pae Aina’? (What is the meaning of this phrase, ‘The
day the ea of the Hawaiian archipelago was returned’?)”100 Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua identifies
that Kahalemaile posed this rhetorical question and answered it with an enumerated list.
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He said, “1. Ke ea o na i-a, he wai. 2. Ke ea o ke kanaka, he makani. 3. O ke ea o ka
honua, he kanaka…4. Ke ea o ka moku, he hoeuli…5. Ke ea o ko Hawaii Pae Aina…Oia
no ka noho Aupuni ana. (1. The ea of the fish is water. 2. The ea of humans is wind. 3.
The ea of the earth is the people…4. The ea of a boat is the steering blade…5. The ea of
the Hawaiian archipelago, it is the government.)”101 A kind of call and response,
Kahalemaile discussed ea as a central rubric for the interdependence of life and
sovereignty in Hawai‘i. The water provides ea for fish. The wind gives ea to humans.
People are the ea of earth. The steering blade of boats is ea. The Hawaiian government
breathes ea into the islands of Hawai‘i. In essence, ea is a cornerstone for survival where
people flourish by maintaining the responsibility to keep the whole ecosystem balanced
and healthy. Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua incisively argues:
The list culminates with the statement that the ea of Hawai‘i is its independent
government. The holiday celebrates the return of life to that government in the
wake of a threat to its very survival. In this list, then, Kahalemaile emphasizes
that ea is necessary for life and that political independence is necessary for the
well-being of the people. Yet he also shows how the meanings of ea surpass statebased forms of sovereignty.102
Moreton-Robinson’s comprehensive definition of Indigenous sovereignty, from the
geopolitical context of Australia, helps to frame the Kanaka Maoli sovereignty articulated
through ea. She posits, “Our sovereignty is embodied, it is ontological (our being) and
epistemological (our ways of knowing), and it is grounded within complex relations
derived from the intersubstantiation of ancestral beings, humans and land. In this sense,
our sovereignty is carried by the body and differs from Western constructions of
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sovereignty.”103 Indigenous practices of sovereignty in Hawai‘i align with her particular
yet capacious definition. “Moreton-Robinson’s theory of Indigenous sovereignty is
relevant to Hawai‘i since Indigenous Kanaka sovereignty (premonarchical) also happens
to be widely understood as embodied,” Kauanui observes, “grounded within complex
relations among and between myriad deities, humans, ancestral beings, the land, and all
of the natural world ties.”104 Kauanui’s claim that ea is an embodied practice within a
system of genealogical kin relations across human and more-than-human subjects is
indeed exemplified by Kahalemaile’s speech.
In this dissertation, ea provides a holistic orientation for examining Kanaka Maoli
legal claims, historical negotiations, and diverse articulations of sovereignty, especially
as they can be practiced beyond the US settler-state and its legal orbit. The claims,
negotiations, and articulations of national and Indigenous Hawaiian sovereignties that I
study constitute what I call the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea, which collectively reflects
the diversity of strategies and tactics within the Hawaiian sovereignty movement. This
provides a more robust angle for studying sovereignty in Hawai‘i. “It is not enough to
claim you are sovereign as Indigenous,” Joanne Barker writes, “you must be accountable
to the kinds of Indigeneity the sovereignty you claim asserts.”105 Although ea exists
outside of the US settler-state and its law, the fight over federal recognition, nationbuilding, and astronomy industry development is undeniably conducted on the temporal
and spatial borders of the liberal democratic settler-state. The Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of
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ea, then, represents a third space of sovereignty in which the battle for liberation is waged
in “political struggle that occurs on, across, and against the boundaries of American
politics.”106 Gifts of sovereignty presented in these sites of struggle reside “neither simply
inside nor outside the American political system but rather exists on these very
boundaries, exposing both the practices and the contingencies of American colonial
rule.”107 As such, the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea can seem quite strange, appearing
almost out-of-time and out-of-place within the normative frames of sovereignty. In this
sense, there is something queer, or odd and non-normative, about ea that helps to grasp a
collective unity in the gifts of sovereignty.
In the final part of this section, I trace scholarship from Queer of Color Studies
and Queer Indigenous Studies to consider sovereignty as a disidentification. The
literature in these fields offer conceptual tools for understanding how the gifts that I
examine in this dissertation disidentify with sovereignty. Issuing responsibility to balance
relations, the gifts work on and against dominant ideologies of sovereignty to create
alternative futures and worlds. While they are practiced in particular ways and sites, they
maintain a collective unity through their disidentificatory performance. I discuss queer
theories for how they offer a way out of sovereignty’s normativity, providing a necessary
bridge between the legal constructions and embodied practices that may seem
incommensurate. This is a queering of sovereignty that I hope can sustain Hawaiian legal
studies on sovereignty and the Indigenous politics of ea as co-constitutive rather than
mutually exclusive. Therefore, queer theory assists me in reading Kanaka Maoli claims,
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negotiations, and articulations of sovereignty as unique disidentifications with
sovereignty that collectively perform and produce the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea.
In Disidentifications, José Esteban Muñoz details that minoritarian subjects—
racialized, gendered, and sexualized peoples measured against the majoritarian public—
face three modes of subjectivization.108 In the first mode, subjects identify with dominant
discourses and ideologies. In the second, subjects outright reject them.
“Disidentification,” Muñoz suggested, “is the third mode of dealing with dominant
ideology, one that neither opts to assimilate within such a structure nor strictly opposes
it.”109 As a performative practice, he elucidated how minoritarian subjects work on and
against the power of ideology. Disidentification is a strategy of survival within
minoritizing and oppressive regimes of power. Specifically, Muñoz theorized
disidentification as an embodied performance for imagining and actualizing queer utopias
as alternatives to majoritarian theories, publics, and power. What if we began to think of
practices of Indigenous sovereignty as embodied performances that work on and against
western theories, settler publics, and colonial state power for imagining and actualizing
alternatives to the regimes of power that animate dominant ideologies of sovereignty?
“Instead of buckling under the pressures of dominant ideology (identification,
assimilation) or attempting to break free of its inescapable sphere (counteridentification,
utopianism),” Muñoz wrote, “this ‘working on and against’ is a strategy that tries to
transform a cultural logic from within, always laboring to enact permanent structural
change while at the same time valuing the importance of local or everyday struggles of
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resistance.”110 This theory aids me understanding how the gifts that I examine in this
project disidentify with sovereignty as a local, everyday strategy of resistance and
survival while simultaneously laboring to enact permanent structural change. Looking at
an assortment of critical theories on subject formation, ideology, and power, Muñoz
synthesized that rebelling against dominant ideological forces, hailing and interpellating
subjects, cannot be reduced to the work of a “bad subject” who ought to strive toward
becoming a “good subject.” Instead, failing to be intelligible in the theater of
apprehension can be liberating. There are of course contradictions on the ideological
stage, such as those played out in debates about sovereignty. But “like a melancholic
subject holding on to a lost object, a disidentifying subject works to hold on to this object
and invest it with new life.”111 The imbuing of fresh life for an alternative world signals
critical hope for something better. It is a practice of creating different futures. Thus,
disidentification is a temporal performance. “This building takes place in the future and
in the present,” Muñoz noted, “which is to say that disidentificatory performance offers a
utopian blueprint for a possible future while, at the same time, staging a new political
formation in the present.”112 In subsequent work, he expanded on this queering of time.
Muñoz claimed in Cruising Utopia that gay pragmatism, manufactured in Queer
Studies and queer activism, produces a discourse of antirelationality and antiutopianism
that shuts down possibilities and potentialities for utopic relationality in place for the here
and now.113 This antirelationality and antiutopianism is loosely mirrored in Hawaiian
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legal studies, which typically views sovereignty in opposition to Indigeneity and suggests
they cannot exist together. Arguing against this, Muñoz contended that the here and now
should be replaced for imagining then and there, a queer futurity that refuses racialized,
gendered trappings of heteronormative time. In the here and now contrived by Sai, this
trapping occurs through state pragmatisim. The sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom
flows from a temporal power, bracketing the Indigenous subject in an anachronistic
condition of inferiority wherein the reproduction of legitimate nations and international
progress toward global modernity are stymied. Differently, a then and there is “a longing
that propels us onward, that thing that lets us feel that this world is not enough, that
indeed something is missing.”114 Queerness is a future-dawning tense that critiques the
present by considering pasts and potentially possible futures. Muñoz said, “The here and
now is a prison house. We must strive, in the face of the here and now’s totalizing
rendering of reality, to think and feel a then and there.”115 This queer utopia maintains a
positive valence and negative function; it is a forward projection that forges critique.
Glimpses of queer utopia function to refuse the here and now for a then and there.
Perhaps it is a way to consider how critiques of state nationalism that undergird
international legal claims to Hawaiian sovereignty may actually project the lāhui forward.
“The here and now is simply not enough,” Munõz elaborated, “queerness should and
could be about a desire for another way of being in both the world and time, a desire that
resists mandates to accept that which is not enough.”116 In this sense, the state
pragmatism that creates Hawaiian exceptionalism is not enough. Ea is an active, diverse
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practice for another way of knowing our sovereignty and for another way of being
sovereign. There is a glimpse of queerness in Indigenous sovereignty, as it can work on
and against legal constructions of sovereignty, practicing and performing alternatives that
interrupt colonial normativities of time and space. This is a flux whereby the here and
now can be transcended by a then and there. It is a temporal disorganization, which is
explored throughout the proceeding chapters, that reconfigures how we belong, relate,
and see collective (queer) potentiality amidst (heteronormative time’s) hopelessness. 117
Juana María Rodríguez puts Muñoz’s arguments into direct conversation with
sovereignty.118 She makes explicit connections between Queer of Color Studies and
Queer Indigenous Studies, which are indispensable for my queer reading of Hawaiian
sovereignty. In Sexual Futures, Rodríguez critiques settler-state power by highlighting
queer Latina gestures of sexual sovereignty in Puerto Rico. She likens sexual sovereignty
to national sovereignty as both exercise self-determination, autonomy, and independence
within relations of power that mediate (non)consensual interactions between bodies,
people, and nations. For example, in 1997, Margarita Sánchez de Léon testified before
the Puerto Rican House of Representatives against a bill proposing to prohibit same-sex
marriage. During her testimony, a representative interrupted Sánchez de Léon to ask if
she was a lesbian. Days later Sánchez de Léon turned herself into the Sexual Crimes
Division of the Justice Department, confessing that she had violated anti-sodomy laws.
However, she was not charged since the anti-sodomy law, named Artículo 103, only
criminalized penetration with a penis. Sánchez de Léon subsequently filed a lawsuit
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against Artículo 103, which set off a time bomb regarding sexual rights and national
sovereignty. After the Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Sanchez (1993),
Puerto Rico submitted to Congress’ plenary power and became subject to US Supreme
Court rulings. However, three days before the Supreme Court handed down its decision
to dismantle the criminalization of sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Puerto
Rican Senate eliminated Artículo 103 from its penal code because of pressure from
Sánchez de Léon and other queer Latina activists. Their assertions of sexual sovereignty
compelled statutory change in Puerto Rico before the US settler-state could do so.
Rodríguez argues that “the Senate vote signaled the elimination of Artículo 103 as a
political gesture of self-determination, free from direct U.S. intervention.”119 Queer
Latina activists praised this as victory for the people of Puerto Rico, not for queer
American liberalism. “Admitting to sodomy and surrendering to the state,” Rodríguez
posits, “activists like Sánchez de Léon have redefined the failed masculinity of the nation
as an empowered femininity that affirms the power and pleasure possible through a
gesture of submission, a submission that engulfs, transforms, and redeploys that which
sought to subjugate it.”120 It was a submission that disidentified with Puerto Rican
sovereignty to destabilize the heteromasculine normativity of the state. Rodríguez
analyzes an image that depicts Sánchez de Léon with a large smile after the repeal of
Artículo 103. “The smile on her face suggests that she, a confessed sodomite,” she
observes, “took considerable pleasure in fucking with the state.”121 This “fucking with the
state” is sexual sovereignty, working on and against dominant ideologies of sovereignty
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to exercise temporal self-determination over sexual rights. Queer Latina activists fucked
with the state(s) by forcing Puerto Rico’s legislature to repeal the anti-sodomy statute
before the US judiciary could. Longing for a then and there on the island, (national)
Puerto Rican and (Indigenous) Taíno gestures articulated sovereignty exterior to the
juridical power of the US settler-state.
The sexual sovereignty that Rodríguez theorizes is operationalized by what Mark
Rifkin calls Indigenous temporal sovereignty. In Beyond Settler Time, he argues that time
has been used by the US settler-state to cast Indigenous peoples as anomalies in
normative calculations of law and politics.122 Extending queer theorizations by Muñoz
and Rodríguez, Rifkin contends that heteronormative time is actually a temporal frame of
reference structured through settler colonialism. It is settler time. Indigenous
communities are not only anomalous in US settler-state law and politics but also strange
subjects against the backdrop of settler time. “Native landedness and duration,” he
maintains, “appear as something of a queer deviation.”123 The geographic pulse and
momentum of Indigeneity comes across as queer within settler time. Rifkin says, “Native
peoples and sovereignties appear as a temporal aberration within a geography defined by
the normalization of settler law.”124 Indigenous people and their sovereignties index a
cadence that is at odds with the legal territorialization of settler-states. Given this, I
wonder then how Indigenous people might fuck with the state by giving it a rough time?
Specifically, I wonder how Kanaka Maoli claims, negotiations, and articulations of
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sovereignty refuse and submit to settler time? The answer may be located in Indigenous
temporal sovereignties. Drawing upon the work of Audra Simpson and Glen Coulthard in
Indigenous Studies,125 Rifkin posits that Indigenous temporal sovereignty emerges in a
refusal of the colonial here and now. It is an Indigenous and queer refusal that longs for a
decolonized then and there. This is useful for thinking about ea. Ea can be read as an
active practice and embodied performance of Indigenous temporal sovereignty that
refuses the colonial here and now for a decolonized then and deoccupied there in
Hawai‘i. Nevertheless, refusing the settler-state is not tantamount to refusing settler time.
Rifkin adds:
The notion of temporal sovereignty occupies this space of potentiality and
difficulty, partaking of the need to signify Native being-in-time while also
attending to how becoming temporally intelligible to settlers may be the vehicle
for enacting forms of ‘state aggression’ and interpellation. In this way sovereignty
indicates both the need to engage non-Native discourse and expectations (such as
the anachronizing image of static Indianness) and the importance of
acknowledging modes of temporal experience that do not conform to settler
orientations, backgrounds, and frames.126
For instance, Sai’s international legal claims to Hawaiian national sovereignty have
refused the US settler-state’s juridical orbit yet identified the Hawaiian state as a modern
nation by suggesting that Indigeneity is a pre-modern condition of inferiority. This is an
example of settler temporal recognition whereby Indigeneity “serves as a symbol of
backward relations to time, of insurmountable melancholic investments in the past in
contrast to the putative straightnesss of time’s passage.”127 Cutting across eras and
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continents, Sai’s argument sustains the juridical cunning of settler time, produced by
folks like Emer de Vattel and John Marshall.
Disidentifying with sovereignty is simultaneously a disidentification with time. It
is an effort to work on and against dominant ideologies of sovereignty that requires
working on and against settler time, as the prevailing temporal orientation. For
Indigenous peoples and nations, this disidentification is, in it of itself, an articulation of
temporal sovereignty, which entertains placing the Native intelligibly as enduringly
landed while also engaging alternative temporalities that are unintelligible to the settlerstate and its operations of power. It is a strategic practice for everyday resistance and
survival, betwixt oppressive regimes of power, that seeks to create alternative futures and
other worlds. In the following chapters, I use this theorization to grasp how gifts of
sovereignty disidentify with dominant notions of sovereignty and time as a way of
issuing responsibilities for sustaining space. Intervening into Queer of Color Studies,
Queer Indigenous Studies has hoped not only for queer utopia but a decolonial future
accompanied by decolonized methodologies and territories.128 It is not enough to queer
sovereignty, by considering it a disidentification that coalesces legal constructions and
embodied practices of sovereignty, as I have done here. Reading the queerness of
Hawaiian sovereignty, as I am setting out to do, requires “[t]he queer in Indigenous
studies,” which Byrd writes, “challenges the queer of queer studies by offering not an
identity or a figure necessarily, but rather an analytic that helps us relocate subjectivity
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and its refusals back into the vectors of ongoing settler colonialism.”129 In particular,
then, I turn to Queer Indigenous Studies to relocate Indigeneity in theories of
disidentification and to locate Indigenous disidentifications with sovereignty. This assists
me in unpacking how Kanaka Maoli claims, negotiations, and articulations of sovereignty
work on and against sovereignty and time to refuse the historical formation and
contemporary manifestation of settler colonial capitalism in Hawai‘i.
Sovereignty is indispensable yet inadequate for my study of settler colonial
capitalism and the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea. The scholarship in Indigenous Studies
illustrates that sovereignty is a legal construction, animated through an imperial and
colonial matrix of power, which regulates and disciplines Indigenous subjects. In other
words, it has been imposed upon and asserted by Indigenous communities. Research in
Hawaiian legal studies on the national sovereignty of the Hawaiian state demonstrates
this. However, Indigenous Studies shows that sovereignty, despite its juridical
attachments, can be repurposed for practices of Indigenous power. Under the flag of
Westphalian sovereignty, tribal sovereignty, or Indigenous sovereignty, Indigenous
communities reformat sovereignty in ways that rip its command away from state power.
But, as work on Indigenous politics in Hawaiian Studies illuminates, Indigenous
modalities of political authority have come to symbolize sovereignty. Predating the
Hawaiian Kingdom’s internationally recognized state sovereignty, ea is a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi
concept that means breath, life, to rise, and also represents autonomy, independence, and
sovereignty. In this body of literature, ea is a uniquely Kanaka Maoli way of knowing
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sovereignty and being sovereign, centered on active practices for interdependent
independence with the ‘āina in Hawai‘i. In this dissertation project, the legal claims,
historical negotiations, and diverse articulations of Hawaiian sovereignty that I mine
produce the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea. Each of the proceeding chapters highlight gifts
that are entrenched in these claims, negotiations, and articulations of sovereignty. The
gifts work on and against dominant ideologies of sovereignty; they disidentify with
sovereignty. Disidentification theory has taken shape from scholarship in Queer of Color
Studies, and it enables me to read the diversity of strategies and tactics in the Hawaiian
sovereignty movement as a collective unity, rather than division and fragmentation. It is a
queer reading that attempts to fill artificial gaps in the relations between supposedly
separate practices for Hawaiian sovereignty. Put another way, the normative silos and
seemingly natural splits in Hawaiian sovereignty come into closer focus when engaged
through the queer rubric of disidentification. Gifts of sovereignty in struggles against
settler capital, federal recognition, nation-building, and astronomy industry development
share a united performance: they work on and against dominant notions of sovereignty.
As these gifts disidentify with sovereignty, acting out a strategy for resistance and
survival, they also issue responsibilities for balancing relationships in Hawaiʻi. Put
differently, gifts of sovereignty present kuleana for sustaining pono relations with the
‘āina of Hawai‘i. Drawing on revisions in Queer of Color Studies made by Queer
Indigenous Studies, for situating Kanaka Maoli disidentifications with sovereignty and
time, the gifts of sovereignty perform ea in ways that desire and act out alternative futures
and worlds in Hawaiʻi, which ultimately refuse the colonial here and now for a
decolonized then and deoccupied there.
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Chapter 2
Settler Colonial Capitalism in Hawai‘i

On April 27, 1874, a specially-designed mat was given to the Mō‘ī of the
Hawaiian Kingdom. Although the historical archive on it is scant, two prominent
Hawaiian-language newspapers discussed this particular mat in 1874. Ka Nupepa Kuokoa
published an article on April 29 with the headline “HE MOENA PAWEHE MAKANA,”
which means a gift of a patterned mat (see figure 1).130 The article identified that Kala‘i, a
Kanaka ‘Ōiwi master weaver from the island of Ni‘ihau, wove the mat given to the Mō‘ī
at that time, David Kalākaua. Celebrated as an experienced and skilled weaver of
Ni‘ihau, Kala‘i plaited letters into the mat that spell out a brilliant message. It took eleven
months to complete and Kala‘i’s husband assisted in the process but died one month

Figure 1. HE MOENA PAWEHE MAKANA. Source: Ka Nupepa Kuokoa.131
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before it was finished (see figure 2). A noticeable blank space is centered at the top of the
mat, near the message’s conclusion, and it is believed to signify the passing of her
husband. The extent at which he helped in gathering, processing, and weaving is
uncertain. What is clear, based on the timing and placement of the empty space, is that
Kala‘i memorialized him, honoring his relationship to her and likely his labor with her to
produce the mat. Perhaps this absent presence is a symbol of the mourning and urgency

Figure 2. Silhouette of moena pāwehe kūikawā. Source: Bishop Museum.
that connected Kala‘i to her message. This gift was not without (see figure 3). Published
on April 29 with the title “HE MAKANA ANA HOU I KA MOI,” meaning a new type
of gift for the Mō‘ī, an article in Ko Hawaii Ponoi specified that the mat was woven from
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makaloa sedge (see figure 4).132 Makaloa, or cyperus laevigatus, is a renowned perennial
sedge that flourished in 13 fresh and brackish water bogs on Ni‘ihau. Although makaloa
sedge grew on other islands like Kaua‘i, O‘ahu, Maui, Kaho‘olawe, and Hawai‘i, the
mats crafted from it became famously known as moena Ni‘ihau, or Ni‘ihau mats, and
revered the makaloa and wāhine (female) weavers of it that together came from Ni‘ihau
island. Kala‘i’s mat is a testament to the interconnected relationship that Kānaka ‘Ōiwi

Figure 3. Enlargement of empty space centered at top of mat. Source: Bishop Museum.
share with the ‘āina of Hawai‘i. These articles suggested that George S. Gay acquired the
mat, either on Ni‘ihau where his family had settled or Kaua‘i where Kala‘i resided, and
presented it to Kalākaua while passing through O‘ahu.
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Figure 4. HE MAKANA ANA HOU I KA MOI. Source: Ko Hawaii Ponoi.133
Kalākaua received the mat shortly after becoming the second elected Mōʻī of the
Hawaiian Kingdom (see figure 5). Kala‘i intended for the mat to be given to the former
Mō‘ī, William Lunalilo, but he died abruptly and ruled only from 1873 to 1874. Designed
for Lunalilo but presented to Kalākaua, Kala‘i’s textual message inquires about the
degradation of Kānaka Maoli. It narrates how the Kanaka Maoli population decreased
throughout the 19th century alongside governance changes in the Hawaiian Kingdom. The
message concludes by demanding that a specific economic policy—the
institutionalization of animal taxes mandated to be paid in money—should be overturned
to liberate the lāhui from the burden it installed. This burden was the introduction,
adoption, and settlement of capital. The mat did not just critique money and capital but
also the beginning of settler colonization. In the early 1840s, capital activated settler
colonialism in Hawai‘i, coalescing into a system of settler colonial capitalism bent on the
destruction of Kānaka Maoli. As Kala‘i conveyed concern over the Hawaiian Kingdom’s
political economy, this chapter engages in a political economic analysis of the mat and its
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message. Three days after receiving the mat, Kalākaua convened the Hawaiian
Kingdom’s legislature to inaugurate his administration. He initiated his reign as sovereign
under the slogan “Ho‘oulu Lāhui: Increase the Race.” But ho‘oulu lāhui does not
translate simply from ʻōlelo Hawaiʻi to English as increase the race. Ho‘oulu can be
translated as to grow or to protect. When considering that lāhui also means nation,
nationhood, and people, there is more meaning found in Kalākaua’s statement. Hoʻoulu
lāhui is a suggestion to grow the nation(hood) and protect the people. How might we
reinterpret the political slogan ho‘oulu lāhui, which issued a momentous call for Kanaka
Maoli cultural revitalization and nationalism in the late 19th century, in the context of the
gift of a patterned mat that Kalākaua was given just three days before his declaration?
Referred to then as the moena makaloa (makaloa mat) and moena pāwehe (plaited mat),
it has more recently been called moena pāwehe kūikawā, a specially-designed mat.134 In
the opening chapter of this dissertation, I track how Kala‘i fashioned and bequeathed the
moena (mat) as a political economic protest that identified the development and criticized
the violence of settler colonial capitalism in Hawai‘i.135 What exactly was she protesting?
How was the protest articulated and interpreted? How does Kala‘i’s mat demonstrate
ho‘oulu lāhui, growing and protecting the lāhui, as a form of agency in the midst of and
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resistance to encroaching forces of coercion, subjugation, and ruin? These are crucial
questions that I endeavor to answer.

Figure 5. Moena pāwehe kūikawā. Source: Bishop Museum.
I examine Kala‘i’s moena to historicize and theorize the formation of settler
colonial capitalism in Hawai‘i. In the first section of this chapter, I etch out my method to
analyze the moena pāwehe kūikawā. It is a complicated piece of material culture that
requires a nuanced method for analysis. Engaging in an integrated Kanaka ‘Ōiwi method,
I investigate the mo‘olelo (history, story, account) of the moena for its kaona (hidden
meaning). Looking at historiographic and literary scholarship in the field of Hawaiian
Studies, I explain mo‘olelo and kaona, delineating their importance for my analysis of the
moena and its expression of sovereignty. In the second section, I show how settler
colonial capitalism surfaced in Hawaiʻi during the early 1840s, before the
institutionalization of policies that privatized land and enshrined legal forms of property
in the late 1840s. Analyzing the textual message and political economy of the moena, I
map out when and how colonial capitalism settled in Hawai‘i. Complementing an
intricate reading of the moena pāwehe’s plaited text, I analyze Hawaiian-language
58

newspapers published in the late 19th century and archival documents from the Bishop
Museum. Turning to theories of settler colonialism and racial capitalism, settler capital
operationalized the US settler-state in Hawai‘i by consolidating as a structure of power
that could corrode the national sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom and Indigenous
sovereignty of Kānaka Maoli. Studies of Hawaiian sovereignty therein must account for
settler colonial capitalism rather than considering either settler colonialism or capitalism.
In the third section, I explore how Kala‘i’s message woven into the moena has been
distorted. Mining an ethnological study, anthropological knowledge production, and
Marxist discourse on class-struggle, the mat became normalized as a protest against taxes
instituted by greedy, tyrannical, and incompetent ali‘i (rulers) of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
The moena pāwehe was weaponized to deface and mar both national and Indigenous
sovereignty of Kānaka Maoli. In the fourth section, I return to the moena makaloa and
posit that it is not a normative protest of class struggle but, instead, a mo‘olelo with kaona
that identifies how animal taxes were linked to the introduction and adoption of capital as
a way to dispossess Kānaka Maoli of land and eliminate Kānaka Maoli by eradicating
relations to each other and the ‘āina. In her own words, Kala‘i demanded “e hoololi” to
overturn the violent formation of settler colonial capitalism in Hawai‘i. The materiality of
the moena offers another mo‘olelo infused with kaona, which demonstrates that Kala‘i
refused settler colonial capital by practicing aloha ‘āina as a geographic way of being for
cultivating and defending ‘āina. This reveals new insights about the history and praxis of
aloha ‘āina as anti-colonial and anti-capitalist. Kala‘i’s moena is a gift of sovereignty,
which offers a new approach to understanding the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea by
identifying and criticizing settler colonial capitalism.
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In Chapter 1, I contend that settler colonial capital was imposed and adopted in
Hawai‘i during the early 1840s, and settler colonial capitalism developed as a way to
dismantle the national sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Indigenous
sovereignty of Kānaka Maoli. However, I argue that the message and materiality of
Kala‘i’s moena identified settler colonial capital, and its complex operations to
disassemble Kanaka Maoli sovereignties, and creatively sought to overturn how it
became imposed in Hawai‘i and adopted into the governance of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
Moʻolelo and Kaona
Moʻolelo and kaona are Kanaka ‘Ōiwi methods of analysis conceived in
Hawaiian Studies, particularly from the concentrations of Hawaiian historiography and
Hawaiian literary criticism. To begin this section, I position my analysis to intervene
within the field of Hawaiian Studies. After tracking methodological commitments for
moʻolelo and kaona, I explicate how I utilize moʻolelo and kaona to analyze the moena
pāwehe kūikawā. I use them together as an integrated method for the study of Hawaiian
sovereignty not just in the past but in the present and future.
In this chapter, I intervene explicitly into a critical debate that Hawaiian Studies
contends with about agency, resistance, and history. The debate is organized around two
myths produced through colonial historiography. The first myth is that Kānaka Maoli are
disempowered subjects that have been stripped of agency at the hands of colonial
domination.136 Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa and Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwoʻole Osorio write
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about how imperialism and colonialism constrained Kanaka Maoli governance, spiritual
beliefs, and relations with ‘āina.137 But they also point out that Kānaka Maoli
demonstrated agency, as active not passive subjects, within and exterior to oppressive
systems of power like western religion and law. As a more recent example, Noelani
Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua investigates how students and faculty of Hālau Kū Māna, a Hawaiian
culture-based charter school in Honolulu, O‘ahu, exercise pedagogical sovereignty and
educational self-determination despite being measured by curriculum standards of the US
settler-state that are steeped in policies for American assimilation.138 Wrestling
specifically with the question of how Kānaka Maoli have exerted agency within larger
structures of power, Kamanamaikalani Beamer posits that, historically, ali‘i appropriated
western ideas and tools in such a way that maintained agency for Kānaka Maoli and
mana (power and authority) for the lāhui.139 To make this claim, he theorizes a mode of
interpretation called ‘Ōiwi optics, which tries to unsettle studies of Hawaiian history that
have allegedly been conducted through a colonial gaze.140 He states, “I use an ‘Ōiwi
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through a colonial gaze that limits agency for Kānaka Maoli, includes Haunani-Kay
Trask’s From a Native Daughter, Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa’s Native Land and Foreign
Desires, Jon Osorio’s Dismembering Lāhui, and Noenoe Silva’s Aloha Betrayed. I point
this out because it seems to be a misreading of their work. Their scholarship is
theoretically sophisticated and, in fact, mirrors what Beamer identifies as the selective
appropriation that ali‘i performed in developing the statecraft of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s
governance. Although I appreciate Beamer’s desire to tell mo‘olelo outside of
colonialism, his methodology parrots those of some legal studies on sovereignty within
Hawaiian Studies that suggest critiques of colonization and talk of colonialism derail
international legal claims to Hawaiian state sovereignty. Beamer maintains, “The material
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optics as a means to reframe colonial discourse on the Hawaiian Kingdom while
highlighting the ways that ‘Ōiwi engaged foreigners and foreign concepts.”141 An ‘Ōiwi
optic breaks down the myth of passivity by shifting the optical frame, or interpretative
approach, to center the continuity of actions taken by Kānaka Maoli throughout history.
Although I think that Beamer’s argument is an important one, which productively asserts
Kānaka Maoli have not been stripped of agency, I believe there is more complexity to
take into account. I try to emulate such complexity in this chapter. Beamer suggests an
‘Ōiwi optic is not concerned with what haole did to Kānaka Maoli but what “‘Ōiwi did
for themselves.”142 When discussing the perspectivalism of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi geographies of
exploration, David A. Chang writes, “Kānaka could look out at the world from a
standpoint that was confidently centered in their own islands.”143 According to the
epistemological perspectivalism highlighted by Chang, seeing what Kānaka Maoli did for
themselves and what haole did to Kānaka Maoli and Hawai‘i are not mutually exclusive.
I explore how the multiple mo‘olelo produced by Kala‘i, as an agent of knowledge
production, and represented in the moena pāwehe makana, as the innovative medium for
her message, criticize what Kānaka Maoli and haole did.
The second myth is that Kānaka Maoli did not resist cultural erosion and national
disenfranchisement.144 This myth suggests that Kānaka Maoli were not only docile, as the
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first conveys, but they were also benign and benevolent. Dissecting colonization in
Hawai‘i, Noenoe K. Silva observes that scholarship coming out of colonial
historiography established and disseminated the myth of complacency to US
colonialism.145 But, tracing a wide array of Hawaiian-language newspapers from the 19th
and early 20th centuries, she argues that Kānaka Maoli emphatically resisted imperialism,
empire-building, and colonialism. Simply put, Kānaka Maoli did not consent to their
marginalization and disenfranchisement. “The Europeans and Euro-Americans sought to
exploit the land and subjugate the people,” Silva writes, “and the people fought back in a
variety of ways.”146 For example, members of Hui Kālaiʻāina and Hui Aloha ʻĀina—both
male and female branches of these coalitions—organized, collected, and distributed the
Kūʻē Petitions to oppose the proposed US annexation of the Hawaiian islands. Silva
powerfully identifies that the Kūʻē Petitions, signed by more than 38,000 Kānaka Maoli,
including my great-great grandfather C.B. Maile, evince how Kānaka Maoli resisted US
annexation and persuaded the US Senate to vote down a treaty of annexation in 1897.147
Resistance also occurred in covert ways. As white Euro-American subjects acquired
political power in the Hawaiian Kingdom’s government during the 1860s and began
publishing propaganda in newspapers to articulate haole supremacy over Kānaka Maoli,
the lāhui wrote back. Silva suggests that moʻolelo (tales and legends), mele (songs), oli
(chants), and moʻokūʻauhau (genealogies) were published by Kānaka Maoli to resist
representations of inferiority by illustrating the richness of ʻŌiwi ways of life, such as
‘ōlelo Hawaiʻi. In many cases, as I detail in the next part of this section, the moʻolelo,
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mele, oli, and moʻokūʻauhau contained kaona with hidden meanings that rallied anticolonial resistance and were illegible to most haole subjects. Building on Silva’s work,
ku‘ualoha ho‘omanawanui contends that mo‘olelo about the akua (goddesses) Pele and
Hi‘iaka, circulated in Hawaiian-language newspapers between 1860 and 1928, are
literary texts steeped in Hawaiian nationalism that worked to overturn haole
misappropriations and mistranslations of such stories, accounts, and narratives.148 Brandy
Nālani McDougall notes the epic moʻolelo about Pele and Hiʻiaka, as well as those
regarding Papahānaumoku (Earth Mother and foundation that births islands), Wākea (Sky
Father and expansive sky), and the Kumulipo, have been deployed in contemporary
‘Ōiwi literature as a form of what she calls kaona connectivity that emphasizes
genealogical kinship relations and contests historical erasures.149 Kala‘i’s moena pāwehe
kūikawā provides another mo‘olelo of how Kānaka Maoli sustained agency, employed
kaona, and exercised resistance to fight against Euro-American colonization and, as I will
demonstrate, settler colonial capitalism.
Mo‘olelo provides an ‘Ōiwi method for analyzing histories, stories, and
accounts. In their edited collection discussing research tools for Kānaka ‘Ōiwi, KatrinaAnn R. Kapā‘anaokalāokeola Nākoa Oliveira and Erin Kahunawaika‘ala Wright suggest
that mo‘olelo is a concept, reflecting our own epistemology and ontology, which operates
both as method and methodology.150 The term mo‘olelo itself “describes what is felt and
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thought about ancient times. Mo‘olelo as a text category allows for the flow of this
account to be unabashedly personal and emotional as well as scholarly.”151 Although
mo‘olelo literally means history, story, and account when translated from ʻōlelo Hawaiʻi,
mo‘olelo functions concomitantly as a method to analyze the histories, stories, and
accounts of Kānaka Maoli. “To rethink the Native Hawaiian past,” writes Kanalu G.
Terry Young, “is to assert the doing of mo‘olelo.”152 This offers me an active framework
for tracking historical documents, stories entrenched in material culture, and narrative
accounts in texts, which have been authored by Kānaka Maoli for Kānaka Maoli in our
own ‘ōlelo makuahine (mother tongue). A mo‘olelo method enables me to read the
histories, stories, and accounts presented by the moena pāwehe kūikawā, particularly as
they are represented in the text and materiality of the moena since it is a woven piece of
material culture that contains a textual message plaited in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i.
Mo‘olelo also offers an alternative reading of history. Methodologically, it
decenters and disrupts colonial historiography, which has spawned marginalizing myths
about the lāhui. For example, employing mo‘olelo as an analytical tool, Kame‘eleihiwa
recodes the narrative, produced and normalized through western historiography, that the
Hawaiian Kingdom’s Māhele of 1848 was a governmental policy that failed maka‘āinana
(commoners and citizens) because ali‘i divided up lands and instituted rights for haole to
purchase and own land. Instead, Kame‘eleihiwa shows it was an attempt by the ali‘i to
share ea and mana with maka‘āinana, rather than a policy to divide or damage the lāhui.
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This is what Beamer might call “giv[ing] voice to a story outside of colonialism.”153
Mo‘olelo, I suggest, facilitates an interpretation of history, on one hand, to signal that
Kānaka Maoli endured the past and persisted into the present and, on the other hand, to
imagine futures beyond colonial understandings of time and settler colonial temporalities.
“A proper mo‘olelo,” Osorio says, “delivers lessons from the past that ought to guide our
present behavior.”154 Extending the idea that mo‘olelo are contoured by the past yet
future-oriented, Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua argues, “In looking to the past, we inform the
decisions and commitments that will shape our futures.”155 I utilize this framework to
appropriately analyze the mo‘olelo of Kala‘i’s moena not just because it comes out of
material culture from the 19th century but because this is a mo‘olelo that should guide our
present and inform our futures. Claiming mo‘olelo is a crucial methodology for
transformation, Kaiwipunikauikawēkiu Lipe maintains, “It is critical to listen to mo‘olelo
as they are told, to share mo‘olelo with others, and to use those mo‘olelo to learn, teach,
connect, and make sense of the world.”156 Indeed, the preceding chapters are guided and
informed by Kala‘i’s transformative mo‘olelo—a profound gift. Viewed this way,
mo‘olelo disturb and exceed colonial and settler colonial notions of time, which bracket
Indigenous people as passive, consenting, and anachronistic subjects that are always
already disappearing, vanishing, and dying,157 by demonstrating how Kānaka Maoli have
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survived. Osorio laments, “History should instruct the living, not merely memorialize the
dead.”158 Reading and sharing mo‘olelo is not simply about remembering our past but
also analyzing the ways that our lāhui continues to thrive. As this orientation illuminates,
mo‘olelo with kaona like that of Kala‘i’s moena elucidate that settler colonialism, despite
operating as a pervasive system of power, is a project that fails to fully dispossess,
replace, and eliminate Kānaka ‘Ōiwi.
Kaona is another method that I use. Kaona functions for me as a Kanaka Maoli
reading practice to interpret veiled messages and hidden meanings imbued within the
moena pāwehe kūikawā. Mary Kawena Pukui and Samuel H. Elbert define kaona as
“hidden meaning, as in Hawaiian poetry; concealed reference, as to a person, thing or
place; [and] words with double meanings.”159 Extending their definition to claim kaona is
a comparative historical method, Noelani Arista reflects that “paying attention to kaona
in my translation of Hawaiian texts, I was especially moved by the way in which
Hawaiian composers actively selected their words, reaching for the interconnected
meanings and contexts evoked by words across a spectrum of Hawaiian oral traditions
and handwritten and published texts.”160 The crafting of kaona is moving for its intricacy
and miscellany. But kaona is not just complex and diverse; it is also political. Silva states,
“An awareness of the political functions of kaona, especially the possibilities for veiled
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communication, helps in analyzing the words and actions of the Kanaka Maoli.”161 The
linguistic interconnectedness and multiplicity of kaona has “presented even greater
opportunities to express anticolonial sentiments.”162 Such anticolonial sentiment could be
expressed without detection. Considering how kaona is unintelligible to most haole
subjects, ho‘omanawanui says, “This is why Kanaka ‘Ōiwi-produced texts can be read as
political strategies embodying resistance, especially as they involve cultural and
linguistic coding in multiple ways, including the use of mele, kaona, and so forth. This
strategy of resistance worked because it was well excecuted, playing to dismissive
colonial attitudes that wrote off mo‘olelo.”163
Kaona allows me to analyze the mat’s mo‘olelo, which is critical of both settler
colonialism and capitalism, and yet concealed from their structural recognition and grids
of intelligibility. Analyzing the mele “Kaulana Nā Pua” written for Lili‘uokalani, the
Mō‘ī of the Hawaiian Kingdom after Kalākaua, during her imprisonment by the white
supremacist oligarchy backed by US military forces, Haunani-Kay Trask details that the
kaona in this mele eluded haole subjects trying to suppress resistance. 164 Trask recalls an
academic discussion with a haole historian in which he suggested there was no real
evidence that Kānaka Maoli opposed US annexation.165 To refute this claim, she
presented lyrics from “Kaulana Nā Pua” written by Ellen Keho‘ohiwaokalani Wright
Prendergast. Trask invokes a specific passage that states:
Kaulana nā pua aʻo Hawaiʻi
Kūpaʻa ma hope o ka ʻāina
161
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Hiki mai ka ʻelele o ka loko ʻino
Palapala ʻānunu me ka pākaha
ʻAʻole aʻe kau i ka pūlima
Ma luna o ka pepa o ka ʻēnemi
Hoʻohui ʻāina kūʻai hewa
I ka pono sivila aʻo ke kanaka.
When translated, these lyrics say:
Famous are the children of Hawai‘i
Who cling steadfastly to the land
Comes the evil-hearted
With a document greedy for plunder
Do not put the signature
On the paper of the enemy
Annexation is wicked sale
Of the civil rights of the Hawaiian people.166
As the mele’s underlying message eluded haole (foreigners and settlers) initiating
military occupation of Hawai‘i, its kaona escaped the haole historian. He “answered that
this song, although beautiful, was not evidence of either opposition or of imperialism
from the Hawaiian perspective.”167 Although the spoken lyrics in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i seem
beautiful—a racialized, gendered, and sexualized construction of exoticism—the
meaning, without translation, is not interpreted as resistance. What is striking about this
example is how Trask shows that kaona antagonizes the recognition, gaze, and system of
colonial power. In this chapter, I add that kaona also antagonizes capitalist relations of
power. Importantly then, kaona requires kuleana to interpret messages and find meanings.
ho‘omanawanui suggests that kaona functions as a meiwi (poetic device), which “places
kuleana on the audience not just to make their own meaning from a text, but also to
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extract the layers of intended meaning; there is an expectation on the writer’s part that
context and meaning can be constructed by their audience with minimal explanation.”168
This is precisely why McDougall claims kaona as an interpretative method based in
genealogy, kinship relations, and collectivity inasmuch as it is a creative one for
composing furtive meanings. For her, “The term ‘kaona connectivity’ describes how
kaona, as a practice, requires us to connect with our kūpuna [ancestors] as well as each
other.”169 Reading for these historical yet contemporary connections is a key ingredient to
my integrated method. Most studies reading for kaona within mo‘olelo mine textual
materials, from mele to oli and other kinds of palapala (literary documents). Aside from
important research on the performance of hula (dance) done by Silva as well as Renee
Pualani Louis and Maya L. Kawailanaokeawaiki Saffery,170 few studies have examined
how kaona is articulated in materiality whether via (human) performance or (more-thanhuman) matter. Employing mo‘olelo and kaona as methods to investigate Hawaiian
history, my analysis contributes to the vast, vibrant body of historical and literary work in
Hawaiian Studies by looking at the mo‘olelo of the moena pāwehe makana as material
culture embedded with kaona in both its textuality and materiality.
Moena Pāwehe Makana
The moena pāwehe makana contains an elaborate mo‘olelo entrenched with kaona
to change taxes on animals to overturn the imposition and adoption of capital and its
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ordering system of settler colonial capitalism. Approximately 7-feet wide and 6-feet tall,
there are five horizontal panels connected vertically with 1,253 woven characters. Sitting
at a diagonal angle and read from left to right upwards, the letters spell out Kala‘i’s
message. I want to think outside the dominant discourse about this message, which, as I
elaborate in the following section, alleges the mat advocates proletarian revolution. But
rather than omitting Marxism from my analysis, I promiscuously and selectively
appropriate it. My theoretical promiscuity avoids the colonial trap that isolates
Indigenous knowledge production away from other formations of knowledge and opens
up other scholarship, fields of study, and theories for our use.171 Specifying the
methodological move, Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua posits that selective promiscuity, “draw[s]
heavily on our ‘Ōiwi lineage” while “selectively bring[ing] in other lineages or thinkers
who provide us with traction to move the lāhui forward.”172 While using mo‘olelo and
kaona to analyze the moena, I selectively draw on Marxism as well as theories of settler
colonialism and racial capitalism, to provide more traction to move the lāhui forward.
This contributes to what Byrd argues is Indigenous critical theory, which draws upon
“indigenous epistemologies and the specificities of the communities and cultures from
which it emerges and then looks outward to engage European philosophical, legal, and
cultural traditions in order to build upon all the allied tools available.”173
Theories of settler colonialism and racial capitalism assist in framing the
historical development and material formation of settler colonial capitalism in Hawai‘i.
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My analysis of the moena contributes in the project called for by Coulthard of
“reestablishing the colonial relation of dispossession as a co-foundational feature of our
understanding of and critical engagement with capitalism.”174 In his reconfiguration of
Marx’s theory of so-called primitive accumulation, it is the dispossession of land from
Indigenous people that violently opened up territories and resources for labor markets to
coerce subjects to sell their labor and be alienated from it. Put another way, relations of
capital—production, exchange value, profit, accumulation, and development—were
made possible primarily by dispossessing Indigenous people of land instead of
proletarianization. This hints at how the moena gets read as proletarian protest rather than
criticism of how capital facilitated settler colonialism in Hawai‘i. Iyko Day’s theorization
of romantic anti-capitalism is helpful to make sense of how Kala‘i’s message became
bemused.175 Day asserts that romantic anti-capitalism is a logic of settler colonial
capitalism, which misapprehends relations of capital by conflating concrete labor with
abstract value insofar as the evils of capitalism get personified in racialized bodies and
expunge white settlers of capitalist exploitation. While she discusses how this plays out
with Asian laborers across North America, whom were and still are racialized through
their labor to the settler-state, I believe that romantic anti-capitalism operates further to
fetishize the moena and racialize Kānaka Maoli so as to settle land in Hawai‘i. “In the
settler colony,” Brenna Bhandar notes, “the colonial animus is driven by the need to
control the land base for the continued growth of settler economies and for the security of
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settler populations.”176 As Coulthard says, the colonizer does not fundamentally desire
labor from Indigenous people, like that from racialized populations of arrivants
comprising alien capital. Rather, colonizers have a murderous and genocidal desire for
Indigenous land.
In the textual message of the moena (see figure 6), the Hawaiian Kingdom’s
taxation of animal ownership is a harmful economic policy to the lāhui. The translation of
the mat’s text was established and popularized by Mary Kawena Pukui. I use her
translations, here, to maintain accuracy of how the message has been constructed over
time. This allows me to perform some of my own translations, in subsequent analysis, for
reinterpreting the mo‘olelo of the mat. In the woven message, Kala‘i discusses how

Figure 6. Moena pāwehe makana on display at the Bishop Museum. Photo by author.
governance in the Hawaiian Kingdom was fair and just before the introduction of animal
taxes to then suggest such taxes on animals were unfair and unjust. She begins with a
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genealogy of governance in the Hawaiian Kingdom. The message starts with the first
Mō‘ī of the Hawaiian Kingdom, who unified the Hawaiian Islands and established a
centralized system of governance in 1810, Kamehameha:
no ka hanai ana o kamehameha i na alii a pau i ka aina a i ku ai ahupuaa i kalana a
i okana a i moku a i mokupuni o ia hoi ka kamehameha oihana i ka wa i lanakila
ai o kamehameha ma luna o kona aupuni hoonohoakula o ia i na alii a pau ma
luna o ka aina kela ano keia ano o na alii a pau ana i hoonoho ai ma luna o ka aina
(Kamehameha provided for all the chiefs of the land thus establishing the
ahupua‘a, kalana, ‘okana, moku land sections and islands. That was what
Kamehameha did when he stood at the head of his government. He placed the
chiefs over the lands; all kinds of chiefs settled on the land.)177
After identifying that Kamehameha institutionalized structures of governance that sought
to balance relations with the ‘āina in Hawai‘i, she discusses how he governed the lāhui:
like hoi ka malu o na alii a me na makaainana ma lalo o ke kanawai hookahi hele
ka luahine a moe i ke ala hele ka elemakule a moe i ke ala ku ka pu ko a hina i
lalo ku ka pu maia a hina i lalo ninau ka moi ma ka hoohuahualau i na elele he
aha la ke ano o ka luahine a me ka elemakule pu ko pu maia hai maila na elele i
ke ano o ka luahine a me ka elemakule o ko kamehameha kumukanawai no ia o ia
no kona maluhia.
(The chiefs and the commoners shared the peace under the one law, “Let the aged
sleep on the highway unharmed; let the sugarcane grow until it falls over; let the
banana grow until it falls over.” The King questioned his messengers to find out
what they thought, “What are the old women and the old men like? Are they like
the sugarcane and banana stalks?” They told him what they were like. That was
Kamehameha’s constitution—his peace.)
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According to Kala‘i, Kamehameha’s governance was peaceful. This peace was possible
because of Māmalahoa, or the Law of the Splintered Paddle, which he enacted as a way
of balancing relations between ali‘i and maka‘āinana, between rulers and common
citizens. Under this governance, maka‘āinana could grow and flourish like the sugarcane
and banana. Kala‘i’s remarks suggest that governance was premised upon cultivating the
entire ecosystem in Hawai‘i wherein the ‘āina and Kānaka ‘Ōiwi are inextricably
connected. She continues:
no ka mea o ka hoailona maluhia no ia o kona aupuni o ka luahine me ka
elemakule o ia no na hua kumukanawai e hao ia ka maluhia nui no ia o ko hawaii
nei pae aina i ka wa i puka mai ai no loko mai o ka puuwai i puka mai ai o ke
aloha i kona lahui kanaka no laila kau aela ia i kona kanawai mamalahoa i mea e
luku hou ole aku ai i kona enemi
(Peace was the symbol of his kingdom; the old women and old men, his
constitution. There was no ruthless seizing. It brought peace to the Hawaiian
Islands when it was issued. It was issued because of his love for the people.
Therefore he laid down his Māmalahoa law that there be no more destruction of
his foes.)
Kala‘i argues that Kamehameha’s older system of governance provided not just peace,
emanating from his aloha for the lāhui, but also freedom:
no laila lanakila aela ka lahui kanaka ma lalo o ke kanawai hookahi i olelo ia
mamalahoa o ia no ka maluhia nui o kona aupuni a me ka hanohano haina hoala
no ke aupuni kahiko ia kamehameha ekahi
(The people became free under the one law called the Māmalahoa, the giver of the
greatest peace in his kingdom, an honor and a revitalizing declaration that have
come to us from an old kingdom, that of Kamehameha I.)
Māmalahoa appears as a gift from Kamehameha that Kala‘i believes can revitalize
governance in Hawai‘i. She delineates the older government of the Hawaiian Kingdom,
in which Kamehameha was Mō‘ī and maintained peace and freedom, from newer
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governments that altered relationships between Kānaka Maoli and also the ‘āina. In this
light, she issues her request:
e ala ae kakou e kamailio i na kumu nui i emi ai ka lahui hawaii a me ka pii ana o
ka lahui mua i ka wa kahiko ia kamehameha no ke noi a na makaainana i ka moi e
hoololi i ka auhau ma luna o na holoholona pipi lio hoki miula hipa aole loa e koe
kekahi o ia ano
(Let us rise to discuss the great cause for the decrease of the Hawaiian people, a
large population in the olden days under Kamehameha, and to ask the King to
change the taxes on animals, cattle, horses, asses, mules, and sheep, and let none
of these taxes remain.)
This final passage is a critical one to perseverate for the concealed meaning Kala‘i left for
us to find. Recalling that kaona is not just a practice of constructing meanings,
McDougall contends that kaona is a practice also for interpreting meanings. Kala‘i
explicates, here, that the lāhui governed by Kamehameha was large in populous, but the
lāhui declined in population under newer governments and the animal taxes instituted by
them should be overturned. The kaona within this mo‘olelo, which at first glance might
look like a kind of linguistic puzzle (see figure 7), reveals much more.

Figure 7. Text of moena pāwehe kūikawā. Photo by author.
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The kaona plaited into the moena pāwehe indicates that Kala‘i’s criticism of
animal taxes was actually a critique of how the haole introduction of hard currency,
literally the foreign imposition of capital, pressured newer governments of the Hawaiian
Kingdom to amend taxation policy so that animal taxes were standardized to be paid in
money. The message directly points out that ruling governments, proceeding that of
Kamehameha, institutionalized animal taxes that were collected only with money,
experienced a decrease in population, and ought to alter taxation of animals to revitalize
peace and actualize freedom. This suggests the installation of a hard currency standard
ameliorated capitalist relations of exploitation. Carlos Andrade laments, “The
maka‘āinana had no choice: they were forced to enter the cash economy…currency
would now be the only acceptable form of balancing out responsibilities to society and
government.”178 After promulgating a centralized system of taxation in the 1839
constitution’s Ke Kānāwai Ho‘oponopono Waiwai (Law Regulating Taxation, Property,
and the Rights of Classes), the House of Nobles created the first laws of monetary
taxation in 1840 (see figure 8). In the Legislative Council of 1841, a new law passed
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HOUSE OF NOBLES.
Session of 1840.

The House of Nobles was in session at Lahaina, Maui. November 2-14 inclusive. Other than the Laws passed there is
nothing of record.

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.
Nobles.
Session of 1841.
n April
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1.

31.
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II,
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(w).
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A.

C.
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KEAHONUI.
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(w).
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(w).

M.

(w).

LELEIOHOKU.
YOUNG, JOHN, 2nd.
KAPENA,

KUAKINI.
PAKI, A.

Clcrl;.

Figure 8. House of Nobles Session and Legislative Council Session. Source: Roster
Legislatures
of Hawaii,
1841-1918.179
Session
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Began April

Ended May
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that standardized money—the
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payment
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for all taxes. It stated, “Money

THE KING.
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(w).
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PAUL KANOA,
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180
LELEIOHOKU.
very well if all menKUAKINI.
would pay their taxes in money.”
The first tax on animals was
Clerk.

passed in 1843, which specifically taxed dogs and cats. In 1845, a tax on horses, mules,
and asses was proposed. The following year, taxation policy was amended and extended
to cattle. All of the animal taxes that Kala‘i wished to change were, in fact, mandated to
be paid in money. In 1847, total revenue from animal tax collection was more than
$25,000, and it doubled the following year. By 1858, total revenue was over $130,000.
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This tax revenue was helpful in resolving foreign debt that had accumulated with other
nations, such as Spain. For haole anthropologist Roger Rose, who authored an
ethnological study on the moena that I take up in the next section, animal taxes were
welcome.181 These taxes were applauded (see figure 9), initially by missionaries and later
by anthropologists, to curb economic inequalities and forge civil society in the Hawaiian
Kingdom. Significantly, Rose explains that haole missionaries during the 1840s
supported animal taxes and directly influenced policy to increase them.182

Figure 9. Palapala hookaa a ka lunaauhau (tax assessor’s receipt). Source: Bishop
Museum.
Born in 1794, Kala‘i lived through Kamehameha’s rule that provided peace and
freedom, and she lived through the settlement of capital, seeing it hit the lāhui hard
through animal taxes. In the last line of her woven message in the moena, Kala‘i says, “e
kalani e, e hookuu ae ia makou i na hana kanawai, i ka noho kaua kuapaa ana ma lalo o n
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haku o ka lewa.” Mary Kawena Pukui translated this, “Oh heavenly one, release us from
the burden of the law that keeps us slaves under masters from the sky.”183 However, there
is kaona here that augments the mo‘olelo. Kala‘i intended to give the moena to the former
Mō‘ī of the Hawaiian Kingdom, William Lunalilo. But Lunalilo died abruptly, after
ruling only from 1873 to 1874, and the demand was delivered to Kalākaua. This passage
is directed at Lunalilo, “e kalani e,” as deference for his mo‘okū‘auhau or genealogical
line that connects him to the gods, goddesses, and divine deities. She asks Lunalilo to
release the lāhui from a burdensome law that keeps Kānaka Maoli bonded as slaves “ma
lalo o na haku o ka lewa,” which Pukui translated “under masters from the sky.” In my
own translation, “ma lalo o na haku o ka lewa” can also mean under lords of the heaven
above, as in the lords of those missionaries advocating animal taxes and lobbying to
boost them. If missionaries proliferated colonial capital in Hawai‘i as Silva contends, 184
then they also assisted in its settlement through animal taxes. Kala‘i’s textual message
asks to change the taxes on animals to release the lāhui from the burden of that law,
which was onerous because payments were required in money, that keeps the lāhui
imprisoned within capitalism.
The mo‘olelo of the moena pāwehe kūikawā identifies that an invasive system of
capitalism enabled settler colonialism in Hawai‘i. The institutionalization of taxes to be
paid in hard currency formally introduced concepts of capital, debt, and accumulation
into the Hawaiian Kingdom. This gave way to the privatization of land and launching of
ownership rights and property taxes. In 1839 and 1843, two distinct foreign threats to
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extinguish the Hawaiian Kingdom’s national sovereignty resulted in haole advisors on
political economy, such as William Richards, suggesting that ‘āina be divided into private
parcels for property and ownership to secure against unlawful seizures by foreign
nations.185 The 1848 Māhele divided lands and led to the 1850 Kuleana Act that
institutionalized private land ownership, which allowed haole subjects to purchase
property for the first time in Hawai‘i.186 In doing so, J. Kēhaulani Kauanui writes,
“Hawaiians and their descendants largely became a landless people.”187 Capital and its
relations of taxation, property, and ownership opened up the dispossession of ‘āina and
elimination of ‘Ōiwi relations to ‘āina. Silva writes, “The institution of taxes to be paid in
cash caused people to be alienated from their ancestral lands, which undoubtedly
contributed to the weakening of their bodies, not to mention their spirits.”188 Kala‘i’s
mo‘olelo, woven into the moena, connects tax impositions (as capitalist violence) and
haole influences (as colonial violence) to the dispossession and elimination of the lāhui.
This is how colonial capitalism began to settle in the early 1840s. Therefore, colonial
capitalism settled as a necessary condition of possibility for eroding the national and
Indigenous sovereignty of Kānaka Maoli to carve out territorial control and juridical
power to eventually institutionalize the US settler-state in Hawai‘i. “Capitalism,” Frantz
Fanon observes, “objectively colludes with the forces of violence that erupt in colonial
territories.”189 Settler colonial capitalism is the back-drop for US settler sovereignty in
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Hawai‘i. Contemporary analysis of how the US settler-state manages Kānaka Maoli
should interrogate manifestations of settler capital and how to overturn them within the
Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea, as Kala‘i’s gift sought to do and now directs us.
Politics of Protest
A stunning piece of material culture, the moena pāwehe kūikawā is also
strikingly political. Woven in pāwehe style from makaloa sedge, the moena is unlike any
other. One of only two makaloa mats made in pāwehe style to contain plaited text,
Kala‘i’s moena has been distinctively praised for its textual protest. Although her
message has been discussed by a handful of Hawaiian- and English-language newspapers
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it has received attention by ethnologists,
anthropologists, and visitors of the Bishop Museum in Honolulu where the mat is
currently on display in Hawaiian Hall. However, it is set to be relocated to the archive in
Department of Cultural Collections because, while on display, the woven letters have
drastically faded from light exposure. Sadly, this material waning is emblematic of how
the textual message diminishes through discourse. The moena has been reduced of its
(political) complexity and universalized in (cultural) ways that are deeply pernicious.
Although the moena is my primary object of analysis, I also look at and critique an
ethnological study of it, anthropological knowledge production, and mainstream Marxist
discourse on class-struggle. Politicizing Kala‘i’s moena in this way interrupts the
sequestering boundary between categories of “culture” and “politics.” It is not simply a
piece of material culture, nor is it a normative political protest. I agree with GoodyearKa‘ōpua: “When people explicitly assert the ways cultural practice is political, and
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political movement is cultural, Hawaiian social movements leap forward.”190
Approaching the mat as a material culture artifact that is political and has been politicized
enables me to trouble what constitutes a proper protest. I begin this section by
investigating how the politics of the mat’s protest have been constructed, circulated, and
naturalized.
In 1990, Roger Rose, a haole ethnologist in the Department of Anthropology at
the Bishop Museum, published the only study in existence about the moena pāwehe.
After the moena was displayed at ‘Iolani Palace by Kalākaua in 1874 and later housed at
the Hawaiian National Museum until 1891, the Bishop Museum acquired it as a gift from
the Government Collection. Since then, the moena has been housed at the museum’s
Department of Cultural Collections, where Rose had access to it. In his study, titled
“Patterns of Protest: A Hawaiian Mat-Weaver’s Response to 19th Century Taxation and
Change,” he argues that Kala‘i’s moena was a rejoinder to ali‘i of the Hawaiian
Kingdom, protesting changes in taxation policy. To support his claim, Rose examines the
makaloa mat and spotlights its historical significance. Establishing a genealogy of
makaloa mat making, mimicking western historiographic periodization and reifies the
doctrine of discovery, he starts with Captain James Cook and Cook’s underwhelming
observation that these moena are “strong and fine, and some are neatly coloured.”191 Rose
focuses much on the aesthetically pleasing utility of them, conveying that they are
exquisite sleeping mats. After commenting on the use-value of makaloa mats, he
concludes the genealogy by identifying them as moena Ni‘ihau, since they were known to

190
191

Goodyear-Kaʻōpua, introduction to A Nation Rising, 12.
Rose, “Patterns of Protest,” 89.
83

be woven from makaloa sedge cultivated from 13 fresh and brackish bogs on Ni‘ihau
island. He thus suggests these moena were hotly desired as “coveted articles of status and
luxury” by haole subjects and ali‘i who collected them as ho‘okupu (offerings and gifts)
from maka‘āinana.192 For Rose, this represented payment for taxes, a pre-colonial system
of taxation in Hawai‘i, which added to their rarity and manufactured their scarcity as
commodities, so he says.
Shifting the framing of makaloa mats from “cultural” to “political,” as if the two
are somehow separable, Rose contends Kala‘i’s moena was an evident protest against
taxes. As such, he named it “The Protest Mat.” Reciting the text plaited into the moena,
he zeroes in on the translation of its last section:
“Let us rise to study the great cause for the decrease of the Hawaiian people, a
large population in the olden days under Kamehameha, and to ask the king to
change the taxes on animals, cattle, horses, asses, mules, and sheep and let none
of them remain. O Heavenly One—release [us] from the burden of the law that
keeps us slaves under masters from the sky.”193
Kala‘i’s protest against new taxes, levied on the ownership of animals, signified a classbased struggle, pitting ali‘i who instituted taxes against maka‘āinana whom were taxed
further. Rose interpreted the moena pāwehe kūikawā as material culture representing the
unfair and unequal socioeconomic treatment of commoners by rulers in the Hawaiian
Kingdom. The Protest Mat, in this logic, appeared as a symbol of working-class citizen’s
resistance to the economic control and domination brought on by oppressive ruling-class
subjects. This was an argument molded by Marx’s critique of capital and steeped in
dominant discourses of class-struggle and communist revolution.194 For instance, before a

192

Ibid., 90.
Ibid., 97-98.
194
Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (New York: Penguin, 1990).
193

84

centralized system of taxation was instituted in 1839, by Kauikeaouli’s constitution of
Kumu Kānāwai, Rose claims that ho‘okupu paid to ali‘i by maka‘āinana “were often
arbitrary and burdensome.”195 The mat’s message does not just appear as a protest against
animal taxes but, more so, a protest against the governance of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
Rose recalls and reiterates the reflections of missionaries to shape these claims. Titus
Coan, who wrote an autobiography dully titled Life in Hawaii,196 said, “There is no form
of oppression among Hawaiian chiefs and officers which has, on the whole, more pained
and disgusted me than this. It is marked with pride, vanity and folly, and a careless,
reckless disregard of the interest and happiness of the common people.”197 “To rectify
this oppression of the maka‘āinana,” Rose opines, “a codified system of taxation was
gradually implemented.”198 This aided in balancing what Marshall Sahlins and Dorothy
B. Berrère, two haole anthropologists that Rose drew upon, called the “unrestrained
tyranny of ali‘i.”199 In this racialized trope of primitivism, a civilized system of political
economy that regulated taxation was required and common sense to shield maka‘āinana
from the socioeconomic inequalities produced by an uncivilized political economy.
Presenting research on the moena in 1988, Rose refined his study at the 87th
conference meeting of the American Anthropological Association, where he recruited the
discipline, philosophies, and procedures of anthropology to rationalize a scientific
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expertise on the Hawaiian Kingdom that could manipulate the moena as an artifact to
criticize Kanaka Maoli agency, governance, and sovereignty. Anthropological knowledge
production, brewing in Rose’s research presentation and indexed in his ethnological
study, played a nefarious role in attempting to erode Kanaka Maoli sovereignty. Seen in
this light, there is a prohibitive interest in the moena pāwehe kūikawā. The mat received
interest from haole researchers of ethnology and anthropology only insofar as that interest
marks Kanaka Maoli governance of the Hawaiian Kingdom to be oppressive,
anachronistic, uncivilized, and pre-modern. Interested in Kala‘i’s moena, the logic works
like this: capitalist political economy is a necessary solution to alleviate the problematic
savagery of socoioeconomic inequalities forged in a pre-modern political economic
system of governance. The contagion of Indigenous primitivism pollutes the Hawaiian
Kingdom’s government and nation-state. A racist, paternalistic, and imperialistic coding,
this anthropological interpretation of the mat is minimally determinant for Kānaka Maoli
but maximizes utility for anthropology’s will to apprehend “others” and produce colonial
subjects and “the Native.” Elizabeth A. Povinelli asserts this is a process of prohibitive
interest whereby Indigenous people are deemed interesting, and worthy of such interest,
by white, settler anthropologists only inasmuch as Indigenous people are prohibited from
their radical alterity, excluded from knowledge production, and undressed of agency.200
Kala‘i’s “Protest Mat” for Rose authenticated a pathology of ‘Ōiwi primitivity and
governmental pre-modernity established earlier in the 19th century writing of Calvinist
missionaries, whom were anthropology’s first technicians on the Hawaiian frontier.
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Extending Trask’s sharp formulation,201 anthropologists were very much like
missionaries; one group colonized the spirit whereas the other colonized the mind. What I
am arguing is Rose’s anthropological claim about the moena normalizes socioeconomic
inequality as a primitive and pre-modern cultural pattern of Kānaka Maoli in
constructions that ali‘i governing the Hawaiian Kingdom were greedy, tyrannical, and
incompotent. This renders the mat an exceptional protest, functioning to rationalize the
haole introduction and Hawaiian adoption of capitalism—a political economic system to
save us from ourselves and solve this Hawaiian problem.
By naming the moena “The Protest Mat,” other possible mo‘olelo and embedded
kaona have been evicted. My analysis of the moena is the first to unsettle Rose’s study by
paying attention to its mo‘olelo and kaona. When I began my archival research in 2012 at
the Bishop Museum, I was incessantly told this mat is exceptional for its woven message
that protests taxation on animals. It seemed so obvious and unquestioned. For that reason
alone the moena received its name from Rose. As I dug deeper, I found this common
sense worked to empty its complexity. Universalizing it as “The Protest Mat” reinforces a
haole anthropological tradition of regulating, disciplining, and prohibiting Kanaka Maoli
agency, governance, and sovereignty. In her research on representations of the moena
pāwehe kūikawā in Hawaiian-language newspapers, Akana-Gooch refers to it as a noi
(petition). Akana-Gooch says, “He noi kupaianaha i ke aupuni e ho‘ēmi ‘ia ka ‘auhau ma
luna o nā holoholona,” which she translates as, “An elaborate petition to the government
requesting a reduction in taxation on the people.”202 While Akana-Gooch rejects the static
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category of protest, claiming the mat as a noi and petition, she still evacuates possibilities
that the moena petitioned, protested, and criticized something more than just animal
taxes. More recently, the website for Bishop Museum’s publication Ka ‘Elele: The
Messenger, displayed student reflections of the mat. One student from Hālau Kū Mana
remarks, “The most interesting artifact that I saw at the Museum was the makaloa
‘Protest Mat’…I really liked how she [Kala‘i] made the call for help in the form of a mat.
It expressed how important the matter of government taxes was to her.”203 The discourse
dispersed and normalized by haole anthropology penetrates and sticks in these sites, to
this very day. It has become common sense knowledge that ultimately distorts Kala‘i’s
mo‘olelo and abstracts it in the service of settler colonial capitalism for US settler
sovereignty. In response, I want to conclude the chapter by demonstrating, to interrupt the
dominant discourse, how Kala‘i’s mo‘olelo demanded that settler colonial capitalism be
overturned as an expression of aloha ‘āina. The moena is not a proletarian protest against
primitives and their pre-modern governance, it is a history and practice of aloha ‘āina.
E Ho‘ololi
Returning to the moena makaloa in this last section, I explore the kaona hidden
within the mat’s materiality. When laws mandated that taxes must be paid in money
rather than ho‘okupu, like moena makaloa, these mats became devalued in at least three
ways. First, they were labororious to produce, sometimes taking upwards of five to six
years to complete, and held low financial return as a result. Second, they needed to
compete with cheaper mats from other countries, such as those imported from China.
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Third, they were difficult to gather materials for because makaloa sedge diminished due
to agricultural development. In 1864, the island of Ni‘ihau, where makaloa was primarily
cultivated in 13 marshy bogs, was purchased by Elizabeth Sinclair, a relative of George
S. Gay who gave Kala‘i’s moena to Kalākaua in 1874. The ponds where makaloa grew
were drained to generate pastures for raising cows and goats, which were invasive to
Hawai‘i yet more fungible and profitable than makaloa. Even though the invasive
livestock industry devastated makaloa, Kala‘i opposed taxing these same animals—the
issue was capital and its valuation of animals, and devaluation of the ‘āina and Kanaka
‘Ōiwi relations with it, rather than the animals themselves. Descendants of Elizabeth
Sinclair, the Robinson family own the island still, and they claim to be conservationists
that steward the land.204 In this light, Rose purports that makaloa sedge, the cultural
knowledge to produce makaloa into mats, and their master weavers have vanished.
Despite all this, Kala‘i’s moena was made, woven from makaloa and presented to
Kalākaua in a resurgent act that refused the imposition and adoption of settler capital,
seeking to overturn settler colonial capitalism in Hawai‘i. As a makaloa mat, it critiques
taxation policy that replaced makaloa mats as ho‘okupu in place for money as payment
for taxes. An ironic criticism, indeed. Kala‘i refused to pay monetary taxes on animals by
crafting and gifting a moena makaloa that had previously been given as ho‘okupu prior to
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the institutionalization of taxes to be paid in hard currency. Such rejection echoes events
in 1863 wherein Kānaka Maoli of Ni‘ihau refused to pay taxes in money to Kamehameha
V, Lot Kapuāiwa. When this occurred, Kapuāiwa then asked for makaloa mats instead of
money. But Kānaka Maoli of Ni‘ihau refused again and paid no tax. The mo‘olelo of
refusal by Kala‘i, her moena, and the Kānaka ‘Ōiwi of Ni‘ihau builds on what Simpson
terms the Indigenous politics of refusal.205 Refusal offers Indigenous people an
alternative to being dispossessed, eliminated, and replaced. Refusal is an alternative to
liberal democratic “goods” like capital and monetary taxation. “To accept these
conditions,” according to Simpson, “is an impossible project for some Indigenous people,
not because it is impossible to achieve, but because it is politically untenable and thus
normatively should be refused.”206 Kala‘i could not accept the conditions brought on by
settler colonial capitalism, which meted out massive depopulation of Kānaka Maoli as
she indicated in her message. It was an impossible circumstance. Settler capitalism
empowered the haole dispossession of Hawai‘i, and therein required the elimination of
Kānaka Maoli and our enduring relations with the ‘āina of Hawai‘i. It attempted to
disappear makaloa and makaloa mat making in the name of profit, ownership, and white
patriarchal possessiveness. Nevertheless, Kala‘i refused to allow this. She created and
gifted the moena to change and overturn an encroaching system of power and destruction.
“Some still know this,” as Simpson writes, “and will defend what they have left.”207
“[E] hoololi,” as Kala‘i wove into the moena, is not just a declarative charge to
change but, as “e” precedes “hoololi,” an imperative command to overturn relations of
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violence brought on by settler colonial capital. Kala‘i’s demand ho‘ololi functions
centrally through aloha ‘āina (see figure 10), a unique geographic way of being that I
ground in my analysis of moena and elaborate in the proceeding chapters. “Place is not
reducible to attachments to land,” Isabel Altamirano-Jiménez argues, “place is a space of
ontological relationships among people and between people and their environments.”208

Figure 10. A petition woven with aloha. Photo by author.
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Incomprehensible to Rose’s anthropocentricism that could only code the moena as human
protest against class struggle, Kala‘i’s mo‘olelo of anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism
was ingeniously articulated through the makaloa fostered on Ni‘ihau. She expressed a
Kanaka Maoli version of grounded normativity. Coulthard conceives of grounded
normativity as a “place-based foundation of Indigenous decolonial thought and
practice…the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding
experiential knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world
and our relationships with human and nonhuman others.”209 The moena is made from
makaloa rooted in the ‘āina, nurtured and gathered at the inimitable union of land and
water in fresh and brackish bogs. That ‘āina is Papahānaumoku, our Earth Mother. She
and Wākea, our Sky Father, are the progenitors of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi. The moena pāwehe
kūikawā materialized from a genuine love, care, and aloha for the ‘āina as a more-thanhuman relation in the mo‘okū‘auhau of our genealogical origin. It demonstrates
mo‘okū‘auhau consciousness. Silva contends that mo‘okū‘auhau consciousness is an
‘Ōiwi sensibility cultivated from the teachings of our kūpuna to guide present and future
relations and practices within our community for autonomy, independence, and
sovereignty—for ea.210 “We see the ways that our intellectual kūpuna of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries used moʻokūʻauhau consciousness to perpetuate our
language, moʻolelo, mele, and so on. They positioned themselves within the
moʻokūʻauhau of our lāhui,” she writes, “that is, they greatly valued the narrative and
poetic traditions of their kūpuna and used their talents to record them for their

209

Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 13.
Noenoe K. Silva, The Power of the Steel-Tipped Pen: Reconstructing Native
Hawaiian Intellectual History (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017).
210

92

descendents. In the twenty-first century, we are who they foresaw.”211 Implanted within
Kala‘i’s mat is an ethical engagement with relationalities to belonging in place and time.
This mo‘okū‘auhau is centered on growing the lāhui by protecting the ‘āina. The moena
articulates aloha ‘āina in an undeniably concrete way: take care of ‘āina through ‘āina. It
is a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi geontology, a way of being in the ‘āina of Hawai‘i, that exceeds and is
critical of settler colonial capitalism. Refusing the violence of settler capital, the moena
loudly exclaimed that makaloa mats are not extinct, the knowledge to produce them
persists, and master wāhine weavers like Kala‘i are alive.
To close this chapter, I offer one final mo‘olelo (see figure 11). According to a
story in Ka Nupepa Kuokoa, published on May 2, 1874, after receiving the moena,

Figure 11. Ua lohe makou (we heard). Source: Ka Nupepa Kuokoa.212
Kalākaua asked Kala‘i to make two additional makaloa sedge mats.213 Apparently, he
was quite a fan. The requested mats would be sent to the US Centennial Exposition
occurring in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1876. Worse though, the request was for
“‘elua mau moena me ke kii hoailona o Amelika a pela no hoi ko Pelekania” or, in my
translation, “two mats with the symbol of America and the other with that of Britain.”
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Kala‘i’s response was silence. She refused the commission. The moena pāwehe requested
for the celebration of two different empires were never made. Encrusted in her sustained
refusals of capital, settler colonialism, and empire, there is kaona about the history and
practice of aloha ‘āina. This hidden meaning is not locked away in our past but living,
breathing, and rising in our present for alternative futures beyond settler colonial
capitalism. Kala‘i’s mo‘olelo shows how aloha ‘āina is anti-colonial and anti-capitalist.
Moreover, it worked on and against the state sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom to
perform a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea, which is signified in her demand to the Hawaiian
Kingdom’s government, “e hoololi i ka auhau,” meaning change the tax and overturn
monetary taxes. Many years ago, Kalākaua merrily envisioned the political slogan
ho‘oulu lāhui for a Kanaka Maoli cultural and national renaissance to take up, much like
Kala‘i’s moena pāwehe makana presented a gift with kuleana, responsibility and
obligation, to Kalākaua three days before he made the declaration. This kuleana is rooted
in and for aloha of ‘āina. It is a kuleana to see, feel, and identify settler colonial
capitalism to overturn it in Hawai‘i as well as within Hawaiian sovereignty. Hidden
beneath the intricate plaited letters and woven makaloa sedge, the kuleana given to
Kalākaua by Kala‘i was a tremendous gift that offers a new framework to examine
contemporary struggles over settler colonial capitalism and sovereignty in Hawai‘i. The
proceeding chapters carefully attempt to unpack and share other gifts of sovereignty.

94

Chapter 3
Federal Recognition and the Geopolitics of Biopower

On May 5, 2014, Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) Chief Executive Officer
Kamana‘opono Crabbe sent a letter to US Secretary of State John Kerry. In the letter,
Crabbe inquired about the legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom. He submitted the letter
in a spirit of responsibility to fulfill OHA’s directive to serve Kānaka Maoli. Established
by the State of Hawai‘i’s Constitutional Convention in 1978, OHA manages and
administers income generated from the sale and lease of “ceded lands.” These are 1.8
million acres of land in Hawai‘i that were originally allotted, under the 1848 Māhele, as
government lands of the Hawaiian Kingdom and crown lands for its monarchs.214
However, when an oligarchy of white Euro-American men, assisted by US military
forces, overthrew the Hawaiian Kingdom’s government in 1893, this land was usurped.
The oligarchy formed a Provisional Government and seized the Hawaiian Kingdom’s
government and crown lands, which were joined together and transmitted later to the
Republic of Hawai‘i in 1894. When Congress passed the Newlands Resolution and
President William L. McKinley authorized it to annex Hawai‘i as a US territory, the
government and crown lands were ceded in 1898 to the US federal government. Through
the Admissions Act of 1959, the federal government transferred ownership of 1.4 million
acres of this land to the newly created State of Hawai‘i insofar as it be put into a public
trust. OHA became institutionalized as an agency for the explicit purpose of managing
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and administering revenue from this public trust. For Crabbe, his letter was a request to
clarify OHA’s fiduciary obligations. But it requested clarification in the wake of new
Hawaiian legal research, which claims the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s
government was illegal and that the Hawaiian state continues to exist as a sovereign
nation under US military occupation.215 Addressed to John Kerry as Secretary of the State
Department responsible for foreign affairs, Crabbe’s letter asked, “Does the Hawaiian
Kingdom, as a sovereign independent State, continue to exist as a subject of international
law?” Assuming the Hawaiian Kingdom persists, and shifting the burden onto the federal
government to prove it does not, Crabbe posited three queries. The first was whether or
not the US government is bound by sole-executive agreements and treaties with the
Hawaiian Kingdom. The second was whether or not US domestic legislation like the
Admissions Act, inventing the “State of Hawai‘i” and transferring ownership of “ceded
lands” to it, is lawful in Hawai‘i. The third was whether or not the State of Hawai‘i,
OHA, and their policies to pursue US federal recognition of a new Native Hawaiian
government have incurred criminal liability under international laws of occupation.
Needless to say, Kerry did not respond. But someone else did.
One month later, the US Department of the Interior (DOI) issued an Advanced
Notice for Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to consider federal recognition for Kānaka
Maoli. Rather than the Department of State, the DOI reacted to Crabbe’s letter: “In
response to requests from the Native Hawaiian community, Hawaii’s congressional
delegation and state leaders, the U.S. Department of the Interior announced today a first
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step to consider reestablishing a government-to-government relationship between the
United States and the Native Hawaiian community.”216 Although the DOI notes multiple
sources compelled the administrative rulemaking process, Crabbe’s inquiry on the legal
status of the Hawaiian Kingdom set a palpable backdrop for this executive procedure.
Sally Jewell, Secretary of the DOI, said, “The Department is responding to requests from
not only the Native Hawaiian community but also state and local leaders and interested
parties who recognize that we need to begin a conversation of diverse voices to help
determine the best path forward for honoring the trust relationship that Congress has
created specifically to benefit Native Hawaiians.”217 From Crabbe’s request to Jewell’s
statement, there is quite a contrast. Let me explain. On one hand, Crabbe sought clarity
on how the US government, through the State of Hawai‘i and OHA, maintains legal
standing to federally recognize a new Native Hawaiian government if the Hawaiian
Kingdom’s government continues to exist. On the other hand, Jewell manipulated
requests for clarification on the legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom and Kānaka Maoli
to rationalize federal recognition as a way to strengthen the relationship that Congress
asserts over Native Hawaiians. There was a tactical confidence met by discernable
anxiety. Crabbe contemplated the geopolitical position of Kānaka Maoli according to
international laws of occupation whereas Jewell ruminated on the biopolitical position of
Kānaka Maoli in accordance with Congressional statutes under federal law. What is
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abundantly present in this opening mo‘olelo is the legal status of Kānaka Maoli is
extraordinarily precarious. It is, as Kauanui has shown, a precarious position.218 How
does US federal recognition of Kānaka Maoli rhetorically acknowledge, discursively
produce, and legally resolve the precarious position of the lāhui Hawai‘i? How have
Kānaka Maoli exposed the promises of federal recognition as empty and, in turn,
antagonized US settler sovereignty in Hawai‘i?
In this chapter, I investigate the ways in which a federal procedure considered
reestablishing a government-to-government relationship between the US and Native
Hawaiian community to create an administrative rule for recognizing a reorganized
Native Hawaiian government. I look at US federal law and dissect an executive
rulemaking procedure and administrative rule, while probing the Congressional statutes
and case law deployed within them. Taking on each branch of US democratic
governance—the executive, legislative, and judicial—I interrogate how federal
recognition is co-constitutive of settler sovereignty. Federal recognition of Kānaka Maoli
has been constituted through the so-called sovereignty of the US settler-state and,
simultaneously, constitutes American jurisdictional and territorial power approximately
4,000 miles away in Hawai‘i. Similar to how Chapter 1 illustrated the introduction of
settler capital in the early 1840s worked to dismantle national and Indigenous sovereignty
in Hawai‘i, this chapter details how federal recognition functions currently to disassemble
Hawaiian sovereignties so as to complete replacement of the lāhui Hawai‘i with the US
settler-state. In the first section of this chapter, I chart theories on recognition, law and
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power, and settler colonialism to frame my approach to US federal recognition of Kānaka
Maoli. This framework develops an intersectional orientation to settler-state recognition
for the field of Critical Indigenous Studies. In the second section, I analyze the DOI’s
ANPRM, suggesting it established a legal history for advancing reconciliation by
reestablishing a government-to-government relationship with the Native Hawaiian
community. In the third section, tracking mo‘olelo of opposition from testimony during
public meetings mandated by the ANPRM, I contend that Kānaka ‘Ōiwi refused the offer
and gifts of federal recognition. Opposition was distinctively articulated as ‘a‘ole (no),
which I contend is rooted and contributes to a genealogy of Kanaka Maoli refusal. In the
fourth section, I elucidate how the DOI, issuing a Notice for Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM), recommended an administrative rule for federally recognizing a reorganized
Native Hawaiian government, despite overwhelming disagreement. The ANPRM and
NPRM were notices of settlement, operating as announcements that the considered and
then proposed administrative rule would settle the biopolitical status of Kānaka Maoli for
the geopolitical settlement of Hawai‘i, once and for all. In the fifth section, I examine the
Final Rule that the DOI published and assert it consolidates the biopolitics and
geopolitics of settler colonialism. However, the rules of this recognition lay bare the
precarity and disorder of US settler sovereignty over Kānaka Maoli and Hawai‘i. To end,
I return to mo‘olelo of opposition from public meeting testimony, which identified and
challenged the biopolitical and geopolitical calculations of federal recognition, to further
theorize how Kānaka Maoli seek to overturn settler colonial capitalism and the US
settler-state in Hawai‘i.
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In Chapter 2, I contend that the DOI’s ANPRM and NPRM were notices of
settlement that announced how a new policy for federal recognition proposed through an
administrative rule change would test and settle the biopolitical status of Kānaka Maoli
for settling the geopolitical status of Hawai‘i. Although the DOI’s Final Rule created
rules of recognition, which anxiously seek to incorporate Native Hawaiians as Indians
without land, Kānaka Maoli rejected and refused this new paradigm for federal
recognition through articulations of ‘a‘ole that exposed the incoherence and precarity of
US settler sovereignty upon the ‘āina of Hawai‘i.
Recognition, Law and Power, and Settler Colonialism
In this section, I situate the framework for this chapter’s analysis by tracing
theories of recognition, law and power, and settler colonialism. This robust network of
interdisciplinary thought orients my way into the chapter’s object of analysis: federal
recognition. Although the scholarship on recognition, law and power, and settler
colonialism that I discuss is interrelated, I am interested in exploring the arrangement of
research, locating contributions and limitations, to develop a more intersectional
approach to settler-state recognition for Critical Indigenous Studies. I utilize this
framework to analyze the DOI’s ANPRM, NPRM, and Final Rule to critique US federal
recognition of Kānaka Maoli.
In Red Skin, White Masks, Coulthard argues that recognition operates as a
political philosophy and material policy. The politics of recognition “refer to the now
expansive range of recognition-based models of liberal pluralism that seek to ‘reconcile’
Indigenous assertions of nationhood with settler-state sovereignty via accommodation of
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Indigenous identity claims in some form of renewed legal and political relationship.”219
Coulthard’s empirical investigation focuses on First Nations’ struggle with recognitionbased models of liberal pluralism enacted by the Canadian settler-state. His theorization
of the politics of recognition is capacious and can be extended to scrutinize the policies of
other settler-states. At the heart of global calls for settler-state recognition is a delegation
of land, capital, and political power to Indigenous people in the form of land settlements,
economic developments, and self-governance programs.220 But liberal policies that seek
reconciliation with Indigenous communities through settler-state mechanisms of
recognition remain colonial. It is a settler colonial relationship, Coulthard says, that
operationalizes “a particular form of domination; that is, it is a relationship where
power—in this case, interrelated discursive and nondiscursive facets of economic,
gendered, racial, and state power—has been structured into a relatively secure or
sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that continue to facilitate the dispossession
of Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority.”221 The settler
colonial relationship of domination hinges upon access to land and resources for capitalist
developments and the formation of settler-states. 222 All this, however, can be obscured by
the seemingly accommodating and conciliatory character of recognition. Recognition is
acutely interesting to Coulthard for how it reconfigures power in liberal politics and
progressive policy to conceal ongoing settler-state practices for dispossessing Indigenous
communities.
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To understand the structure of dispossession in recognition, Coulthard turns to
Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation that elaborates the union of colonial rule and
capital accumulation. Historicizing the birth of capitalism in the 16th century, Marx
described that violent state practices, such as “conquest, enslavement, robbery,
murder,”223 separated communities from the means of their production. “In Capital,”
Coulthard writes, “these formative acts of violent dispossession set the stage for capitalist
modes of production and accumulation by tearing Indigenous societies, peasants, and
other small-scale, self-sufficient agricultural producers from the source of their
livelihood—the land.”224 Two preconditions for capital were inaugurated: dispossession
and proletarianization. First, collectively maintained territories and resources were
dispossessed, privatized, and enclosed through state force. Second, people dispossessed
of communally cultivated lands were compelled to enter markets where their labor could
be sold. Primitive accumulation, therefore, is this historical process whereby noncapitalist forms of life are violently transformed into capitalist forms of life. Although
colonial dispossession is identified as one of two pillars animating capitalism, the
primary concern for Marx, and Marxism as a resulting philosophy, was the alienation of
the (white, male) worker. In response, Coulthard argues for a contextual shift from the
capital relation to the colonial relation, which centers the colonized subject’s positionality
and their analysis of colonial dispossession. 225 For him, the dispossession of territories
and resources, rather than proletarianization, is the fundamental background structuring
relations between the state and Indigenous communities. Colonial dispossession provided
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the necessary conditions of possibility for capital to flourish and be exported, which
Coulthard identifies as the system of settler colonial capitalism. Making this contextual
shift provides “a better angle from which to both anticipate and interrogate practices of
settler-state dispossession justified under otherwise egalitarian principles and espoused
with so-called ‘progressive’ political agendas.”226
But “what are we to make of contexts where state violence,” Coulthard asks, “no
longer constitutes the regulative norm governing the process of colonial dispossession, as
appears to be the case in ostensibly tolerant, multinational, liberal settler polities?”227 To
grasp how the spectacular violence of colonial dispossession transformed, Coulthard
explores the structural and subjective dimensions of recognition theorized by Frantz
Fanon. Fanon suggested recognition is a technique of power whereby colonial relations
of domination are constructed and upheld, in which conditions of accommodation (for the
colonized) in exchanges of recognition are typically determined by and in the interest of
the hegemonic party (the colonizer).228 Instead of fashioning mutual reciprocity, the
structure of recognition serves and obfuscates continuous settler-state practices of
colonial dispossession. Revising G. W. F. Hegel’s master/slave dialectic,229 Fanon
posited that the master in colonies does not desire recognition but work from slaves.230 In
this sense, he emphasized the intersecting relations of capital and colonialism, dissimilar
from Marx. Building on Fanon’s revision, Coulthard asserts, “The ‘master’—that is, the

226

Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 15.
228
Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox (New York,
NY: Grove Press, 2008).
229
G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1977).
230
Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 220.
227

103

colonial state and state society—does not require recognition from the previously selfdetermining communities upon which its territorial, economic, and social infrastructure is
constituted. What it needs is land, labor, and resources.”231 But sustaining colonization
requires that Indigenous people internalize the arrangements of domination and terms of
dispossession within recognition. Through the growth of psycho-affective attachments to
this scheme of recognition,232 Indigenous people, coerced by reconciliation and
accommodation, are transformed into subjects of settler-state rule that become
ideologically invested in cultivating the economic and political status quo of the colonial
relation. “In situations where colonial rule does not depend solely on the exercise of
violence,” Coulthard sums, “its reproduction instead rests on the ability to entice
Indigenous people to identify, either implicitly or explicitly, with the profoundly
asymmetrical and nonreciprocal forms of recognition either imposed on or granted to
them by the settler state and society.”233 These are recognition’s structural and subjective
problems, which are helpful frameworks for my analysis. Although Chapter 2 explicates
the structural problems of federal recognition, Chapter 3 builds on this analysis and
investigates federal recognition’s subjective problems.
While Coulthard provides a vital lens to view the structures of settler-state
recognition, I draw upon Barker’s theorizing on law and power to account for the
micromechanics of federal recognition. There are a few reasons for this. One reason is
concerning method. In Native Acts, Barker investigates the multiple, contradictory ways
in which the legal statuses and rights of Indigenous communities are articulated through
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US national narrations that produce notions of authenticity based on recognition,
membership, disenrollment, and tradition. She suggests that Indigenous people can
rearticulate colonial relations of inequality—racism, sexism, homophobia, American
nationalism, and religious conservativism—within and across Indigenous communities.
To do so, she looks at US federal law. In this chapter, I turn to US federal law as a
domain for analysis, targeting the DOI’s executive rulemaking procedure and
administrative rule. “Federal law,” Barker argues, “demands a particular kind of Native
culture and identity in order for Natives to be recognized as legitimately, legally
Native.”234 Following her method, I perform a discursive method of legal analysis to
probe the micromechanics of power embedded within legal demands of and for settlerstate recognition.235
This leads to another reason, which is methodological. Whereas Coulthard centers
structuralist conceptions of power, Barker relies on poststructuralism to analyze
operations of power “from below.”236 Despite not shying from poststructuralist thought,
Coulthard’s analysis of recognition develops mainly from the structural critiques of Marx
and Fanon, where power is seen as a something possessed—either by the bourgeoisie or
worker, the colonial master or subaltern slave, the settler-state or Native. Barker’s
approach to recognition, influenced by the poststructuralist theories of Michel Foucault
and Stuart Hall, considers how power is exercised and capillary. In his criticism of
Marxist economism, Foucault suggested, “Power passes through individuals. It is not
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applied to them.”237 This assists in framing how settler-state recognition’s colonial
domination and dispossession are not simply applied to Indigenous people but passes
through them. Barker thus explores law as a discourse that is mediated by and
manufactures power. Rather than trusting law to be omnipotent, apolitical, absolute, or
even coherent, Barker says, “The law is a discourse that operates in historically
contingent and meaningful ways, articulated to other discourses ideologically,
strategically, and irrationally. It informs the constitution and character of the relations of
power and knowledge between Native peoples and the United States, and within Native
communities.”238 For instance, the executive rulemaking and administrative rule that I
explore in this chapter are articulated through other laws to craft new procedures and
regulations for federally recognizing Kānaka Maoli. “By perceiving the law as a
discourse,” Barker writes, “the law is understood within the context of how it is
articulated to other discourses and to what (un)intended ends.”239 Looking at the
objectives and meanings of legal discourses opens up the capacity for interpreting how
they are rearticulated and antagonized by those subjected to them. Speaking on religion
as a discourse akin to law, Hall asserted, “Its meaning—political and ideological—comes
precisely from its position within a formation. It comes with what else it is articulated to.
Since those articulations are not inevitable, necessary, they can potentially be
transformed.”240 Fusing the work of Barker and Coulthard, I am interested in the
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discourses and structures of US federal recognition for how they can be transformed and
rejected by Kānaka Maoli. “The question that lingers is not why Native peoples would
use the law,” Barker laments, “but how, in those uses, they seek to rearticulate their
relations to one another, the United States, and international community.”241 The chapter
at hand, and dissertation on whole, takes this question of how, not why, Indigenous
people engage law with utmost seriousness.
The final reason is about ethics. I turn to Barker to hold my analysis accountable
to Indigenous feminism in two ways. First, Indigenous feminists guide my interrogation
of recognition. While the backbone of Coulthard’s approach to recognition calls upon
two theorists criticized for forwarding sexist arguments,242 his analysis glosses important
studies of recognition done by numerous Indigenous feminist scholars. Although there is
reference to Barker’s research on legal activism by Indigenous women in Canada,243 it is
a brief anecdote that avoids sustained commitment.244 Coulthard does, however, utilize
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson’s arguments to theorize Indigenous resurgence as a
process for rejecting the colonial politics of recognition.245 What I am pointing out is
Coulthard takes for granted the myriad Indigenous feminist scholars that critique
recognition like Kauanui, Simpson, and Barker, to name just a few. In this chapter, I
employ Barker’s orientation toward recognition as a corrective to the approach
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naturalized by Coulthard. Second, Indigenous feminism strengthens my analysis of
recognition. Barker contends that “Native peoples must choose strategically and ethically
how they will negotiate these demands as they articulate their cultures and identities as
Natives in claims of their legal status and rights.”246 Political engagement, whether with
the settler-state and its law or within and across Indigenous communities, is also an
ethical engagement. Barker grounds her political analysis of recognition in an ethics of
Indigenous feminism. For example, she discusses how “hard” political issues of
Indigenous sovereignty tend to get privileged over “soft” political matters, like gender
and sexual inequality, as if claims against sexism and homophobia are inconsequential to
Indigenous sovereignty.247 Countering such colonial narrations, she argues for a renewed
ethics of relationality premised on Indigenous feminism, expanding Coulthard’s ideas
about grounded normativity discussed in Chapter 1. Barker calls it the polity of the
Indigenous: “the unique governance, territory, and culture of an Indigenous people in a
system of (non)human relationships and responsibilities to one another.”248 The
Indigenous feminism propagated by Barker offers an ethical, not just political, approach
to US federal recognition of Kānaka Maoli. It is an ethic, which I deeply trust for this
project, that attempts to genuinely account for intersecting relations of colonial power as
they are structurally ordered and discursively produced.
Because federal recognition of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi proliferates US American law and
power in Hawai‘i, I end this section by specifically considering the biopower and
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geopower of settler colonialism. Although Coulthard and Barker gesture to the ways in
which settler colonialism fuels state power, neither elaborates on how the biopolitics and
geopolitics of settler colonialism are instrumental to the settler-state for recognizing
Indigenous people and nations. The framework I sketch aspires to fill this theoretical gap
in Critical Indigenous Studies. In the final part of this section, I track theorizations of
settler colonialism by Morgensen to elucidate its biopolitical and geopolitical animus.
Morgensen’s arguments, adding to Queer Indigenous Studies, provide an intersectional
orientation for my analysis of federal recognition by accounting for, on one hand, how
the settler-state regulates and disciplines Indigenous people via techniques of race,
gender, and sexuality and, on the other, how the biopolitics of settler colonialism pivot
upon geopower.
“For more than five hundred years,” Morgensen contends, “Western law
functioned as biopower in relation to ongoing practices of European settler
colonialism.”249 He explains the globalization of biopower—a modern incarnation of
western governmental power—is premised on and perpetuates settler colonialism, a
geopolitical project with the irreducible element of accessing territory.250 Global
transmissions of this state power have reproduced the dispossession and elimination of
Indigenous people, sustaining settler colonization as an ongoing structure rather than an
aloof historical event. In Spaces Between Us, Morgensen demonstrates that settler
colonial biopower is institutionalized by settler-states in ways that weaponize race,
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gender, and sexuality toward dispossessive and eliminatory ends. The genealogy of
settler colonial biopolitics conveyed by Morgensen completes my framework to examine
the recognition—an American brand of politics, policy, law, and power—thrust onto
Kānaka Maoli in Hawai‘i.
Morgensen begins by exhuming Foucault’s theory of biopower. In Society Must
Be Defended, Foucault explored how modern racism is inscribed in state apparatuses visà-vis biopower. In the 17th and 18th centuries, a new mechanism of power was invented,
surpassing juridico-political sovereignty, and it applied “primarily to bodies and what
they do.”251 The invention was disciplinary power, which forged “a discourse about a
natural rule, or in other words a norm.”252 It focused on anatomo-politics of the human
body to produce subjects through processes of normalization. As disciplinary power
operated to normalize society, the discourse of race struggle portrayed a war to cultivate
the race against those defined outside the norm. This, for Foucault, was how state racism
arose in the shift from defending society against external enemies to internal ones. But
biopolitics surfaced in the meeting of disciplinary and regulatory powers. Returning to
sovereign power, Foucault suggested, “The right of life and death was one of
sovereignty’s basic attributes.”253 The switch from sovereign power to biopower became
explained in a turn of phrase: “The right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let
live. And then this new right is established: the right to make live and to let die.”254 In the
late 18th century, the instruments of disciplinary power were infiltrated. “After a first
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seizure of power over the body in an individualizing mode,” Foucault wrote, “we have a
second seizure of power that is not individualizing but, if you like, massifying, that is
directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species.”255 This is the biopolitics of the
human race. The sovereign’s “right of the sword” to mete out spectacular death ceased,256
and “death was now something permanent, something that slips into life, perpetually
gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it.”257 It is the letting die to maximize life that
allows disciplinary and regulatory techniques to perform simultaneously, whilst
maintaining their differentiated targets of the body and populations. Foucault concluded
that biopower inheres in the state as it governs both individual bodies and populations of
people. As an example, he argued that sex became targeted by a power organized through
the management of life instead of the menace of death.258 With race and sexuality
indispensable to the state, biopower appeals that the death of others makes one
biologically stronger and thus strengthens the population.
Giorgio Agamben takes up Foucauldian biopolitics and argues that biopower does
not eclipse sovereign power but is its origin. Looking at Greek philosophy and Roman
law, Agamben claims bare life is “the life of homo sacer (sacred man), who may be killed
and yet not sacrificed.”259 Examining the production of homo sacer, a life made bare by
both juridico-political sovereignty and biopower, he says homo sacer is included within
“juridical order [ordinamento] solely in the form of its exclusion…offer[ing] the key by
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which not only the sacred texts of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power
will unveil their mysteries.”260 Agamben posits, interrogating the 20th century totalitarian
state and its creation of the concentration camp, inclusion of (bare) life into (bio)politics
is an expression of sovereignty’s state of exception. Sovereignty is exercised by declaring
the exception to law, positioning sovereign authority within and exterior to juridical
order.261 This is the zone of indistinction between natural (life) and (political) right.
Agamben regards this zone as “the originary structure in which law refers to life and
includes it in itself by suspending it.”262 A subject banned from juridical order, through a
sovereign exception, is not outside of law but abandoned by it, “exposed and threatened
on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable.”263
These arguments revise the deserting of sovereignty and its periodization by Foucault.
Agamben therefore asserts that sovereignty and biopower cannot be separated since “the
inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original—if concealed—
nucleus of sovereign power.”264 In this sense, my analysis in the chapter interrogates the
nucleus of sovereign power that the US settler-state attempts to conceal in Hawai‘i.
Imagining the biopolitics of settler colonialism, Morgensen believes Agamben’s
critique of Foucault should be adapted in two ways. First, Achille Mbembe utilizes
Agamben’s concept of the sovereign state of exception to criticize Foucault’s
displacement of biopower’s death function.265 Mbembe argues the colony is the principal
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site in which sovereign power is exercised outside law for the necropolitical making of
death-worlds. “The colonies,” he says, “are the location par excellence where the controls
and guarantees of juridical order can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the
state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of ‘civilization.’”266 Second, Rifkin
retools claims made by Agamben to suggest settler-state sovereignty is an empty symbol.
For Rifkin, the US settler-state’s territorialization depends upon legally classifying
Indigenous people as anomalous and peculiar. He demonstrates that Agamben’s theory of
biopolitics neglects Indigeneity in three ways: the sovereign exception is divorced from
territoriality, bare life is individuating, and state sovereignty is pre-supposed as given.
Calling out the Eurocentric framing of the concentration camp, Rifkin highlights
collectivized bare life on tribal reservations for Native Americans. He argues, as a
corrective, it is a settler colonial state of exception that “emphasizes the coercive
imposition of domesticity on Native peoples who neither sought nor desired it,
foregrounding the ways the narration of Indigenous polities as subjects of domestic law
depends on a process of exceptionalization,” whereby, “they axiomatically are consigned
to a ‘peculiar,’ and thus regulatable, internality that forcibly disavows their autonomy and
self-representations.”267 Therefore, settler sovereignty is an empty signifier that fretfully
attempts to cohere by flagging Indigenous people, like Kānaka ‘Ōiwi pestered by US
federal recognition, as peculiar anomalies within the alleged geopolitical terrain of the
settler-state.
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Building on these adaptations, Morgensen argues that American settler societies
came to be through the genocidal elimination of Indigenous people by making and letting
them die. Incorporating Patrick Wolfe’s ideas on the logic of elimination,268 Morgensen
distinguishes “material conditions and discursive effects of settler from franchise
colonies, where the latter defined by European control at a distance or as a minority,
while the former pursue the wholesale replacement of Native peoples to establish a white
settler majority.”269 Elimination “clears land for white settlers, and their brutal creation
and reproduction of subject racialized populations through the transatlantic slave trade
and indentured colonized labor to make settled lands productive.”270 Morgensen
intervenes into Mbembe’s theory of colonial biopolitics, as it primarily references
franchise colonies in Africa and Asia in the 19th and 20th centuries. Instead, he suggests
that “settler colonization in the Americas from the sixteenth century functioned alongside
colonization in Africa and Asia within modes of biopower to produce the biopolitics of
settler colonialism.”271 Reiterating Foucauldian biopolitics and Agamben’s revision,
Morgensen compares their European environments to settler colonial contexts in the
Americas whereby sovereign power introduced via colonialism from the 16th to 18th
century was already biopolitical by casting Indigenous people in a state of exception. He
expands Mbembe’s theorizing by claiming, “The logic of Indigenous elimination
provided a necessary premise for any subsequent subjection of African, Asian, or Pacific
peoples within the colonial state of exception on putatively emptied land.”272 Although
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Mbembe flags the slave plantation as the zone of indistinction experimenting with bare
life, Morgensen suggests the exceptionalization of Indigenous people opened up lands
across the Americas, through dispossession and elimination, for colonial violence against
diasporic African peoples, and also Asian and Pacific people.273 Indeed, this is one way
in which settler colonialism is wed to African slavery and anti-Blackness.
A biopolitical theory of settler colonialism frames how regulatory and
disciplinary instruments of settler-state power have changed the shape of making and
letting the Native die. As I will show, the management of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi life through US
federal recognition camouflages a core impetus but nevertheless attempts to eliminate the
Kanaka Maoli. In Spaces Between Us, Morgensen describes that Indigenous people have
been marked racially primitive and sexually perverse in order to cultivate life for (white,
queer) settler subjects upon stolen lands signified as territory of the settler-state. The
transmission of biopower is premised on the global elimination and dispossession of the
Native. “No account of biopolitics will explain a multiracial and transnational settler
society or its projects into a colonized and globalized world,” Morgensen asserts, “unless
its foundational conditioning by the biopolitics of settler colonialism and the logic of
Indigenous elimination structures our theory of the exception and the colonial exercise of
sovereignty.”274 Biopolitical elimination is tethered to “the geopolitical project of
defining the territoriality of the nation.”275 In the subsequent sections, the biopolitical
calculus in federal recognition of Kānaka Maoli attempts to geopolitically settle Hawai‘i,
at long last.
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Advancing Reconciliation
Michael L. Connor, Deputy Secretary of the DOI, published an ANPRM on June
20, 2014 in the Federal Register to initiate an executive process for creating a new
administrative rule to federally recognize a reorganized Native Hawaiian government.
Echoing Jewell’s statement that prefaced this chapter, the ANPRM begins, “The
Secretary of the Interior is considering whether to propose an administrative rule that
would facilitate the reestablishment of a government-to-government relationship with the
Native Hawaiian community, to more effectively implement the special political and trust
relationship that Congress has established between that community and the United
States.”276 The purported purpose of the ANPRM was to solicit public input on a
proposed rule, to be codified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), which could
acknowledge and recognize a reorganized Native Hawaiian government. Based on
executive powers of the federal government, the ANPRM provided legal notice for
requesting feedback “on whether and how the DOI should facilitate the reestablishment
of a government-to-government relationship with the Native Hawaiian community.”277 It
thus offered five threshold questions to frame and guide the content of responses:
(1) Should the Secretary propose an administrative rule that would facilitate the
reestablishment of a government-to-government relationship with the Native
Hawaiian community?
(2) Should the Secretary assist the Native Hawaiian community in reorganizing its
government, with which the United States could reestablish a government-togovernment relationship?
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(3) If so, what process should be established for drafting and ratifying a
reorganized Native Hawaiian government’s constitution or other governing
document?
(4) Should the Secretary instead rely on the reorganization of a Native Hawaiian
government through a process established by the Native Hawaiian community and
facilitated by the State of Hawaii, to the extent such a process is consistent with
Federal law?
(5) If so, what conditions should the Secretary establish as prerequisites to Federal
acknowledgement of a government-to-government relationship with the
reorganized Native Hawaiian government?278
Public input and feedback on the proposed rulemaking could be submitted to the DOI in
written and oral formats. Verbal comments could be offered during testimony at public
meetings. A key mandate, the ANPRM declared the DOI would conduct public meetings
on the islands of Hawai‘i, Kaua‘i, Lāna‘i, Maui, Moloka‘i, and O‘ahu. It announced that
public meetings would also be held in Indian Country on the continent. The first meeting
was set to take place only three days after publication of the ANPRM. This meant there
were just three days to read the ANPRM to prepare written feedback and oral testimonies
for the initial public meeting. The notice for rulemaking, and its solicitation of public
input and feedback, was undeniably rushed, occurring less than two months after
Crabbe’s letter that prefaced this chapter was sent to John Kerry and the Department of
State.
In this section, the ANPRM established a legal history for advancing
reconciliation by reestablishing a government-to-government relationship with a
reorganized Native Hawaiian governing entity. Reestablishment of a government-togovernment relationship between the US and Native Hawaiian community, according to
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the ANPRM, reconciles historic injustices and past wrongs done to Kānaka Maoli by the
federal government. Reconciliation appears to provide rights to self-determination that
have been stripped from and denied to Kānaka Maoli. The ANPRM subtly suggests that
federal recognition, by extension, is a form of self-determination. To create a new legal
pathway for federal recognition of Kānaka Maoli, distinct from prevailing mechanisms of
Congressional legislation and current executive procedures, the ANPRM emphasized a
special political relationship with trust responsibilities already exists between the federal
government and Native Hawaiians. This legal history for advancing reconciliation,
claiming wrongdoing to engineer and enforce a special trust relationship for legitimating
juridical authority, undergirds the entire rulemaking process and its administrative rule.
The legal history constructed in the ANPRM describes three narratives that
explain and excuse federal recognition. First, Congressional statutes created a special
political and trust relationship with the Native Hawaiian community. After reiterating that
Native Hawaiians are an Indigenous people that governed the Hawaiian Kingdom,
miming Sections 7512 of Title 20 and 11701 of Title 42 in Federal Code, the ANPRM
identified that throughout the 19th century and until 1893 the US “recognized the
independence of the Hawaiian Nation…[and] extended full and complete diplomatic
recognition to the Hawaiian Government” by making treaties for friendship, commerce,
and navigation in 1826, 1849, 1875, and 1887.279 This initial legal relationship was
without special trust obligations but diplomacy between two independently sovereign
nation-states. However, this relation was supplanted for another, transforming an
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international association into a site of federal jurisdiction. Discussing that the Hawaiian
Kingdom was overthrown by “a small group of non-Hawaiians, aided by the United
States Minister to Hawaii and the Armed Forces of the United States,”280 the ANPRM
asserted a joint resolution passed by Congress in 1898 to annex the Hawaiian islands
forged a new relationship. This inaugurated the federal government’s original recognition
of a domestic relationship with Kānaka ‘Ōiwi, as a community claiming prior belonging
to US territory rather than people who are Indigenous to Hawai‘i and also national
citizens of the Hawaiian Kingdom. International recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s
national sovereignty turned into Congressional acknowledgement of a Native Hawaiian
community within the US. Subsequently, the advanced notice discussed that Congress
instituted the Hawaiian Organic Act in 1900 to create the Territory of Hawai‘i and
acquire the “ceded lands” from the Hawaiian Kingdom, inasmuch as proceeds from the
lease and sale of these lands would benefit inhabitants of Hawai‘i, including Kānaka
‘Ōiwi. It then discussed that Congress instituted the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act
(HHCA) in 1920 to “rehabilitate the native Hawaiian population,” after their decline “by
some estimates from several hundred thousand in 1778 to only 22,600,” by designating
approximately 200,000 acres of “ceded lands” for Native Hawaiians to reestablish
traditional ways of life. In her comprehensive analysis of this legislation, Kauanui posits
the HHCA “institutionalized a trust agreement, constituting a special legal
relationship.”281 Lastly, the ANPRM discussed that Congress vested authority in the State
of Hawai‘i, through the Admissions Act in 1959, to administer and manage the lands set
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aside for rehabilitating “native Hawaiians” under the HHCA. The ANPRM argued,
“Congress has enacted more than 150 statutes recognizing and implementing a special
political and trust relationship with the Native Hawaiian community.”282 These statutes
constitute a legal relationship that the DOI, in its executive rulemaking process, interprets
and invokes to classify the US-Native Hawaiian relation as politically special and
premised upon trust. This special trust relationship that the US alleges to have formed
historically and maintained legally with the ‘Ōiwi community, however, is not formally
recognized as a government-to-government relationship.
Second, Congressional statutes instituted federal programs and services for
Kānaka Maoli. Another element of how the federal government claims its relationship
with Kānaka Maoli is through Congressional programs and services developed to benefit
Native Hawaiians. “Since Hawaii’s admission to the Union,” according to the ANPRM,
“Congress has enacted dozens of statutes on behalf of Native Hawaiians pursuant to the
United States’ recognized political relationship and trust responsibility.”283 It listed a few
of these statutes that have created programs and services for Native Hawaiians. The
Native Hawaiian Health Care Improvement Act, Native Hawaiian Education Act,
Workforce Investment Act, and Native American Programs Act generated special
programs for health care, education, loans, and employment. The Native American
Languages and National Historic Preservation Acts served to protect and preserve Native
Hawaiian culture, language, and historical sites. Congress also extended some of the
rights and privileges granted to American Indian, Alaska Native, Eskimo, and Aleut
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peoples—specifically from Native American Programs Act, American Indian Religious
Freedom Act, National Museum of the American Indian Act, and National American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act—onto Kānaka Maoli by classifying Native
Hawaiians as Native Americans. This is where the ANPRM begins to evacuate Kanaka
Maoli national sovereignty by distinctly including Native Hawaiian persons, and making
them primarily legible, in a US legal framework of civil rights and affirmative action
protections for Native American people. The ANPRM phrases it this way, “Congress has
consistently enacted programs and services expressly and specifically for the Native
Hawaiian community that are, in many respects, analogous to, but separate from, the
programs and services that Congress has enacted for federally recognized tribes in the
continental United States.”284 The language “analogous to but separate from” is, in my
estimation, a deliberate mechanism in the executive rulemaking process to interpellate
Kānaka Maoli as subjects of federal law. It continued, “As Congress explained, it ‘does
not extend services to Native Hawaiians because of their race, but because of their unique
status as the indigenous peoples of a once sovereign nation as to whom the United States
has established a trust relationship.”285 Later in the analysis, I expose this rhetorical
maneuver, suggesting Native Hawaiians—an Indigenous population the federal
government claims a political relationship with, trust obligations to, and thus implements
special programs and services for—are analogous to but separate from Native Americans,
to be a sly legal discourse and technique of settler-state power.
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Third, federal recognition of Native Americans represents a formal
government-to-government relationship. This government-to-government relationship
purports to impart self-determination, sovereignty, and other benefits onto Native
American tribes. “Yet,” the ANRPM stated, this has “long been denied to one place in
our Nation, even though it is home to one of the world’s largest indigenous communities:
Hawaii.”286 Two logics stand out in this passage. On one hand, the benefits of a
government-to-government relationship are denied to Kānaka Maoli. Such exclusion
rationalizes new instruments for inclusion, which are signified as expressions of equality,
justice, and reconciliation. On the other hand, acknowledging Kānaka ‘Ōiwi are a large
community of Indigenous people, Hawai‘i gets claimed as “one place in our Nation.”
This suggests Hawai‘i has been geographically included within the US settler-state but
Kānaka Maoli are politically excluded from a legal status and set of rights, enjoyed by
Indian tribes, under federal law. In fact, a group of ‘Ōiwi individuals and organizations
filed a lawsuit in 2001 that challenged the DOI’s Procedures for Federal
Acknowledgement of Indian Tribes, in Part 83 of Title 25 in the CFR, which excluded
Native Hawaiians from eligibility for federal recognition. In the Circuit Court decision
for Kahawaiolaa v. Norton (2004), the Procedures for Federal Acknowledgement were
upheld. The ANPRM noted, “the Ninth Circuit upheld the geographic limitation in the
part 83 regulations, ‘concluding that there was a rational basis for the Department [of the
Interior] to distinguish between Native Hawaiians and tribes in the continental United
States.’”287 Yet, the new proposal for rulemaking could bypass Part 83’s geographic
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limitation because the Circuit Court expressed the DOI may apply its expertise to
determine whether Native Hawaiians could be recognized on a government-togovernment basis. Flagging the administrative rule for federal recognition as an
accommodating and conciliatory gesture of political inclusion, the ANPRM continued,
“Reestablishing a government-to-government relationship with a reorganized sovereign
Native Hawaiian government that has been acknowledged by the United States could
enhance Federal agencies’ ability to implement the established relationship between the
United States and the Native Hawaiian community, while strengthening the selfdetermination of Hawaii’s indigenous people and facilitating the preservation of their
language, customs, heritage, health, and wealth.”288 Federal recognition would therein
reestablish a formal government-to-government relationship between the US and a
reorganized Native Hawaiian governing entity. This relationship could ameliorate the
capacity of federal agencies to enforce the special political and trust affiliation with
Kānaka Maoli. However, creating an administrative rule to amend executive procedures
for recognizing the sovereignty of a reorganized Native Hawaiian government would
strengthen the self-determination necessary to preserve Indigenous language, customs,
heritage, health, and wealth in Hawai‘i. These are the alleged benefits and gifts presented
to Kānaka Maoli in the US settler-state’s offer of federal recognition.
This legal history highlights that the ANPRM is not the first proposal to
federally recognize Kānaka Maoli. Proposed in 2000 by US senator Daniel Akaka, the
Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act, also known as the Akaka Bill, was an
earlier attempt to reorganize a Native Hawaiian government to be federally recognized.
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Kauanui disentangles three key legal developments that configured advocacy for the
federal recognition offered by the Akaka Bill.289 The first was a misguided interpretation
of the US Supreme Court ruling in Rice v. Cayetano (2000). The second was a succession
of lawsuits after the Rice v. Cayetano decision. The third was a genealogy of
Congressional acts that recognize Kānaka Maoli as Indigenous people and call for
reconciliation, such as Public Law 103-150 passed in 1993, also called the Apology
Resolution. Rice v. Cayetano opened up the programs and services for Kānaka Maoli to
attack. Written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the majority opinion ruled that the State
of Hawai‘i’s constitutional provision to restrict voting eligibility for trustees of OHA to
only Kānaka Maoli violated the Fifteenth Amendment by engaging in race-based voting
qualifications. Lawsuits emerged subsequently alleging state and federal policies to
implement programs and services for Kānaka Maoli, like OHA itself, were racially
discriminatory. Raiding civil rights and affirmative action protections, the political status
of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi Indigeneity became reduced to a racial identification. “Within the
broader context of these legal assaults, which deem any indigenous-specific program
racist,” Kauanui explains, “many Native Hawaiians and their allies support Akaka’s
proposal for federal recognition, since he pitched the legislation as a protective measure
against such lawsuits.”290 This is how federal recognition as a protective measure entered
into discourse. Kauanui says that when Akaka introduced the bill, he named the Apology
Resolution, which recognizes the sovereignty of Kānaka Maoli and apologizes for the
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US-backed illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, as the Akaka Bill’s basis for
pursuing reconciliation. “In the post-Rice climate,” she writes, “he suggested that the
apology provided the foundation for reconciliation and that the Akaka Bill was the means
by which a resolution was best served.”291 The Apology Resolution is the fundamental
legal authority in federal law for advancing reconciliation with Kānaka Maoli through
recognition.
The ANPRM used the Apology Resolution to rationalize federally recognizing
Kānaka ‘Ōiwi as an advancement of reconciliation. “In 1993,” it stated, “Congress
enacted a joint resolution to acknowledge the 100th anniversary of the overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaii and to offer an apology to Native Hawaiians.”292 Turning to
Congress’ words in the Apology Resolution, the ANPRM identified that the federal
government “express[ed] its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for
reconciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people.”293 Reiterating
the resolution’s apology for overthrowing the Hawaiian Kingdom, the ANPRM
manipulated the federal government’s admission of culpability to demonstrate that “there
has been no formal, organized Native Hawaiian government since 1893, when the United
States helped overthrow the Kingdom of Hawaii,”294 and thus suggest reestablishing a
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government-to-government relationship can reconcile this. Namely, reestablishing a
government-to-government relationship with Kānaka Maoli under federal law is a way
for the US to right its own wrong. With this in mind, the ANPRM acknowledged that the
US thwarted ‘Ōiwi rights to national and territorial sovereignty. The Apology Resolution
outlines, “The indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to
their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States,
either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or referendum.”295 This is a
remarkable legal claim because it suggests Kānaka ‘Ōiwi are a sovereign Indigenous
people that have never surrendered the Hawaiian Kingdom’s national land to the federal
government. However, the Apology Resolution is surreptitious, and the ANPRM mimics
its furtiveness. The Apology Resolution goes on, “Nothing in this Joint Resolution is
intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United States.”296 Claiming the
Apology Resolution is a no-fault apology, Kauanui contends, “It is clear that this
particular apology is nothing but an empty gesture that served a limited political goal to
recognize the one hundredth anniversary of the U.S.-backed unlawful overthrow of the
Hawaiian Kingdom.”297 The ANPRM conveys a “sorry state,” borrowing Kauanui’s
phrasing.298 It did so by weaponizing the apology to note, “Promulgating a rule would not
(1) alter the fundamental nature of the political and trust relationship established by
Congress between the United States and the Native Hawaiian community, (2) authorize
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compensation for past wrongs, or (3) have any direct impact on the status of the Hawaiian
homelands.”299 The apologetic settler-state, pretending to want to cure harms it has
perpetrated, opens up legal mechanisms for federal recognition under a veil of
reconciliation to coerce Kānaka Maoli into a legal, territorial settlement. A sorry state of
things, indeed. Commenting on the settlement process enacted through federal
recognition, Julian Aguon refers to this as “the red carpet the assassin lays out before the
murder takes place.”300 In the following section, I discuss how Kānaka Maoli refused the
supposed gifts offered through federal recognition’s reconciliation, and in turn rejected
the settler-state’s scheme for colonial domination of Kānaka Maoli and colonial
dispossession of Hawai‘i.
Articulating ‘A‘ole
When the DOI hosted public meetings in the summer of 2014 to solicit feedback
on whether and how the US should reestablish a government-to-government relationship
with a reorganized Native Hawaiian governing entity, Kānaka Maoli said no. At the
initial public meeting in Honolulu, O‘ahu on June 23, Juanita Kawamoto told
representatives from the DOI, “No thank you.” “I’d like to be clear,” she stressed, “all the
things that you’re doing here today are completely inappropriate, and I’m speaking in
clear English so that all of you can understand, this is very inappropriate, to the point of
absolutely disrespectful to our people here.” Kawamoto’s message was made clear and
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others followed suit. On the same day, in the meeting at Waimānalo, O‘ahu, Shane Pale
generously addressed each of the threshold questions offered in the ANPRM, described
in the last section. Answering all threshold questions, he retorted, “The short answer,
again no, no, no, no and no.” Five nays for five threshold inquiries. Although there was
very short notice given by the DOI, Kānaka Maoli mobilized quickly. Those that
provided verbal input on the ANPRM at public meetings, like Kawamoto and Pale,
declined its offer of federal recognition, unapologetically. In this section, I mine the
official transcripts that recorded oral testimony from DOI public meetings across Hawai‘i
and Indian Country in 2014, and show how Kānaka ‘Ōiwi rejected federal recognition
and refused the gift of its reconciliation. Analyzing testimony from these meetings for
mo‘olelo of opposition, I demonstrate that repudiation of the executive rulemaking
procedure and its proposed administrative rule was articulated through the utterance of
‘a‘ole, literally meaning no. Although ‘a‘ole appeared in mo‘olelo challenging federal
recognition in 2014 (see figure 12), ‘a‘ole is part of a larger mo‘okū‘auhau and historical
genealogy of ‘Ōiwi resistance to American imperialism, empire, colonialism, and settler
colonial capitalism in Hawai‘i. I track how articulations of ‘a‘ole against federal
recognition were conveyed in relation to histories, discourses, and embodiments of
Hawaiian national and Indigenous sovereignties. ‘A‘ole contributes to an archive of
Kanaka Maoli refusal. However, some opposition to the DOI, ANPRM, and federal
recognition reified paradigmatic Indianness. I close this section by reflecting, firstly, on
how ‘Ōiwi criticisms of settler-state recognition can transit US empire by exercising antiintersectionality in abjections of the Indian and, secondly, that ‘a‘ole provides a
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dialectical framework for relations of solidarity in the politics and practice of Indigenous
refusal.

Figure 12. ‘A‘OLE DOI NO ADMINISTRATIVE RULE CHANGE. Source: Hawaii
Reporter.301
The public meeting testimony illuminates that Kānaka Maoli overwhelmingly
disapproved of an executive rulemaking process and administrative rule to reestablish a
government-to-government relationship between the US and Native Hawaiian
community. In Kapa‘a, Kaua‘i on July 1, James Alalan Durest tackled the DOI’s
threshold questions in the ANPRM and exclaimed, “For you guys’ answers for the
questions, hell no.” For Durest and many others, disapproval was vehement and explicit.
But it was much more than an answer of no. Opposition was distinctively articulated as
301
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‘a‘ole. At the same meeting in Kapa‘a, Puanani Rogers posited, “I protest and oppose the
advance notice proposed rulemaking…and say ‘a‘ole, which means no in English.” In
their Hawaiian Dictionary, Mary Kawena Pukui and Samuel H. Elbert suggest that ‘a‘ole
translates, “No, not, never; to be none, to have none.”302 Those testifying against the DOI
and its ANPRM wielded this concise word with commanding meaning in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i
to reject the US settler-state’s politics and policy of recognition. Gale Ku‘ulei Baker
Miyamura Perez attended the July 3 meeting in Waimea, Hawai‘i and told the DOI, “I’m
here to say ‘a‘ole, or no, to all of your questions.” Although five threshold questions
oriented public input and feedback, there were also 19 procedural questions tucked into
the conclusion of the ANPRM—questions mainly about processes and criteria for
eligibility to participate in governmental reorganization, drafting a constitution, and
ratifying a constitution—that Kānaka ‘Ōiwi like Perez answered. E. Kalani Flores also
testified in Waimea. He declared, “We say ‘a‘ole, no, to all the questions. What it’s been
is occupation, and the occupation has caused destruction, desecration to our lands.”
Flores juxtaposed the symbolic proposition of recognition with realities of military
occupation and environmental desecration. In his argumentation, reestablishing a
government-to-government relation does not and cannot address the materiality of settlerstate violence upon the land. Building on these comments, Mitchell Alapa noted in
Kapa‘a, “All I got to say to you folks is ‘a‘ole. All these things is ‘a‘ole.” The ‘a‘ole went
farther, too. It suggested the DOI must leave or, as Heali‘i Kauhane phrased it in
Keaukaha on July 2, “go away.” Queries on whether and how the DOI should create a
new administrative rule for federally recognizing Kānaka Maoli were not turned down

302

Pukui & Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary, 27.
130

mildly. The rejection vigorously asserted that the federal government retreat from the
Hawaiian islands back to the American continent. Lawrence Aki, on June 28 in
Kaunakakai, Moloka‘i, issued an order: “You need to go home.” “These hearings,”
Walter Ritte summarized at the same meeting, “represent an honest reaction from the
Hawaiian community. The majority is in no mood to continue our subservient
relationship with the United States.” This was “a politicized expression of Indigenous
anger and outrage directed at a structural and symbolic violence that still structures our
lives, our relations with others, and our relationships with land,” Coulthard reminds us.303
According to a quantitative study of oral feedback on the ANPRM, approximately 95%
of Kanaka Maoli testifiers opposed the proposed rule making.304 The honest reaction, in
the words of Ritte, was qualitatively and quantitatively overwhelming. It communicated
an unquestionable disapproval of federal recognition as well as an utter contempt,
disgust, and resentment for the colonial relations of subordination that the US settler-state
attempts to continue.
‘A‘ole was articulated in relation to an intergenerational history of resistance.
“Oh, honest Americans,” Lākea Trask joshed at the Keaukaha meeting, “I stand before
you today empowered by the nearly 40,000 who signed the Ku‘e Petitions and said no to
annexation, the hundreds who testified already on their behalf. I stand here, humbled,
ha‘aha‘a, that you folks have come all this way to meet us face-to-face, alo to alo. And I
stand before you, angered and outraged at your motives for being here, for trying once
again to steal our identity.” Many testified, including myself, that their ancestors
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participated in the Kū‘ē Petitions to fight against US annexation of Hawai‘i in 1897,
illustrating a truth that the Hawaiian Kingdom never consented to submit to the national
sovereignty of the US and the Indigenous people of Hawai‘i continue to refuse consent to
be subjected under the executive authority of the federal government. As Trask remarked,
the proposal for federal recognition was a contemporary iteration of prolonged efforts to
burgle ‘Ōiwi Indigeneity and rob Hawaiian sovereignty. The Kū‘ē Petitions successfully
protected against this in the late 19th century, and they provide a genealogical context and
rationale for ‘Ōiwi resistance to the US settler-state. “Refusal holds on to a truth,”
Simpson asserts, “structures this truth as stance through time, as its own structure and
comingling with the force of presumed and inevitable disappearance and operates as the
revenge of consent.”305 So on July 8 in Kahului, Maui, Napua Nakasone stood firm on
her truth: “Just as my kupuna wahine’s signature proudly sits on the ku‘e petition of
December 1897. I want my children, and my children’s children, and their children after
that to know beyond a shadow of a doubt that I wholeheartedly oppose the United States’
occupation of my Hawai‘i.” In the spirit of ancestral relatives who opposed the
commencement of US occupation in the late 19th century, Kānaka Maoli testifying
against the DOI and ANPRM in the 21st century refuse to reconcile with the US by
reestablishing a government-to-government relationship because federal recognition
masquerades the settler-state’s unabated occupation of Hawai‘i. From Nakasone’s
invocation of her kupuna wahine (female ancestor) to her children and future
descendants, it was mo‘okū‘auhau consciousness in action.
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Articulating ‘a‘ole was rooted to and enhanced an archive of Kanaka Maoli
refusal. It is an archive full of rich mo‘olelo—histories, stories, and accounts of our
refusal. On one hand, the ‘a‘ole in testimony against federal recognition was established
through a history of ‘Ōiwi refusals. On the other hand, these particular expressions of
‘a‘ole contributed to an enduring genealogy of Kanaka Maoli refusal. “The past is
referred to as Ka wa mamua, ‘the time in front or before.’ Whereas the future, when
thought of at all, is Ka wa ma hope, or ‘the time which comes after or behind.’ It is as if
the Hawaiian stands firmly in the present,” Lilikalā Kame‘eleihiwa says, “with his back
to the future, and his eyes fixed upon the past, seeking historical answers for present-day
dilemmas.”306 With 1,795 pages of transcripts recorded from 20 public meetings across
six Hawaiian islands and five tribal territories in 2014, the official record is overflowing
with, and haunted by, utterances of no and ‘a‘ole from Kānaka Maoli. And there is more.
My analysis does not explore the video recordings of meetings, which are available
online, or in-situ observations of the public meetings. My argument is that this archive of
refusal, documenting explicit articulations of ‘a‘ole to the DOI and its ANPRM, is based
on and perpetuates mo‘olelo to overturn the US settler-state in Hawai‘i as a domain of
knowledge that shapes truth for the lāhui Hawai‘i in the struggle over federal recognition.
It is another gift of sovereignty that I desire to share.
However, some testimony against federal recognition replicated settler colonial
relations of domination and dispossession. An exemplar from public meetings elucidates
this. In Keaukaha, Mililani Trask testified against the DOI and ANPRM. Beginning with
opposition to the US settler colonial relationship extended to Kānaka Maoli, she said,

306

Kame‘eleihiwa, Native Land and Foreign Desires, 22-23, original emphasis.
133

“When the federal government and the state agreed to impose upon our peoples the yoke
of perpetual wardship, this yolk, we break. We cannot accept it any further.” Trask then
conveyed her specific disapproval. “Our response to the interrogatories that are posed by
Interior are all no. And the reason why,” she opined, “is because we are capable of being
self-governing. But we are not capable of expressing our right to self-determination
because federal policy limits this. We are not Indians. We will never be Indians and the
federal Indian policy is inappropriate for our peoples.” This is an example of what Amy
L. Brandzel calls anti-intersectionality.307 Brandzel suggests that the settler-state does not
desire intersectionality but actively refutes it by proliferating anti-intersectionality, or
“epistemologies of identity that are normative, single-axis, and comparatively valued
against other categories of identity.”308 They argue, “Hegemonic anti-intersectionality
renarrativizes the naturalness and idealization of normative categories and reenacts
violence to nonnormative categories by renaturalizing their inhumanity.”309 In Against
Citizenship, Brandzel reflects on rhetoric deployed by Kānaka Maoli during the DOI’s
public meetings as an example of how the US settler-state uses disciplinary powers of
racialization to pass through and divide Indigenous populations regulated by its colonial
power. “Kanaka Maoli argued that they are ‘not Indians,’ and that the offer to recognize a
‘government to government’ relationship on the U.S. nation-state’s terms was a process
of transforming Kanaka Maoli into ‘tribes’ and ‘Indians,’” according to Brandzel.310 This
logic played out in Trask’s testimony. Although some Kānaka Maoli communicated
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opposition to federal regulation in solidarity with American Indian people and their tribal
governments, Brandzel asserts testimonies that articulated anti-Indian rhetoric hindered
possibilities for intersectional coalitions and resistance within the identificatory category
of Indigeneity by reifying discourses of colonial racism. In her protest of federal
recognition, Trask concluded, “You can braid my hair and stick feathers in it, but I would
never be an Indian. I will always be a Hawaiian.” Instances of this anti-intersectional
logic are peppered throughout the archive of refusal. Doing so, Trask and other Kānaka
Maoli renarrate “‘Indian’ as sign within U.S. colonial discourse,” which Byrd says,
“serves as a deracinated supplement that signifies the underside of imperial
dominance.”311 My hope in this discussion is to name rather than silence and denaturalize
instead of normalize an anti-Indian rhetoric in the genealogy of Kanaka Maoli resistance
to the US settler-state. Otherwise, paradigmatic Indianness continues to circulate and
prop up the colonialism and empire of the US settler-state. “Because ‘Indianness’ serves
as the ontological scaffolding for colonialist domination, anticolonial resistances, which
align themselves against ‘Indianness’ as a manifestation of empire,” such as Trask’s
stand against federal recognition of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi in Hawai‘i, “risk reflecting and
reinscribing the very colonialist discourses used to possess and contain American Indian
nations back onto the abjected ‘Indian’ yet again.”312 Instead of challenging federal
recognition through paradigmatic Indianness, I suggest ‘a‘ole offers an intersectional
framework to filter the cacophony of settler-state techniques of racialization and
colonization. Testifying ‘a‘ole to the DOI and ANPRM in (racialized) abjections of the
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Indian testifies, at the same time, ‘ae or yes to material conditions of (colonial) violence
that Native American peoples are subjected through federal Indian law. This is a dialectic
orientation to consider what refusal rejects as well as what it may affirm. ‘A‘ole can be a
critically intersectional framework that is intellectually promiscuous enough to say no to
federal recognition without saying ‘ae to the settlement of other Indigenous people,
which further emboldens US juridical and territorial power to settle Kānaka Maoli and
Hawai‘i.
Notices of Settlement
Despite explicit opposition to the federal recognition proposed in the ANPRM,
the DOI published a Notice for Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on October 1, 2015. The
DOI suggested that a majority of written comments submitted in reference to the
ANPRM supported federal recognition. Exactly 5,164 written comments were received,
“more than half of which were identical postcards submitted in support of reestablishing
a government-to-government relationship through Federal rulemaking.”313 The
privileging of written comments over verbal testimony was a blatant dismissal of
opposing input and feedback from Kānaka Maoli at public meetings. “Despite 90% of the
oral testimonies being in opposition to drafting a proposed rule,” according to the
coalition Protest Na‘i Aupuni, “they were not counted and the DOI has never given a
clear answer as to ‘Why?’”314 By doing so, the DOI claimed the general public
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“overwhelmingly favored creating a pathway for reestablishing a formal government-togovernment relationship.”315 In this section, I argue that the ANPRM and NPRM were
notices of settlement. Settlement was signified as a two-fold procedure. The ANPRM and
NPRM were formal legal notices that announced the federal government was attempting
to test and settle the precarious biopolitical position of Kānaka Maoli to geopolitically
settle Hawai‘i for the US settler-state. The NPRM was the second component in the
DOI’s executive rulemaking process to create a new administrative rule for reestablishing
a government-to-government relationship with a reorganized Native Hawaiian
government. The proposed rule would not assist in reorganizing a Native Hawaiian
government, nor would it help in drafting a constitution for what it called the reorganized
Native Hawaiian Government Entity (NHGE). The NPRM indicated, “The Native
Hawaiian community itself would determine whether and how to reorganize its
government.”316 The notice asserted instead that the rule “would establish an
administrative procedure and criteria that the Secretary would use if the Native Hawaiian
community forms a unified government that then seeks a formal government-togovernment relationship with the United States.”317 What the DOI garnered from
responses to the ANPRM was that federal law should open a procedural door for the
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Native Hawaiian community to choose to walk through or not. The choice to be federally
recognized is up to Kānaka Maoli.
The NPRM briefly summarized and addressed 14 thematic responses to the
ANPRM. It scorned opposing responses that objected to US jurisdiction, from federal and
state governments, over Kānaka Maoli and Hawai‘i. The NPRM retorted, “Comments
about altering the fundamental nature of the political and trust relationship that Congress
has established between the United States and the Native Hawaiian community were
outside the ANPRM’s scope and therefore did not inform the development of the
proposed rule.”318 The rulemaking process openly omitted these comments, these
choices. It subsequently posited, “The Department is bound by Congressional enactments
concerning the status of Hawaii. Under those enactments and under the United States
Constitution, Hawaii is a State of the United States of America.”319 Reiterating the legal
history produced in the ANPRM, it argued that citizens of the State of Hawai‘i, through a
referendum election, consented to all provisions of the Admissions Act in 1959. “The
comments in response to the ANPRM that call into question the State of Hawaii’s
legitimacy, and its status as one of the United States under the Constitution,” the NPRM
stated, “therefore are inconsistent with the express determination of Congress, which is
binding on the Department.”320 In other words, any opposition based in argumentation
that the US federal government and State of Hawai‘i do not maintain jurisdiction over
Kānaka Maoli and Hawai‘i would be dismissed from the executive rulemaking process.
Valuing written comments, the NPRM thus did not hold public meetings to solicit verbal
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testimony. Public input and feedback were only accepted through written forms, which in
the case of the ANPRM supported federal recognition vis-à-vis identical postcards that
were repeatedly submitted and uniquely counted.
The NPRM manipulated the ANPRM’s contrived legal history, establishing the
federal government’s special trust relationship with the Native Hawaiian community, as a
way to rationalize that Congress’ plenary power over Native Americans extends to Native
Hawaiians and a new administrative rule for federal recognition would not alter that
juridical power but would strengthen its territorial sovereignty in Hawai‘i. In its overview
of the proposed rule, the DOI discussed how the special trust relationship between the
federal government and Native Hawaiian community authorized the executive
rulemaking process because of Congress’ existing jurisdiction over Indigenous
populations within the US. “Through its plenary power over Native American affairs,”
the NPRM alleged, “Congress recognized the Native Hawaiian community by passing
more than 150 statutes during the last century and providing special Federal programs
and services for its benefit.”321 Whereas the ANPRM pronounced a legal history for
advancing reconciliation, the NPRM announced that this legal history is a settled matter
under Congressional authority. “The existing body of legislation makes plain that
Congress determined repeatedly, over a period of almost a century,” the NPRM
suggested, “that the Native Hawaiian population is an existing Native community that is
within the scope of the Federal Government’s powers over Native American affairs and
with which the United States has an ongoing special political and trust relationship.”322 In
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such logic, reestablishing a government-to-government relationship with a reorganized
NHGE would not mirror the nation-to-nation association developed between the US and
Hawaiian Kingdom. Delineating these relations, the NPRM asserted, “The Native
Hawaiian Governing Entity would remain subject to the same authority of Congress and
the United States to which those tribes are subject and would remain ineligible for
Federal Indian programs, services, and benefits.”323 Kānaka ‘Ōiwi would be officially
denationalized as subjects of the Hawaiian Kingdom and regulated as an Indigenous
population, not comprising a tribe eligible for federal Indian programs and services,
subjected to the juridical and territorial sovereignty of the US settler-state. The pervasive
rhetoric that Native Hawaiians are “analogous to but separate from” Native Americans
legally resolves the precarious position of Kānaka Maoli to settle the territoriality of
Hawai‘i as geographically part of the US settler-state. The NPRM blatantly argued,
“Reestablishment of the formal government-to-government relationship will not affect
title, jurisdiction, or status of Federal lands and property in Hawaii. This provision does
not affect lands owned by the State of Hawaii or provisions of State law…And nothing in
this proposed rule would alter the sovereign immunity of the United States or the
sovereign immunity of the State of Hawaii.”324 In effect, the proposed administrative rule
would confirm the federal government’s avowed special political relationship with trust
obligations, pulling Kānaka Maoli deep into the undertow of Congress’ plenary power,
and could formally recognize a Native Hawaiian Governing Entity as a dependent ward
of the settler-state without legal rights to land and resources in Hawai‘i. This is precisely
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how the ANPRM and NPRM acknowledged, discussed, and rationalized that the legal
status of Kānaka Maoli would be settled and Hawai‘i would be settled as territory
possessed by the US settler-state.
Rule of Recognition
In this concluding section, I analyze the DOI’s Final Rule and contend that it,
strengthening the geopower of US settler colonial biopolitics, institutionalized a new
paradigm for federal recognition that seeks to incorporate Native Hawaiians as Indians
without land. Whereas the ANPRM suggested reestablishing a government-togovernment relationship between the US and Native Hawaiian community would
advance reconciliation, the NPRM deployed the ANPRM’s legal history to naturalize the
federal government’s authority over a special trust relation with Native Hawaiians and to
normalize the federal and state governments’ territorial jurisdiction over Hawai‘i.
Approximately one year after publishing the NPRM, the DOI issued an administrative
rule on October 14, 2016 to facilitate federal recognition of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi. “The Final
rule,” it begins, “sets forth an administrative procedure and criteria that the Secretary
would use if the Native Hawaiian community forms a unified government that then seeks
a formal government-to-government relationship with the United States.”325 As the Final
Rule is operative presently, the choice is either to seek federal recognition of a NHGE or
maintain the juridical status quo of Congress’ plenary power through an existing special
trust relationship. In cases like this, the exercise of federal law upon Indigenous people
purports to provide a liberal democratic freedom of choice, while deceitfully working in
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practice to fortify the disciplinary and regulatory jaws of the settler-state’s vice grip. By
interrogating the legal mechanisms, logical extensions, and theoretical models imbued
into the Final Rule, I suggest that the federal government’s assertions of sovereignty are
precarious and in disorder. Looking once more at opposing mo‘olelo in oral testimony
from public meetings in 2014, I track how Kanaka Maoli refusal of federal recognition
brilliantly exposed the incoherence and disarray of US settler sovereignty upon the ‘āina
of Hawai‘i. To that end, this section explicates the biopolitical animus aimed at Kānaka
Maoli for geopolitical settlement of Hawai‘i and also the ways in which Kānaka Maoli
disrupt the sovereign nucleus of US settler colonial biopower.
The biopolitical and geopolitical schematics within the US settler-state’s offer of
recognition to Kānaka ‘Ōiwi employ mechanisms, logics, and models that hinge upon
colonial techniques of race, gender, sexuality, and class. In the Final Rule, the rhetorical
maneuver that previously in the ANPRM and NPRM marked Kānaka ‘Ōiwi as
“analogous to but separate from” Native Americans transforms into a discursive
formation. By comparing the programs and services provided to Native Hawaiians as
analogous to but separate from those bestowed onto Indians in federally recognized
tribes, the administrative rule regulates Kānaka Maoli as an Indigenous group akin to
Native Americans, which stands-in for a racialized categorization of populations subject
to US settler-state sovereignty. Referencing Congress’ plenary power over Indian affairs
and its support through case law, the DOI suggests the Final Rule flows from and
enforces Indian law and policy. For example, the rule cites the Federally Recognized
Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, which recognized Congress’ power to acknowledge Indian
tribes via legislation and delegated such authority to the DOI, to elaborate that because
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Congressional statutes already acknowledge a special trust relationship with Native
Hawaiians that “the language of the List Act’s definition of the term ‘Indian tribe’ is
broad and encompasses the Native Hawaiian community.”326 Here, Native Hawaiians are
considered Indians and, as a political community, constitute a tribe. Discussing US
Supreme Court decisions in Johnson v. MʻIntosh (1823), Cherokee v. Georgia (1831),
and Worcester v. Georgia (1832), Barker shows the US settler-state “asserted that tribes
were weaker—uncivilized races living as barbarians in a permanent state of nature.”327
The Final Rule reifies, as Barker puts it, US national narrations that racialize Indigenous
people as uncivilized primitives, immoral and perverse heathens, backwards barbarians,
merciless savages, domestic dependents, and childlike and immature wards—racializing
monikers of inferiority that are concomitantly gendered and sexualized—that are tropes
of white supremacist and heteropatriarchal settler colonialism.
Incorporating Native Hawaiians under federal law as an Indigenous population
similar to those of Indian tribes transfers a separate process of racialization for analogous
colonial objectives. This is the colonial order of things undergirding the DOI’s discourse
of analogous yet separate. But, the rule of recognition that the Native Hawaiian
community constitutes an Indian tribe is limited through logics of land. The federal
government is recreating Native Hawaiians as Indians without land. Institutionalizing a
dangerous archetype for colonial dispossession in federal Indian law and policy, the rule
seeks to recognize and absorb new tribes that are without jurisdiction over territory and
resources, which the settler-state and its settler citizenry can then, in turn, call its own.
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For example, the Final Rule interprets the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, delimiting
the geographic scope for definitions of “Indian,” to suggest that “Indian land” cannot be
taken into trust for a NHGE. It similarly interprets the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of
1988 to declare that the NHGE would not be eligible to conduct gaming due to
definitions of “Indian lands” for “Indian tribes.” The rule states that the Gaming Act “was
enacted to balance the interest of states and tribes and to provide a framework for
regulating gaming on ‘Indian lands.’ There are no such lands in Hawaii.”328 Here, Native
Hawaiians are considered Indians but without Indian land, effectively dispossessing
Kānaka Maoli of land in Hawai‘i. Other measures like the Indian Child Welfare Act and
Violence Against Women Act would also not apply since “Congress provides a parallel
set of benefits to Native Hawaiians within the framework of legislation that also provides
programs to other Native groups.”329 An inclusive biopolitical exclusion of Native
Hawaiians running parallel to, but premised on, the peculiar juridical status of Native
Americans, these legal instruments pivot upon the logical extension of settler-state
territoriality. “Because there is no Indian country in Hawaii,” the Final Rule explains,
“upon reestablishing a government-to-government relationship with the United States, the
Native Hawaiian Governing Entity would not have territorial jurisdiction.”330 It is as
Barker says, “The rub as it were, for Native peoples, is that they are only recognized as
Native within the legal terms and social conditions of racialized discourses that serve the
national interest of the United States in maintaining colonial and imperial relations with
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Native peoples.”331 The biopolitical management of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi as a racialized,
gendered, and sexualized population of Native Hawaiians alike Native Americans
produces a discursive formation, which creates rules and limits according to “analogous
but separate” and “parallel” legal logics that ultimately attempt to shore up the geopower
of US settler colonial biopolitics. Testing and settling the biopolitical status of Kānaka
Maoli not only functions to settle the geopolitical status of Hawai‘i but, concomitantly,
fashions a fresh liberal paradigm for federal Indian law and policy that desires to
recognize and incorporate tribes without land and resources or territorial jurisdiction over
them.
In testimony against the DOI’s proposal for the Final Rule, Kānaka Maoli
identified and disrupted the biopolitical and geopolitical calculations within settler-state
recognition. In Kahului, Kaleikoa Ka‘eo pronounced, “No consent, never. No,
Department of the Interior. No treaty, never. No, Department of Interior. No cession of
our citizenship. No, Department of Interior. No justice for our people for 120 years. No to
the Department of Interior. No lawful authority to sit upon our people and step upon our
necks. No to the Department of Interior.” His words illustrate how the US settler-state
exercises heteropatriarchal colonial power by disregarding Kanaka Maoli consent.
Furthermore, Ka‘eo extended consent’s revenge to assert that a treaty of annexation was
never signed, Hawaiian national citizenship has never been resigned, and federal
government thus does not have juridical authority to regulate the lāhui and discipline
Kānaka Maoli. All of this was to say no to the DOI and its rule for recognition. On
Moloka‘i, these sentiments were echoed. “I am not American, I am not American,” Guy
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Hanohano Naehu declared there, “[a]nd shame on you guys for perpetrating the illegality.
Shame on you guys for perpetrating the fraud.” Building on Ka‘eo’s assertion of
Hawaiian citizenship, Naehu stated plainly that he is not American, that Kānaka ‘Ōiwi
are not US citizens and the rules of recognition perpetuate a fraudulent construction that
Kānaka ‘Ōiwi are Americans because of a special trust relationship stemming from an
unlawful and illegal occupation of Hawai‘i. These mo‘olelo of opposition were resurgent
refusals. They combined the rejection of recognition through Indigenous resurgence with
a refusal of US settler-state sovereignty. “Indigenous peoples’ individual and collective
expressions of anger and resentment,” Coulthard writes, “can help prompt the very forms
of self-affirmative praxis that generate rehabilitated Indigenous subjectivities and
decolonized forms of life in ways that the combined politics of recognition and
reconciliation has so far proven itself incapable of doing.”332 This archive of Kanaka
Maoli refusal represents a collective self-affirmation that celebrates the polity of the
Indigenous and seeks decolonization and deoccupation, in the same step. On the island of
Maui, Tisha-Marie Beattie responded to questions from the DOI: “Your answer from me
is no.” But she clarified her answer by saying, “You cannot give me back something I
never gave up...take your thing you wanna give us, throw ‘em in the trash.” Such
mo‘olelo combatted federal recognition by detecting and challenging how the settler-state
was attempting to solidify its geopower through biopolitics. National and territorial
sovereignty could not be given back to Kānaka Maoli because it has never been
relinquished, which the ANPRM, NPRM, and Final Rule noticeably admit in their
reliance on the Apology Resolution to advance reconciliation. The offer of recognition is
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trash, not a gift or even something recyclable but indeed a thing to be thrown away. “We
don’t want it,” Beattie concluded, “[w]e sovereign.”
The potent assertions of Hawaiian sovereignties, performing a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi
politics of ea, illuminate a settler state of exception. Rather than amending the process for
formal acknowledgement in the CFR, the executive rule manufactured a new
administrative procedure to facilitate federal recognition through reestablishing a
government-to-government relationship with Native Hawaiians. Codified as Part 50 of
Title 43 in the CFR, the Final Rule made an exception to the geographic limitation
barring Kānaka Maoli from acknowledgement under Part 83 of Title 25 in the CFR. In
doing so, the Final Rule is a US settler state of exception. The executive, supported by
the legislative and judiciary branches of American democratic governance, has declared
an exception to existing legal frameworks of formal acknowledgement to create new law
for federal recognition that precariously attempts to signify sovereign power through the
extension of law in its suspension. The (sovereign) rulemaking includes Native
Hawaiians (biopolitically) within existing regulations of Indian affairs only insofar as
they are excluded from territorial authority and jurisdiction (geopolitically). Nevertheless,
Rifkin suggests that Indigenous claims of sovereignty can unmask and radically
antagonize the emptiness and incoherence of settler sovereignty as it anxiously attempts
to be stabilized through settler states of exception.333 Kānaka Maoli did just this. On
Kaua‘i island, Ka‘iulani Lovell told the DOI, “We’re not part of your state. We’re not
here to create something where we’re working together. We don’t need to be recognized
by you. We know who we are.” By articulating ‘a‘ole to the executive rulemaking, and
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practicing and performing ea, Kānaka Maoli exposed the offer of federal recognition to
be a surreptitious sham of settler sovereignty, attempting to cohere US geopower in
Hawai‘i by manufacturing and resolving the anomalous biopolitical status of Native
Hawaiians. Kānaka Maoli are not a part of the US settler-state. Kānaka Maoli are not
wishing to collaborate with the federal government. And Kānaka Maoli do not need to be
recognized by the US settler-state because we know who we are. Maintaining kuleana to
the ‘āina, this was a gift that presented responsibility to the US settler-state and its settlers
in Hawai‘i. It is time they start listening. As a generous gift, the public testimony
disrupted the notices of settlement and rules of recognition to overturn the settler
sovereignty fueled by settler colonial capital.
I want to wrap up with a theoretical model in the administrative rule, which
vividly expresses the incoherence and disorder of US settler sovereignty in Hawai‘i and
also how the rule of recognition continues to be operational in the machinery of US
settler colonial biopolitics. The Final Rule institutes an administrative procedure to
reestablish a government-to-government relationship with Native Hawaiians and, in
doing so, generated criteria for the reorganization process. One pivotal criterion is
community support for the reorganization of a Native Hawaiian government. Despite
DOI claims to non-interference, reorganization must meet criteria outlined in the Final
Rule for ratifying a constitutional document in order to follow rules for federal
recognition. “A Native Hawaiian government,” the rule stipulates, “must have a
constitution or other governing document ratified both by a majority vote of Native
Hawaiians and by a majority vote of those Native Hawaiians who qualify as HHCA
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Native Hawaiians.”334 What the DOI means by distinguishing “Native Hawaiians” from
“HHCA Native Hawaiians” goes back to definitions in the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act of 1920, which suggest a “native Hawaiian” possesses and demonstrates 50 percent
blood ancestry to be eligible for rehabilitive homesteading.335 Kānaka Maoli that do so
are legally classified native Hawaiians and known also as HHCA Native Hawaiians. The
Final Rule requires that reorganization must have a majority of affirmative votes from a
sufficiently large turnout in the ratification of a constitutional document from both Native
Hawaiian and native Hawaiians. This reifies racialized class distinctions of Kānaka
‘Ōiwi, manufactured historically through the blood quantum policy of the HHCA, that
continue to fragment and divide the lāhui around imposed notions of cultural authenticity.
The rule turns on specific threshold criteria in a ratification referendum by Native and
native Hawaiians. While convoluted, it is structured like this. The Secretary of the DOI
will only assess an application to reestablish a government-to-government relationship if
the NHGE meets a minimum threshold for broad-based community support. The
minimum threshold for broad-based community support is 30,000 affirmative votes from
Native Hawaiians and 9,000 affirmative votes from native Hawaiians. Another threshold
creates a presumption of broad-based community support. If affirmative votes cast by
Native Hawaiians exceed 50,000 and affirmative votes cast by native Hawaiians exceed
15,000 then the Secretary “would be well justified in finding broad-based community
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support.”336 The model to determine threshold criteria for broad-based community
support, however, is warped and unstable to say the least.
The DOI’s modeling of thresholds for broad-based community support as part of
broad-based community participation is self-referential and artificially low. This makes
the process for recognizing and incorporating Kānaka Maoli without land or territorial
authority dangerously easy. The Final Rule outlines a four-fold methodology for
participation and support thresholds. First, the DOI reviewed Native Hawaiian voter
turnout in national and state elections from 1988 to 2014 to measure broad-based
electoral participation in the State of Hawai‘i. Second, based on that data, the DOI
predicts that “a Native Hawaiian ratification referendum would have a turnout
somewhere in the range between 60,000 and 100,000” and “turnout within this range
demonstrates broad-based participation.”337 This range is modeled on voter data from
1998 that shows 65,000 Kānaka Maoli voted out of 100,000 whom were registered
voters. The DOI claims that the predicted range reflects an accurate measurement of
broad-based electoral participation in the State of Hawai‘i. Third, the DOI adjusted
estimates to account for the Native Hawaiian population increasing over time and Kānaka
Maoli that are located outside the State of Hawai‘i. Adjusting for an increasing growth
rate and high and low percentages of Native Hawaiian voters in 1988 and 1999,
respectively, the Final Rule estimates that 52,300 to 81,913 of in-state Native Hawaiians
will likely turnout to vote. The DOI adjusted this range upwards by 20 percent to
proportionally include out-of-state Native Hawaiian representation, which resulted in a
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slightly larger estimate of 62,760 to 98,296 for both in- and out-of-state Native
Hawaiians that will likely turnout to vote. This estimate fit and confirmed the initial
prediction that 60,000 to 100,000 Native Hawaiians will likely turnout to vote in a
ratification referendum. Fourth, the DOI predicts that 18,000 to 30,000 of native
Hawaiians will likely turnout to vote in a ratification referendum because “HHCA Native
Hawaiian adults are approximately 30 percent of the Native Hawaiian adult
population,”338 and this range represents broad-based community participation from
native Hawaiians. In sum, the minimum number of affirmative votes required to
demonstrate broad-based community support by native Hawaiians is 9,000 and by Native
Hawaiians is 30,000, whereas a presumption of broad-based community support requires
affirmative votes by native Hawaiians that exceed 15,000 (as a simple majority of
30,000) and by Native Hawaiians that exceed 50,000 (as a simple majority of 100,000).
But the modeling for this threshold criteria is terribly self-referential. Predictions of
Native Hawaiian voter turnout for a ratification referendum are predicated on voter
turnout data from national and state elections in the State of Hawai‘i. Using this data is
biased toward, and skewed by, settler-state elections. Yet, the DOI analyzed this dataset
to predict figures for Kanaka ‘Ōiwi elections. The model is a closed loop because the
DOI refers to and uses its own data from US settler-state elections as a way to determine
thresholds for broad-based community participation and support by Kānaka Maoli in the
reorganization of a Native Hawaiian government. If the ratification referendum for a
NHGE is not a settler-state election then it is shrewdly self-referential by generating
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threshold criteria for it based on data from settler-state elections. This self-referentiality
also fosters artificially low threshold ranges. For example, the adjustment to
proportionally include out-of-state Native Hawaiian representation only increases the
estimated range for broad-based community participation from 52,300-81,913 to 62,76098,296. This adjustment accounts for approximately 10,000 to 16,000 additional Native
Hawaiian voters from out-of-state, while about 500,000 Kānaka ‘Ōiwi are displaced from
Hawai‘i and out-of-state, as the Final Rule describes, representing about half of the entire
population of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi. Digging into the model, this paltry adjustment is premised
on proportional representation data from elections organized by the State of Hawai‘i. The
self-referential analysis of US settler-state voter turnout and election data keeps
thresholds for broad-based Native Hawaiian participation and support artificially low.
Unambiguously, this designs the administrative procedure for reestablishing a
government-to-government relationship to be significantly easier for the NHGE to satisfy
criteria for the ratification referendum and follow rules for reorganization so that the
Secretary of the DOI will more likely approve an application for federal recognition. The
settler-state is stacking the cards in its own favor. I contend that the self-referentiality and
artificially low thresholds vividly illustrate the federal government’s anxiety over settling
the legal status of Kānaka Maoli. However, this reveals the federal government’s
precarious and disorderly attempts to manufacture US settler sovereignty in Hawai‘i. But
the rules of recognition persist, and they remain operative still. In the next chapter, I
explore how the State of Hawai‘i strategically coordinated a state-determined process for
reorganizing a Native Hawaiian government that sought to obey the rule of recognition
and its colonial dispossession.
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Chapter 4
Geontologies of Aloha ‘Āina

After meeting for just twenty days, delegates of a constitutional convention held
in Maunawili, O‘ahu drafted and passed a constitution to create a Native Hawaiian
government. On February 26, 2016, the convention organized by Na‘i Aupuni, a private
non-profit organization funded by OHA, adopted the Constitution of the Native Hawaiian
Nation. The preamble of the Constitution of the Native Hawaiian Nation states:
We, the indigenous peoples of Hawaiʻi, descendants of our ancestral lands from
time immemorial, share a common national identity, culture, language, traditions,
history, and ancestry. We are a people who Aloha Akua, Aloha ‘Āina, and Aloha
each other. We mālama all generations, from keiki to kupuna, including those
who have passed on and those yet to come. We mālama our ‘Āina and affirm our
ancestral rights and Kuleana to all lands, waters, and resources of our islands and
surrounding seas. We are united in our desire to cultivate the full expression of
our traditions, customs, innovations, and beliefs of our living culture, while
fostering the revitalization of ʻŌlelo Hawaiʻi, for we are a Nation that seeks Pono.
Honoring all those who have steadfastly upheld the self-determination of our
people against adversity and injustice, we join together to affirm a government of,
by, and for Native Hawaiian people to perpetuate a Pono government and
promote the well-being of our people and the ‘Āina that sustains us. We reaffirm
the National Sovereignty of the Nation. We reserve all rights to Sovereignty and
Self-determination, including the pursuit of independence. Our highest
aspirations are set upon the promise of our unity and this Constitution.
The preamble presents a circuitous stance. It twists the concept of aloha into aspirations
for sovereignty, self-determination, independence, and unity that the Constitution of the
Native Hawaiian Nation appears to represent and promises to deliver. Aloha for the akua,
for the ‘āina, and for each other becomes a suspicious smokescreen for the new Native
Hawaiian Nation. With this in mind, there are some key questions that I address in this
chapter: How has the US settler-state controlled and narrowed nation-building for
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Kānaka Maoli?; In what ways has the State of Hawai‘i fashioned a process to reorganize
a Native Hawaiian government for federal recognition?; How have Kānaka Maoli
mobilized aloha ‘āina to reject nation-building linked to federal recognition and engage
alternative modes of self-governance?
The State of Hawai‘i’s legal process for Native Hawaiian nation-building is
entangled with the executive procedures to federally recognize Native Hawaiians. The
Constitution of the Native Hawaiian Nation was manufactured four months after the DOI
published its NPRM and approximately eight months before the DOI issued its Final
Rule, which generated an administrative procedure for federally recognizing a
reorganized Native Hawaiian Governing Entity (NHGE). This timing is no coincidence.
The ANPRM and NPRM, in 2014 and 2015 respectively, suggested that reorganization of
a NHGE depends upon crafting a governing document. In light of this, OHA—a State of
Hawai‘i agency pursuant to statutory laws on Native Hawaiian self-determination—gave
birth to Na‘i Aupuni. Na‘i Aupuni sought to design a governing document in a
constitutional convention called the ‘Aha, which means assembly, gathering, and
meeting.339 After the ‘Aha adopted a constitution in February of 2016, the DOI published
its Final Rule in October the same year and then outlined criteria for recognizing a
reorganized NHGE. One major criterion is that a NHGE, like the newly created Native
Hawaiian Nation, convene a ratification referendum and procure broad-based community
participation and support for its constitution. Indeed, the Constitution of the Native
Hawaiian Nation is not fortuitous. Familiar bedfellows, the federal government’s
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administrative rule to reestablish a government-to-government relationship with Native
Hawaiians is intimately attached to the State of Hawai‘i’s legal processes for facilitating
Native Hawaiian self-governance. This chapter interrogates the latter and how it has
attempted to constitute Kanaka Maoli consent for federal recognition and settler
sovereignty.
Seeing through the sham, Kanaka Maoli activists protested the ‘Aha. Although
some Kānaka Maoli participated as delegates in Na‘i Aupuni’s ‘Aha to reorganize a
Native Hawaiian government, many Kānaka Maoli opposed this method of nationbuilding since it was influenced by US federal and state governments and barred Kānaka
Maoli whom were not delegates. Despite the fact that all participating delegates were
Kanaka Maoli, the process was not structurally determined by Kānaka Maoli and
excluded a majority of Kānaka Maoli. During the ‘Aha, Kanaka Maoli activists disturbed
the proceedings of the constitutional convention. Some blockaded delegates from
entering the premise where the convention took place. Others attempted to enter the
meeting to participate without designation as a delegate, whereas other activists
attempted to enter the meeting to deliberately interrupt it. The security team hired by Na‘i
Aupuni called police and Kanaka ‘Ōiwi activists were arrested for trespassing on private
property. Considering that the Constitution of the Native Hawaiian Nation’s preamble
declares that “[w]e are a people who Aloha Akua, Aloha ‘Āina, and Aloha each other,”
police intervention was counterintuitive and appalling. It is difficult to imagine how
policing, criminalizing, and incarcerating Kānaka Maoli exercised sincere love and care
for each other. In response, several of the same activists organized an alternative
convention. They called it ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina—an ‘aha for aloha of ‘āina. This chapter
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looks at how some Kānaka ‘Ōiwi participated in constituting consent and how others
challenged the reorganization process and contested this coercive nation-building by
creating an alternate ‘aha centered on aloha ‘āina, a genuine love and care of the ‘āina in
Hawai‘i.
In this chapter, I examine two projects for Kanaka ‘Ōiwi nation-building: Na‘i
Aupuni and ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina. In the first section of this chapter, I discuss aloha ‘āina as
an approach to interpret Indigenous nation-building in Hawai‘i. This section explores the
development of aloha ‘āina as an ontology, discourse, and ideology. Aloha ‘āina does not
simply convey aloha for ‘āina, it is a more complex geontology, or geographic way of
being, that offers a framework for reading the practices and performances of ea within
nation-building. In the second section, I investigate the State of Hawai‘i’s legal
mechanisms for Native Hawaiian self-determination and self-governance and how OHA
activated Na‘i Aupuni through them. Analyzing state legislation and law, nonprofit
bylaws and contractual agreements, and a federal lawsuit, I show that Na‘i Aupuni and its
‘Aha disguised state-determined procedures for nation-building under a veneer of Native
Hawaiian self-determination and self-governance. This project for nation-building
attempts to constitute Kanaka ‘Ōiwi consent for federal recognition as a way of
acquiescing to US settler sovereignty and abandoning responsibility to ‘āina. In the third
section, I track the formation of ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina, an alternative convention for Kanaka
‘Ōiwi nation-building. Looking at the direct-action activism against Na‘i Aupuni that
gave birth to ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina, and governing documents of ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina, I assert
that state-determined nation-building was countered through aloha ‘āina. This reimagined
and actualized Kanaka Maoli sovereignty beyond the settler-state and its legal edifice.
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The chapter concludes with a discussion of how aloha ‘āina offers a regenerative refusal
that rejects nation-building for federal recognition while rejuvenating Indigenous forms
of life and governance in Hawai‘i.
In Chapter 3, I posit that Na‘i Aupuni and the ‘Aha were state-determined
operations for Native Hawaiian nation-building tied to federal recognition, which
attempted to constitute Kanaka Maoli consent for federal recognition and US settler
sovereignty in ways that abandoned responsibility to the ‘āina of Hawai‘i. Although this
state-determined form of Native Hawaiian nation-building produced a governing
document that can be used to apply for federal recognition, the ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina, an
alternative ‘aha organized by Kanaka Maoli activists, articulated aloha ‘āina as a Kanaka
‘Ōiwi geontology for Indigenous governance in Hawai‘i that exceeded the settler-state
and its legal apparatuses.
Aloha ‘Āina
In this section, I discuss aloha ‘āina in order to use it as an approach for
analyzing Indigenous nation-building in Hawai‘i. I begin by looking at research on aloha
‘āina from the field of Hawaiian Studies. Because it is “a very old concept, to judge from
the many sayings (perhaps thousands) illustrating deep love for the land,”340 aloha ‘āina
expresses an ontology that indexes the relationship between Kānaka Maoli and Hawai‘i.
As a multifarious concept, it represents the cosmological worldview and genealogical
kinship that connects Kānaka Maoli to the ʻāina of Hawai‘i, and vice versa. I then map
out how aloha ‘āina was asserted within political struggles over Hawaiian sovereignties
in the late 19th century. Shifting focus from its ontological register to development as a
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discourse and ideology, I chart the multiple meanings of aloha ‘āina. It has been
conveyed as a philosophical standpoint and embodied practice of aloha for ‘āina, a love
for land. But it also suggests affection for country. Contributing to scholarship that
utilizes aloha ‘āina yet delineates the study of ‘āina from Kānaka Maoli, I suggest that
aloha ‘āina is a geontology—a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi way of being of Hawai‘i—that provides a
potent orientation for examining contemporary Indigenous nation-building upon the ‘āina
of Hawai‘i.
Aloha ‘āina is a concept explored in Hawaiian Studies that represents the nature
of being Kanaka Maoli. Kānaka Maoli have come to be through the ‘āina of Hawaiʻi and
the entwined ways of being through one another. Silva writes, “Aloha ‘āina is a complex
concept that includes recognizing that we are an integral part of the ‘āina and the ‘āina is
an integral part of us.”341 Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua indicates, “Many ‘Ōiwi assert that we are
not only related to the land but also a part of what is referenced when one talks about
‘āina.”342 Kānaka ‘Ōiwi come from the land and are part of it. While aloha ‘āina tends to
be posited as a feeling of love for land, its particular meaning emerges from the
cosmological and genealogical structure of that feeling. That structure is an expansive
kinship system that ties Kānaka Maoli (human subjects) to ‘āina (more-than-human
subjects) as familial relatives. There are myriad mo‘olelo, mo‘okū‘auhau, and mele
ko‘ihonua that detail this structure and system. The Kumulipo is one of the most
important. It establishes the fundamental ontology of aloha ‘āina. Meaning the source of
darkness, the Kumulipo is a mele ko‘ihonua and cosmogenic chant that contains 2,102
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lines divided into sixteen sections called wā (epochs).343 The first seven wā occur in pō
(darkness) and the last nine wā take place in ao (daylight). Pō is the time period
belonging to the akua, whereas ao is the era of Kānaka. For instance, in the twelfth wā,
Papahānaumoku and Wākea, progenitors of the Hawaiian islands, give birth to a daughter
named Ho‘ohōkūokalani. Wākea later procreates with Ho‘ohōkūokalani and she
conceives a stillborn child, Hāloanaka. Hāloanaka is buried in the ʻāina and the first kalo
(taro) plant grows from that burial place. “The genealogical relationship between the
Kānaka, kalo, and ‘āina (from which kalo grows) is revealed in the historical account of
Papa and Wākea and their descendants,” Oliveira stresses.344 When Wākea and
Ho‘ohōkūokalani give birth to a second child, the child is given the name Hāloa to honor
Hāloanaka. As the younger sibling of Hāloanaka and kalo, Hāloa becomes the first
Kanaka Maoli. Silva argues, “This story of Hāloa is often invoked to symbolize the
Kanaka belief in a familial relationship to the land and opposition to ownership over
land.”345 Kalo and the ‘āina it grows from are “owed filial love, loyalty, and care.”346
Aloha of ‘āina, a living ancestor, is necessary to sustain balance in this kinship system
that does not hold ‘āina as private property, according to settler capital, but embraces the
relative in ‘āina.
The Kumulipo also illustrates how sovereignty is exercised through aloha ‘āina.
“The Kumulipo,” Silva observes, “is a cosmological chant/prayer that describes the
genesis of living things on the earth, including humankind, and links them to the
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genealogy of Lonoikamakahiki, which then leads directly to Kalākaua.”347 Predating the
arrival of haole in Hawai‘i by hundreds of years, it was published for the first time in
1889 by Kalākaua. He referred to it as He Pule Hoolaa Alii (A Prayer to Consecrate a
Ruler). The Kumulipo was published in the late 19th century in Hawaiian-language
newspapers for a few reasons: to disseminate the origin of Kānaka Maoli and Hawai‘i; to
celebrate the richness of ‘Ōiwi culture, language, and Indigeneity; to upend haole
allegations of cultural erosion and national disenfranchisement; to affirm lineage to the
more-than-human world and its divine power; to legitimate the national sovereignty of
the Hawaiian Kingdom. Publishing the Kumulipo was especially necessary for Kalākaua
to ensure that the lāhui endured in pono and balance through a new genealogical
succession, since Kamehameha’s royal genealogical line ended. This reflected
Kalākaua’s concern with Kanaka Maoli depopulation,348 and his campaign for revitalize
the lāhui under the slogan ho‘oulu lāhui discussed in Chapter 1. In this sense, the
Kumulipo is a cultural text with vast political importance. Silva writes, “Gods, plants,
animals, and even stars appear in the Kumulipo. The presence of all of these within the
genealogy of human beings expresses belief in the familial relationship of Kanaka Maoli
to all the other life forms in their environment.”349 It is a “history of interrelatedness—all
plants, animals, kānaka, and akua are genealogical connected.”350 The nature of being
Kanaka ‘Ōiwi and the ‘āina are one in the same. “This genealogical world view,” Silva
contends, “gives rise to the particular form that love of nation takes in Hawai‘i, which is
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aloha ‘āina.”351 As the Kumulipo and Kalākaua’s use of it make clear, aloha ‘āina is
premised upon the co-constitutive nature of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi and the ‘āina, and this familial,
interrelated kinship animates ea. Indeed, aloha ‘āina is an act of ea.352
In the late 19th century, aloha ‘āina exploded as a discourse. Although a cultural
concept that emerges from a much older ontology, it was strategically cultivated as an
ideology in the political struggle of this era. “Aloha ‘āina expresses an unswerving
dedication to the health of the natural world,” Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua says, “and a staunch
commitment to political autonomy, as both are integral to a healthy existence.”353 The
maturation of aloha ‘āina into an ideology for self-rule, independence, and sovereignty
reveals an explicit concern with nation-building. This past helps to understand our
present. It assists me in analyzing contemporary projects for Indigenous nation-building
in Hawai‘i. At the end of the 19th century, aloha ‘āina was “the cornerstone of resistance”
against the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s government and illegal
annexation of Hawai‘i.354 Silva states, “It expressed the desire that maka‘āinana and ali‘i
shared for self-rule as opposed to rule by the colonial oligarchy of settlers or the military
rule of the United States.”355 Self-rule became synonymous with aloha ‘āina. Aloha of
‘āina reshuffled into desiring and engaging in practices to protect Hawai‘i from the rule,
control, and force of others. It desired ea for Kānaka Maoli and the Hawaiian Kingdom as
well as the ‘āina. This ideology arose from the revolutionary work of ‘Ōiwi political
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organizations, newspapers, and intellectuals that advocated for the interconnected
sovereignty of the Kanaka Maoli, Hawaiian Kingdom, and Hawai‘i.
The discursive proliferation of an aloha ʻāina ideology occurred through diverse
opposition to the illicit overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s government. Under the
threat of violence by US military forces and haole businessmen, many of whom were
missionary sons, Kalākaua authorized the Bayonet Constitution in 1887. The Bayonet
Constitution devastated the crown powers of the Mō‘ī. In particular, it transferred
political power to a haole oligarchy that sought to alter Hawaiian Kingdom law, by
controlling the legislature and suppressing the crown’s cabinet, to sell sugar in US
markets without being taxed. This effectively manufactured an image that the Hawaiian
Kingdom approved increasing wealth for haole planters.356 To deepen profits on sugar
and concoct consent for settler capital, representation in the legislature was restricted
based on race and class so that “wealthy white foreigners could vote and working-class
maka‘āinana and Asian immigrants could not.”357 Increasingly pernicious, the new
constitution contained no article that guaranteed the inviolability of the Hawaiian
Kingdom’s crown lands. The rapacity of capital gave way to Hawaiian dispossession.
Massive opposition by Kānaka ‘Ōiwi broke out. Hui Kālai‘āina, one of the first political
organization of Kānaka Maoli in this era, formed to protect Kalākaua and the Hawaiian
Kingdom’s monarchy, amend the Bayonet Constitution, and overturn racialized class
restrictions in the legislature. When Hui Kālai‘āina organized against a US free-trade
agreement called the Reciprocity Treaty, which Osorio characterizes as “a fight over the
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nation’s independence,”358 they allied with the Mechanics’ and Workingmen’s Political
Protective Union. Together, they formed the National Reform Party and sought to elect
representatives to the House of Nobles and House of Representatives. The coalition
succeeded in electing candidates that could advocate for independence and labor issues,
such as my great-great grandfather C.B. Maile. Perhaps anti-colonialism and anticapitalism runs in my family. In 1892, C.B. Maile became a member of the House of
Nobles and participated in the last legislative session of the Hawaiian Kingdom, which
ended three days before the haole oligarchy’s coup in 1893. The Bayonet Constitution
remained unfazed, but members of Hui Kālai‘āina and the National Reform Party
persevered. Some went on to found another political group called Hui Aloha ‘Āina, an
association for aloha of ‘āina.
Hui Aloha ‘Āina surfaced to protest the dethroning of Mō‘ī Lili‘uokalani.
Proceeding her brother Kalākaua as the Hawaiian Kingdom’s Mō‘ī and monarch,
Lili‘uokalani attempted to promulgate a new constitution in 1893 to secure self-rule in
Hawai‘i as the sovereign wahine head of state. For the haole oligarchy that forced
Kalākaua to adopt the Bayonet Constitution, Lili‘uokalani was “a dangerous woman.”359
Unwilling to support her cause, they usurped Lili‘uokalani’s crown and government. On
January 17, 1893, the oligarchy stormed the palace of the Hawaiian Kingdom,
accompanied by American marines from the USS Boston, and proclaimed themselves the
Provisional Government. It was the beginning stage in US military occupation of
Hawai‘i. But Lili‘uokalani protested vehemently as did the lāhui. Hui Aloha ‘Āina
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formed in this context and created a sister branch, Hui Aloha ‘Āina o Nā Wāhine. Joseph
Nāwahī became president of Hui Aloha ‘Āina and Abigail Kuaihelani Maipinepine
Campbell became president of Hui Aloha ‘Āina o Nā Wāhine. The two, as directors of
associations centered on aloha ‘āina, have been referred to as po‘e aloha ‘āina. Silva
maintains, “Throughout the struggle Kanaka Maoli who worked to retain the sovereignty
of their own nation called themselves ‘ka po‘e aloha ‘āina’ (the people who love the
land).”360 More than talk of love for land, aloha ‘āina spawned into an ideology that
hailed Kānaka ‘Ōiwi, and non-Kanaka Maoli Hawaiian citizens, to maintain national
sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom. When US President Cleveland turned away the
Provisional Government’s proposed treaty to annex Hawai‘i, he dispatched commissioner
James Blount to investigate the situation in the islands. Both branches of Hui Aloha
‘Āina provided Blount with evidence, illustrating opposition to the Provisional
Government and support of Lili‘uokalani’s sovereign authority. A copy of Hui Aloha
‘Āina’s constitution was shared. It began with two articles:
Article I. The name of this association shall be the Hawaiian Patriotic League (Ka
Hui Hawaii Aloha Aina).
Article 2. The object of this association is to preserve and maintain, by all legal
and peaceful means and measures, the independent autonomy of the islands of
Hawaii nei.361
Translating “Ka Hui Hawaii Aloha Aina” into “Hawaiian Patriotic League” articulated
aloha ‘āina as a nationalist ideology of patriotism for the Hawaiian Kingdom. However,
the organization’s objective to “preserve and maintain…the independent autonomy of the
islands of Hawai‘i” designates more. “Unlike the root words nation and patriot, which
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are both etymologically tied to European notions of family, tribe, and country that have
historically been gendered male,” Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua claims, “aloha ‘āina does not
connote a male-dominant familial structure.”362 Hui Aloha ‘Āina sought to perpetuate the
sovereignty of the islands of Hawai‘i. In doing so, aloha ‘āina exceeded dominant
enunciations of patriotism, patriots, nationalism, and nation. The linguistic genealogy of
it, instead, is based in ‘Ōiwi cosmology.363
Although Blount’s investigation assisted Cleveland in determining that the actions
of the provisional government were unlawful, po‘e aloha ‘āina continued to resist the
formation of a settler-state in Hawai‘i. In the “President’s Message Relating to the
Hawaiian Islands” in the Blount Report, Cleveland suggested that Lili‘uokalani should be
restored as the sovereign of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Lili‘uokalani trusted his position.
But, as Silva laments, he betrayed her aloha.364 Cleveland deferred to Congress to resolve
the situation and, more heinously, allowed US Minister Albert Willis on July 4, 1894 to
recognize the Republic of Hawai‘i, which the Provisional Government created to
consolidate juridical power and territorial control over the Hawaiian islands. The
Provisional Government held a constitutional convention to elect officials for the
Republic of Hawai‘i, requiring that voters sign an oath of loyalty and renounce the
Hawaiian Kingdom. Kānaka Maoli refused to take the oath and did not participate in the
constitutional convention. “Only about 4,000 men, most of foreign birth, signed the oath
and voted in the election,” according to Silva.365 Hui Aloha ‘Āina boycotted and sent

362

Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, The Seeds We Planted, 33, original emphasis.
Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 130-131.
364
Ibid., 170-172.
365
Ibid., 136.
363

165

dissent to US Minister Willis. In a petition submitted to foreign ministers of the US,
England, France, Germany, Portugal, and Japan, the women of Hui Aloha ‘Āina o Nā
Wāhine decreed, “without even the courtesy of waiting for America’s final decision,” the
Republic’s new constitution was “the most illiberal and despotic ever published in
civilized countries.”366 On July 2, a large public meeting took place outside of ‘Iolani
Palace, where the haole oligarchy had been occupying the Hawaiian Kingdom’s
government building, “to express their disagreement with the republic’s formation, and to
approve a resolution drafted by the officers of Hui Aloha ‘Āina to be submitted to the
U.S. Minister.”367 The resolution exclaimed, “Ke kue kupaa loa nei ka Hui Hawaii Aloha
Aina a me na Hui Aloha Aina e ae, a me na kupa aloha aina o ke Aupuni Hawaii…i ke
kuahaua ia ana o kekahi Kumukanawai Hou i hana ia me ka ae ole ia me ka lawelawe pu
ole hoi o ka Lehulehu. (The Hui Aloha Aina, and other patriotic leagues together with the
loyal subjects of the Hawaiian Kingdom…do hereby most solemnly protest against the
promulgation of a new Constitution formed without the consent and participation of the
people.)”368 Whether through material culture, public testimony, petitions and
resolutions, or direct action, Kānaka Maoli have expressed aloha ‘āina as a way to defend
and enact ea. Articulations of aloha ‘āina by these political organizations produced forms
of governance for building the lāhui that surpassed the nation-state and national state
sovereignty.
During the Republic of Hawai‘i’s tenure, the language and force of aloha ‘āina
intensified. When peaceful and diplomatic protest stymied, some po‘e aloha ‘āina
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coordinated a takeover of the Republic’s administration. In December of 1894, two
leaders of Hui Aloha ‘Āina, John Bush and Joseph Nāwahī, were arrested for planning an
armed rebellion. But two other leaders, Samuel Nowlein and Robert Wilcox, continued in
their absence. They received a shipment of arms, purchased from San Francisco, and
unloaded and distributed it in Kāhala, O‘ahu. On January 6, 1895, the Republic learned
where the weapons were housed and sent Republic police forces there. A gunfight
ensued. Wilcox and his po‘e aloha ‘āina retreated to Lē‘ahi and then through Pālolo,
Mānoa, Pauoa, and Nu‘uanu. Eventually, they surrendered and two hundred of them were
imprisoned and fined, including C.B. Maile. Lili‘uokalani was also implicated in the
insurrection. “On January 16,” Silva narrates, “The republic claimed that they found arms
buried in Queen Lili‘uokalani’s garden at Washington Palace. In response the queen was
arrested and held prisoner in a room at ‘Iolani Palace.”369 On January 24, Lili‘uokalani
abdicated her throne in exchange for the release of the arrested revolutionists. She
remained imprisoned for eight months. After his release from prison, Nāwahī and his
wife started a weekly newspaper named Ke Aloha Aina. According to Silva, “In this
newspaper, Nāwahī wrote a series of articles expressing what aloha ‘āina meant for the
Kanaka Maoli.”370 In a published essay, Nāwahī inquires, “O wai kou makuahine? O ka
aina no! O wai kou kupunawahine? O ka aina no! (Who is your mother? The ‘āina
indeed! Who is your grandmother? The ‘āina indeed!)”371 Instead of calling upon
Hawaiian national citizens of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Nāwahī directs his questions to
Kānaka Maoli. His call and response represented the ontology that ‘āina is both mother

369

Ibid., 139.
Ibid.
371
Ibid., 140.
370

167

and grandmother of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi. He goes on to write, “Alaila, o ke aloha i kou
makuahine, kou aina, kou wahi i hanauia ai, oia ka mea e loihi ai na la, na makahiki o ke
ola ana. (Thus, love for your mother, the land, the place where you were born, that is
what will make the days and years of your life long.)”372 Not only did Nāwahī identify
the familial, interrelated relationship that Kānaka Maoli share with the ‘āina of Hawai‘i,
he suggested additionally that aloha of ‘āina sustains and perpetuates life. Silva argues,
“Aloha ‘āina, then, meant more than an abstract or emotional love for the ‘one hānau’
(birth sands). For Nāwahī and the other po‘e aloha ‘āina, it meant that people must strive
continuously to control their own government in order to provide life to the people and to
care for their land properly.”373 Nāwahī’s work, through Hui Aloha ‘Āina and Ke Aloha
Aina, was a gift that paved the way for many other po‘e aloha ‘āina. But it did not come
without a cost. Nāwahī died in 1896 after suffering from tuberculosis contracted in the
Republic’s prison.
Facing US annexation of Hawai‘i, Hui Aloha ‘Āina, Hui Aloha ‘Āina o Nā
Wāhine, and Hui Kālai‘āina governed the lāhui on aloha ‘āina. Although Lili‘uokalani
speculated that the haole oligarchy hoped Nāwahī’s death would spark the demise of
these organizations, this was not the case.374 The three hui held a convention on
November 28, 1896, a national holiday called Lā Kū‘oko‘a that celebrates international
recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s sovereign independence in 1843. “Delegates
were elected from all of the islands to come to Honolulu, vote for new permanent
presidents and, for the Hui Aloha ‘Āina, consider an amended constitution,” Silva tells
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us. She describes further how an editorial in Ke Aloha Aina mentioned that the presence
of wāhine as convention delegates became a symbol that inclusive governance in the
lāhui mattered for self-rule.375 Silva maintains, “While these organizations were clearly
modeled on Western political structures, the Kanaka Maoli adapted them according to
their world view, in which there is no inherent reason why women cannot participate in
politics.”376 Although David Kalauokalani was elected as president of Hui Kālai‘āina and
James Keauiluna Kaulia as president of Hui Aloha ‘Āina, the president of Hui Aloha
‘Āina o Nā Wāhine Abigail Campbell “was acknowledge all through the struggle as a
leader of the nation along with the two other male hui presidents.”377 As the year closed,
they prepared to contend with the next US President, William L. McKinley, who was
keen on annexing Hawai‘i to extend US empire in the Spanish-American War. McKinley
met with representatives from the Republic, and in June of 1897 he signed a treaty of
annexation with the Republic of Hawai‘i. However, McKinley needed congressional
authorization by the Senate. Knowing this, po‘e aloha ‘āina focused on stopping the
treaty’s ratification. The three hui embarked on an enormous campaign to collect
signatures for petitions against annexation, the Kū‘ē Petitions mentioned in Chapters 1
and 2. The hope was to convince American Senators to vote against the treaty by
demonstrating a majority of Kānaka Maoli opposed it. On September 6, 1897, Hui Aloha
‘Āina held another great rally at ‘Iolani Palace to explain the details of the treaty and how
it would harm the lāhui. James Kaulia gave an impassioned speech that energized the
crowd. He said, “Aole loa kakou ka lahui e ae e hoohuiia ko kakou aina me Amerika a
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hiki i ke Aloha Aina hope loa. (We the lāhui will never consent to the annexation of our
land to America down to the very last Aloha Aina.)”378 He went on to proclaim, “Mai
maka‘u, e kupaa ma ke Aloha i ka Aina, a e lokahi ma ka manao. E kue loa aku i ka
hoohui ia o Hawaii me Amerika a hiki i ke aloha aina hope loa. (Do not be afraid, be
steadfast in aloha for your land and be united in thought. Protest forever the annexation
of Hawai‘i until the very last aloha aina lives.)”379 These were powerful words that
compelled the lāhui to endorse the petitions. Approximately 38,000 signatures were
collected, which is incredible considering that the population of Kānaka Maoli at that
time was about 40,000.380 On December 6, a delegation of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi, including
Kaulia, arrived in Washington to persuade Senators to vote against the treaty of
annexation. They shared Kū‘ē Petitions with Senators and some were brought to tears.381
When it came time to vote, the treaty of annexation received less than two-thirds of
support and failed to be ratified in the Senate. The articulation of aloha ‘āina within these
historical struggles for Kanaka Maoli sovereignty is instructive for studying the battle
over nation-building in the present. “This knowledge, experience, and aloha from ‘āina,”
Summer Puanani Maunakea writes, “provide[s] the next generation of scholars with
systemic frameworks to further liberate academic scholarship.”382 To conclude the
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section, I explain how aloha ‘āina provides a critical framework for liberating my
analysis.
Aloha ‘āina coalesces into a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi geontology. What I am suggesting is
that aloha ‘āina is a way of being that entwines Kānaka ‘Ōiwi with the ‘āina of Hawai‘i.
Put simply, aloha ‘āina expresses the nature of being Kanaka Maoli. It is steeped in a
cosmological worldview of expansive genealogical relations in which Kānaka Maoli are
constituted by and kin with the ‘āina. Povinelli elucidates the philosophical arrangement
of geontology. In The Empire of Love, she posits, “The ancestral past [is] the geological
material of the present, the flesh as it is now arranged.”383 This definition of geontology
is symbolically and materially representative of aloha ‘āina. Povinelli contends that
Indigeneity enunciates itself through ancestral genealogies that come to signify
geological matter upon which subjects are produced. Aloha ‘āina enunciates a
genealogical kinship between Kānaka Maoli and ‘āina, which comes to signify the
geological mattering of Hawai‘i and, quite literally, produces subjects as po‘e aloha ‘āina.
One cannot be po‘e aloha ‘āina without Kānaka Maoli, one cannot be Kanaka Maoli
without Hawai‘i, and Hawai‘i cannot be without the ‘āina.
With this in mind, Povinelli offers another theory of geontology as a form of
power operationalized through settler late liberalism. Whereas the bios depicted by
Foucault and zoe discussed by Agamben deconstruct a theory of life,384 which is the
biopower plotted in the previous chapter, another power has been operative but hidden in
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the tight allegiance to biopolitics. In Geontologies, Povinelli argues that this form of
power camouflaged by biopolitics is geontopower.385 “The simplest way of sketching the
difference between geontopower and biopower,” she says, “is that the former does not
operate through the governance of life and the tactics of death but is rather a set of
discourses, affects, and tactics used in late liberalism to maintain or shape the coming
relationship of the distinction between Life and Nonlife.”386 If biopower operates by
making live and letting die then Povinelli is interrogating the constitution of what is life
and what is not life that might be made to live or left to die. She suggests that settlerstates, and also scholarly orientations in the field of new materialism, tend to rely on
discourses, affects, and tactics that separate what is and is not life. In this sense,
geontopower delineates Life (bios and zoe) and Nonlife (geos). Povinelli suggests that
biontology is the nature of Life and geontology is the nature of Nonlife. Distinguishing
them proliferates power over Nonlife beings, or subjects determined to be without human
life. She describes the theory, “Geontology is intended to highlight, on the one hand, the
biontological enclosures of existence (to characterize all existents as endowed with the
qualities associated with Life). And, on the other hand, it is intended to highlight the
difficulty of finding a critical language to account for the moment in which a form of
power long self-evident in certain regimes of settler late liberalism is becoming visible
globally.”387 In my estimation, aloha ‘āina represents Povinelli’s first theory of
geontology. Aloha ‘āina expresses a geological way of being through cosmological
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genealogy, which, unlike Povinelli’s second theory of geontology, does not differentiate
between Life and Nonlife. Instead, Aloha ‘āina is a nexus of ea, a node of life and
sovereignty for Kānaka ‘Ōiwi and ‘āina. Nevertheless, Povinelli’s notion of geontopower
under settler late liberalism is useful to denaturalize scholarly orientations, whether in
Hawaiian Studies or Asian Settler Colonial Studies, which offer critical language on
aloha ‘āina that inadvertently bifurcate Kānaka and ‘āina, bios and geos, and Life and
Nonlife. This notion of geontopower is further useful in my critique of Native Hawaiian
nation-building by the State of Hawai‘i. Recalling the Constitution of the Native
Hawaiian Nation’s preamble, opening this chapter, geontopower “translat[es] the
dynamic order of human-land relations into the given political order.”388 The aloha
conveyed in the constitution is manipulated by the State of Hawai‘i to abandon ‘Ōiwi
kuleana to ‘āina. Whereas one geontological orientation aids in interpreting ea beyond the
settler-state, the other assists in analyzing how the settler-state delineates and limits ea.
State-Determination
To begin my analysis, I trace state legislation and laws that have encouraged
Native Hawaiian self-determination through self-governance that produced necessary
conditions of possibility for Na‘i Aupuni. Although US federal courts ruled that there is
no close nexus between the State of Hawai‘i and Na‘i Aupuni, which I elaborate on later,
I show how Na‘i Aupuni is indeed a state-determined project for Kanaka Maoli nationbuilding. By state-determined, I mean to signal how the State of Hawai‘i has determined
this structure of nation-building to fit for federal recognition. In 2011, during the twentysixth legislature of the State of Hawai‘i, a bill to facilitate the reorganization of a Native
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Hawaiian government was introduced. Democratic Senators Clayton Hee, Brickwood
Galuteria, Gilbert Kahele, and Pohai Ryan sponsored Senate Bill 1520, the “First Nation
Government Bill.” Acknowledging Native Hawaiians as the only Indigenous people of
Hawai‘i, an early version of the bill proposed “a process for the reorganization of a first
nation government by Native Hawaiians and its subsequent recognition by the State of
Hawaii.” Curiously using the political classification First Nation, this legislation was a
response to federal legislation under deliberation in Congress. That federal legislation
was the “Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act,” also known as the Akaka
Bill. The Akaka Bill was first introduced on July 20, 2000 in the House of
Representatives by Neil Abercrombie, a US Congressman representing the State of
Hawai‘i’s first district. Although Congress has yet to authorize one of the versions of the
Akaka Bill, mainly due to conservative opposition, the fanaticism for federal recognition
endures elsewhere. After leaving Congress in 2010, Neil Abercrombie was elected
Governor of the State of Hawai‘i. On July 6, 2011, approximately 11 years after
introducing the Akaka Bill in Congress, Abercrombie signed Senate Bill 1520 and
authorized it as Act 195. Act 195 is listed under “Native Hawaiian Recognition” in
Chapter 10H of the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes. According to J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, “Act
195 was not about crafting a process that allows for anything other than a staterecognized First Nation that will form in anticipation of passage of the Akaka Bill.”389 As
suggested at the onset of this chapter, the State of Hawai‘i and federal government are
embroiled in complementary, perhaps harmonious, pursuits to dispossess and eliminate
Kānaka Maoli. “This is a structural problem,” Kauanui remarks, “it is a state process in
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the service of federal recognition.”390 While scholars like Kauanui have analyzed Senate
Bill 1520 and Act 195, I explain in this section how the legislation and law specifically
serve the Department of the Interior’s administrative rule to re-establish a government-togovernment relationship with the Native Hawaiian community, which other scholars have
not.
Act 195 was glorified as an instrument for the State of Hawai‘i to foster Native
Hawaiian self-determination by facilitating governmental reorganization. When Governor
Abercrombie signed Act 195 into law, he stated proudly, “This is an important step for
the future of Native Hawaiian self-determination and the ability for Native Hawaiians to
decide their own future.”391 Represented as a liberal and impartial advocate, the State of
Hawai‘i appeared to marshal a future for Kānaka Maoli, as if Kānaka Maoli do not
already exercise agency to shape our own futures. Kanaka Maoli politicians, at the state
and federal level, alleged this future is only possible through democratic governance.
State Senator Malama Soloman elaborated, “What this bill does is it helps to formally
organize the Hawaiian people so they in fact, and we’re hoping through convention or
whatever other form they may choose, that they organize themselves for the purpose of
creating their own self governance and also to determine their own self determination.”392
The law promoted Native Hawaiian self-determination by encouraging governmental
reorganization through a convention. In this logic, a future for the lāhui required a future
constitutional convention. The settler-state dictated the legal terms and political structure
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of Indigenous self-determination from the jump. US Senator Daniel Akaka, whom the
Akaka Bill is named after, chimed in. “This bill compliments what we’re doing in
Congress,” he stated, “and it indicates to the people of the United States that the people of
Hawaii strongly support the rights of the Native Hawaiians.”393 Building on the federal
legislation that continued to fade in Congress, Act 195 empowered the State of Hawai‘i
to create a process for reorganizing and recognizing a Native Hawaiian government.
Although some Kānaka ‘Ōiwi, such as Senator Akaka, saw this as a progressive
instrument to protect programs and services for Native Hawaiians, other Kānaka ‘Ōiwi
expressed that the state process, like its federal counterpart, was divisive and
inappropriate for nation-building.394
Act 195 reportedly fulfills the State of Hawai‘i’s trust obligation to Native
Hawaiians by establishing a legal process for nation-building. Section 1 of the Act
describes its rationale and purpose. Referencing the State of Hawai‘i’s special political
and legal relationship to Native Hawaiians, it recounts that legislation has historically
been passed “for the betterment of their condition.” A history of passing legislation in the
name of bettering conditions for Kānaka Maoli justifies state involvement in matters for
Native Hawaiian self-determination and self-governance. This language is based on the
Admissions Act of 1959 that Congress passed to institutionalize the “State of Hawai‘i.”
In particular, Act 195 mimes section 5(f) in the Admissions Act. This section placed most
of the 1.8 million acres of “ceded lands”—the Hawaiian Kingdom’s government and
crown lands that were seized by the provisional government—into a public trust. The
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federal government delegated management of the public land trust to the State of Hawai‘i
with five purposes, one of which being the betterment of conditions for Kānaka Maoli.
Extending this trust relation, Act 195 praises the State of Hawai‘i for creating the OHA as
an agency to advocate for Kānaka Maoli with 20% of revenues from the public land trust.
“The State’s designation of the office of Hawaiian affairs as a trust vehicle to act on
behalf of Native Hawaiians until a Native Hawaiian governing entity could be
reestablished,” it celebrates, “reaffirmed the State’s obligations to the Native Hawaiian
people.” This rhetoric is all too familiar. As I explained in Chapter 2, the DOI echoes this
language in its rationale for the notices of settlement and rule of recognition. Mirroring
federal support in the DOI’s Final Rule, Act 195 reiterates state support for the Apology
Resolution and Akaka Bill as evidence of fulfilling obligations to Native Hawaiians. It
reflects further that the State of Hawai‘i has mandated the transfer of Kaho‘olawe, an
island in the Hawaiian archipelago bombed by the US Navy for almost 50 years,395 to a
reorganized and recognized Native Hawaiian government. The DOI’s administrative rule
makes transparent that the only land that could be transferred to a Native Hawaiian
Governing Entity is Kaho‘olawe. Section 1 concludes by formalizing state recognition of
Native Hawaiians: “The purpose of this Act is to recognize Native Hawaiians as the only
indigenous, aboriginal, maoli population of Hawai‘i.” Acknowledgement in place, Act
195 declares its fundamental purpose. It concludes, “It is also the State’s desire to support
the continuing development of a reorganized Native Hawaiian governing entity and,
ultimately, the federal recognition of Native Hawaiians.” The State of Hawai‘i passed
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legislation and then enacted law with an emphatic desire to reorganize a NHGE that
could be, with expressive intent, recognized by the federal government. Act 195 is
intended to facilitate Native Hawaiian nation-building fit for federal recognition.
In Section 2, Act 195 lays out an amendment to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes, which
created the Native Hawaiian Roll Commission. Appearing to honor Native Hawaiian selfdetermination, this statutory amendment tasked OHA with the administrative
responsibility of managing the roll commission. However, the governer was given the
power to select and appoint five “qualified Native Hawaiians” to govern the roll
commission. The Native Hawaiian Roll Commission, therefore, was made responsible
for:
(1) Preparing and maintaining a roll of qualified Native Hawaiians; and
(2) Certifying that the individuals on the roll of qualified Native Hawaiians meet
the definition of qualified Native Hawaiians. For the purposes of establishing the
roll, a “qualified Native Hawaiian” means an individual who the commission
determines has satisfied the following criteria and who makes a written statement
certifying that the individual:
(A) Is:
(i) An individual who is a descendant of the aboriginal peoples
who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in the
Hawaiian islands, the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii;
or
(ii) An individual who is one of the indigenous, native people of
Hawaii and who has eligible in 1921 for the programs authorized
by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, or a direct lineal
dscendant of that individual;
(B) Has maintained a significant cultural, social, or civic connection to the
Native Hawaiian community and wishes to participate in the organization
of the Native Hawaiian governing entity; and
(C) Is eighteen years of age or older.
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The charge was to prepare and maintain a roll, or registry and database, of individuals
that are “qualified Native Hawaiians.” The commission would evaluate and determine
who is a qualified Native Hawaiian for eligibility on the roll, according to settler-state
standards established by the State of Hawai‘i and federal government. “The recognition
of Native status and rights,” Joanne Barker reminds us, “is really about the coercion of
Native peoples to recognize themselves to be under federal power within federal
terms.”396 To be eligible as a qualified Native Hawaiian, three criteria must be satisfied.
In the first criteria, an individual could satisfy one of two qualifications: either
identifying as a descendent of the aboriginal people that occupied and exercised
sovereignty in Hawai‘i prior to 1778 or as an Indigenous person of Hawai‘i that was
eligible in 1921 for the programs conferred by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, or
identifying as a lineal descendant of an individual eligible in 1921 under the HHCA. In
the second criteria, an individual must demonstrate a significant connection, either
cultural, social, or civic, to the Native Hawaiian community and additionally desires to
participate in reorganizing a NHGE. In the third criteria, an individual must be at least
eighteen years old. Satisfying all three criteria would compel the commission to register
an individual as a qualified Native Hawaiian on the roll. Moreover, the statute requires
the roll commission to publish the list of qualified Native Hawaiians, and update the list
as well as publish updated lists. This served a specific purpose. “The publication of the
roll of qualified Native Hawaiians,” the statute notes, “is intended to facilitate the process
under which qualified Native Hawaiians may independently commence the organization
of a convention of qualified Native Hawaiians, established for the purpose of organizing
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themselves.” The following subsection stipulates that the governor will dissolve the
Native Hawaiian Roll Commission after it completes its work—this work being the
“organization of a convention of qualified Native Hawaiians.” Authorized by Chapter
10H of the Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS), the Native Hawaiian Roll Commission was
created for nation-building with the explicit objective of governmental reorganization that
ultimately, according to Act 195, is paired to federal recognition.
Furthermore, Chapter 10H of the HRS shores up settler sovereignty. As I
described earlier, this law invokes the Admissions Act to establish the special political
and trust relationship with Native Hawaiians. The law also uses the Admissions Act to
reaffirm federal authority, power, and negotiations. Consequently, the statute on “Native
Hawaiian Recognition” institutionalizes State of Hawai‘i recognition of Native
Hawaiians as “the indigenous, aboriginal, maoli population of Hawaii” insofar as to
territorially settle Hawai‘i. In subsection nine of section ten, there is an unsurprising
disclaimer. It observes, “Nothing in this chapter is intended to serve as a settlement of
any claims against the State of Hawaii, or affect the rights of the Native people under
state, federal, or international law.” The federal and state laws that I have analyzed, in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 respectively, illustrate how Native Hawaiian nation-building for
federal recognition of a reorganized government will significantly disarm Kanaka Maoli
legal claims against the US settler-state. It is as Coulthard writes, “Colonial powers will
only recognize the collective rights and identities of Indigenous peoples insofar as this
recognition does not throw into question the background legal, political, and economic
framework of the colonial relationship itself.”397 Adding insult to the ongoing injury—
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illegal US occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom and settler colonial capitalism in
Hawai‘i—Chapter 10H of the HRS instructs OHA to fund the roll commission. OHA was
mandated to allocate money it receives from a minor portion of revenue generated on the
public trust that the State of Hawai‘i administers from seized lands of the Hawaiian
Kingdom. Displacing not only financial responsibility but also legal and political
accountability, Chapter 10H demands, “The legislature urges the office of Hawaiian
affairs to continue to support the self-determination process by Native Hawaiians in the
formation of their chosen governmental entity.” This legislation and law is the juridical
foundation that propelled OHA, an agency of the State of Hawai‘i, to spawn and fund
Na‘i Aupuni, a project for nation-building to deliberately reorganize and federally
recognize a NHGE according to the DOI’s new administrative rule.
But the Native Hawaiian Roll Commission (NHRC) floundered. After
authorization of Act 195, Governor Abercrombie appointed a five-member commission
for implementing the roll, including former Governor John D. Waihe‘e who became the
chairman. Previously, Waihe‘e accompanied leaders from OHA to lobby Congress to
pass the Akaka Bill. Although they were unsuccessful, Waihe‘e and OHA trustees
emerged as Kanaka Maoli politicians that enthusiastically sought federal recognition.
Recalling that OHA trustees were no longer elected by only Kānaka Maoli but all
residents of the State of Hawai‘i after Rice v. Cayetano (2000), Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua says,
“the trustees pursued a particular path of Hawaiian self-government as elected officials of
the settler state, not as elected leaders of a self-determining aboriginal Hawaiian political
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body.”398 Akaka found himself in a parallel situation, serving a non-Native Hawaiian
majority electorate. “The push for federal recognition became a movement of political
elites,” Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua argues, “not a demand of a broad spectrum of the Hawaiian
people.”399 Her argument resonates with Coulthard’s assertion that colonial power seeps,
as Fanon put it,400 into the Indigenous bourgeoisie and political elite as a way to “subtly
structure and limit the possibility of their freedom.”401 As such, OHA provided the roll
commission with approximately $3.3 million for an initial operating budget. The funding
paid to launch Kana‘iolowalu as the main registry of the NHRC. On July 20, 2012, they
proclaimed, “Kana’iolowalu is a year-long effort to create a base roll of Native
Hawaiians – a registry of individuals who will then be eligible to participate in the
formation of a sovereign government.”402 Based on my analysis of the DOI’s
administrative rule and State of Hawai‘i legislation and law, the sovereignty that the
NHRC professed for a reorganized NHGE would be regulated by federal and state
governments, limited by Congress’ plenary power, and subordinated under US settler
sovereignty. Some Kānaka Maoli desired this form of sovereignty while others refused to
relinquish their ea. Nevertheless, the ambitious goal of Kana‘iolowalu was to enroll
200,000 individuals as qualified Native Hawaiians in just one year. By August of 2013,
about 19,000 individuals voluntarily enrolled in the registry—accounting for a meager
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4% of Kānaka Maoli across the globe.403 Another report suggested that initial enrollment
was 40,000, which was still less than 25% of the objective to register 200,000.404 The
results were atrocious. In response, the NHRC turned to desperate measures.
The NHRC sought additional state legislation to boost enrollment on the
Kana‘iolowalu registry. The legislature and Governor Abercrombie came through again,
leaving more evidence on this overdetermined path to nation-building. The twentyseventh legislative session passed House Bill 785, which Abercrombie quickly authorized
as Act 77 on May 21, 2013. Act 77 amended subsection A in section 3 of Chapter 10H in
the Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes. The NHRC’s responsibility was amended to be:
(1) Preparing and maintaining a roll of qualified Native Hawaiians; and
(2) Certifying that the individuals on the roll of qualified Native Hawaiians meet
the definition of qualified Native Hawaiians. For the purposes of establishing the
roll, a “qualified Native Hawaiian” means an individual who the commission
determines has satisfied the following criteria and who makes a written statement
certifying that the individual:
(A) Is:
(i) An individual who is a descendant of the aboriginal peoples
who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in the
Hawaiian islands, the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii;
or
(ii) An individual who is one of the indigenous, native people of
Hawaii and who has eligible in 1921 for the programs authorized
by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, or a direct lineal
dscendant of that individual;
(iii) An individual who meets the ancestry requirements of
Kamehameha Schools or of any Hawaiian registry program of the
office of Hawaiian affairs;
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(B) Has maintained a significant cultural, social, or civic connection to the
Native Hawaiian community and wishes to participate in the organization
of the Native Hawaiian governing entity; and
(C) Is eighteen years of age or older.
(3) Receiving and maintaining documents that verify ancestry; cultural, social, or
civic connection to the Native Hawaiian community; and age from individuals
seeking to be included in the roll of qualified Native Hawaiians. Notwithstanding
any other law to the contrary, these verification documents shall be confidential;
and
(4) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, including in the roll of
qualified Native Hawaiians all individuals already registered with the State as
verified Hawaiians or Native Hawaiians through the office of Hawaiian affairs as
demonstrated by the production of relevant office of Hawaiian affairs records,
and extending to those individuals all rights and recognitions conferred upon
other members of the roll.
With the italicized sections highlighting amendments, Act 77 made two primary
alterations in state law. It eased criteria for individuals to be certified as qualified Native
Hawaiians and transferred names of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi from other registries. It was a
duplicitous maneuver to increase the number of qualified Native Hawaiians on the
Kana‘iolowalu roll. The NHRC also weaseled themselves into acquiring an additional
$595,000 from OHA, after eclipsing their initial budget, to serve this process. Randall
Akee reported that some 71,000 names were imported from other registries to
Kana‘iolowalu,405 such as the apolitical, confidential registry Operation ‘Ohana that had
no intentions for nation-building.406 On July 10, 2015, Kana‘iolowalu was updated and
listed 95,000 qualified Native Hawaiians.407

405

Akee, “He ‘Aha Kēia? Is This a Convention?”
Noelani Arista and Randall Akee, “Manufacturing Consent for the Living
AND the Dead in Hawai’i,” Indian Country Today, November 20, 2015,
http://www.indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com.
407
Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua, “‘Now we know,’” 458.
406

184

The NHRC’s initial failure and subsequent lobbying revealed explicit violations
of consent for a state-determined process of Kanaka Maoli nation-building. According to
Anne Keala Kelly, Act 77 functioned “to disguise that abysmal failure, giving permission
to Kanaiolowalu commissioners to loot other state registries. Lists of Hawaiian people,
who were trying to get scholarships and loans or signed other forms of enrollment
separate from Kanaiolowalu were counted.”408 In fact, this happened to me. Without free,
prior, and informed consent, my name miraculously appeared on the roll. “It is important
to underscore,” Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua observes, “that 75% of the people on the certified roll
were included without prior consent.”409 The State of Hawai‘i was in violation of Article
32 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP),
which suggests that states must obtain “free and informed consent prior to the approval of
any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources,” especially since Act
195 applied UNDRIP and reaffirmed Kanaka Maoli rights under international law. After
receiving criticism, the NHRC instituted a process whereby individuals whose names
were imported into Kana‘iolowalu could remove themselves. This was too good to be
true. When I submitted an official form to remove my name, it was not removed. I
suspect this occurred to others as well. Although this was negligent, the transferal of
names from other databases proved to be quite repugnant. Kana‘iolowalu imported the
names of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi that were dead. The name of my kupuna kāne (grandfather), who
passed in 2012, appeared on Kana‘iolowalu. It remains on the Kana‘iolowalu roll to this
very day. Noelani Arista and Randall Akee posit that at least 604 deceased kūpuna
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(ancestors) were included on the roll.410 “While all voter rolls may contain at least some
names of the deceased,” they assert, “the difference here is that those individuals gave
their express consent to be included on those lists while alive. We found almost a
hundred names of people who died prior to the start of the Kana‘iolowalu legislation in
2012.”411 Kānaka ‘Ōiwi left to die and made dead became valuable to the settler-state, not
for their life or labor, for their representational capacity, in a state-determined process of
nation-building for federal recognition, to consent to the settlement of their land. This
was a necropolitical acquiescence, forcing assent from the world of death. “This
process,” Arista and Akee continue, “should not manufacture consent for the living or the
dead…Mai kaula‘i i ka ‘iwi ma ka lā. Do not display the bones (the dead) in the sun.”412
Meanwhile, other federal and state processes—the DOI’s ANPRM and NPRM and
OHA’s Na‘i Aupuni—were in motion to utilize the roll of qualified Native Hawaiians for
nation-building in the service of a new policy for federal recognition.
Constituting Consent
The state-determined project for Native Hawaiian nation-building ushered in a
legal process of constituting consent to federal recognition. This legal process was
contoured by other federal and state mechanisms. As I mentioned, the DOI issued an
ANPRM and NPRM immediately after the State of Hawai‘i authorized Act 195 and
appointed the NHRC in 2011, delegated that OHA oversee and fund the Kana‘iolowalu
roll in 2012, and passed Act 77 to import other databases into Kana‘iolowalu in 2013.
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After a state-determined process to reorganize a Native Hawaiian government and new
federal procedure to recognize a reorganized Native Hawaiian government without land
were in place, Na‘i Aupuni stormed onto the scene. Na‘i Aupuni formed as a private
nonprofit organization with the principal purpose of reorganizing a Native Hawaiian
government. To be clear, it was institutionalized in the wake of state legislation, laws, and
instruments to reorganize a NHGE and while an executive rule-making procedure
proposed an administrative rule to federally recognize a reorganized NHGE.
“[C]oercion,” Osorio says, “has been the hallmark of this whole process.”413 In this
section, I map out this coercive process to demonstrate how Native Hawaiian nationbuilding, working on achieving self-determination and sovereignty via the State of
Hawai‘i, abstracts and abandons relations to the ‘āina of Hawai‘i.
The DOI’s ANPRM and NPRM recommended Kana‘iolowalu as a certified roll
to determine voting eligibility for Na‘i Aupuni. The ANPRM stated that an
administrative rule would not affect the design of a constitution or its membership
criteria, since these are “sovereign prerogatives.”414 “But,” the ANPRM stipulated, “a
Federal administrative rule concerning reorganization of a Native Hawaiian government
would need to determine who can participate in the reorganization, including who would
be eligible to vote in a ratification referendum.”415 It proposed four possible approaches
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to determine eligibility for voting in a ratification referendum. First, eligibility could be
limited to “native Hawaiians” as defined by the HHCA. Second, eligibility could be
limited to “qualified Native Hawaiians” in accordance with Acts 195 and 77. Third,
eligibility could be limited to “qualified Native Hawaiians” as determined by the NHRC.
Fourth, eligibility could be limited to “qualified Native Hawaiian constituents” in
accordance with the Akaka Bill. These approaches coalesced in the NPRM. In it,
eligibility for voting to ratify a governing document included all approaches. The NPRM
proposed thresholds for broad-based community participation and support from HHCAnative Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians. Total turnout, for all Native Hawaiian voters,
was predicted between 60,000 and 100,000. Uncannily, the estimated top of this turnout
range reflected the number of qualified Native Hawaiians on Kana‘iolowalu in July of
2015, just three months before the DOI published the NPRM. The NPRM additionally
suggested that documentation would be required to demonstrate how the Native
Hawaiian community determined participation in ratification of a constitution. It stated,
“The Native Hawaiian community may use a roll of Native Hawaiians certified by a
State of Hawaii commission or agency under State law as an accurate and complete list of
Native Hawaiians eligible to vote in the ratification referendum.”416 The notices of
settlement highlighted that Kana‘iolowalu offered an appropriate registry of qualified
Native Hawaiians to participate in ratifying a governing document designed and adopted
by a constitutional convention to reorganize a NHGE. The State of Hawai‘i, OHA, and
NHRC succeeded in establishing a roll, despite egregious violations of consent, that
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could be utilized by Na‘i Aupuni for achieving federal recognition through the DOI’s rule
change.
Na‘i Aupuni’s organizational bylaws and contractual agreements demonstrate
there was a close nexus between Na‘i Aupuni and the State of Hawai‘i that sought to be
hidden. With a registry of certified voters established, OHA created Na‘i Aupuni.
Authorized on February 23, 2015, the Bylaws of Na‘i Aupuni state, “The purpose of the
Corporation [Na‘i Aupuni] shall be to assist in the non-political aspects of an election of
delegates, ‘Aha and ratification vote for the purpose of self-determination.” The purpose
was three-fold: facilitate an election for delegates in a constitutional convention, host a
constitutional convention, and oversee a ratification referendum. Na‘i Aupuni pivoted on
facilitating an election for delegates of the ‘Aha, or constitutional convention, and a
ratification of their constitution. To do so, it institutionalized as a corporation with
nonprofit character. Na‘i Aupuni did not register as a nonprofit organization under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code in federal law. “The Office of Hawaiian
Affairs (OHA) authorized and approved the use of the Funds,” the bylaws continue, “to
enable Native Hawaiians to participate in a process through which a structure for a
governing entity may be determined by the collective will of the Native Hawaiian people
by transmitting the Funds to an entity that is independent of OHA and any apparatus of
the State of Hawai‘i.” Na‘i Aupuni’s contractual agreements with OHA explain what this
means. In the first week of April in 2015, a Letter Agreement was signed by the CEO of
OHA, President and Director of Na‘i Aupuni, and Chairman and Secretary of the Akamai
Foundation. The agreement mandated that OHA grant approximately $2.6 million of trust
funds to the Akamai Foundation for the benefit of Na‘i Aupuni. As a 501(c)(3) nonprofit
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organization, the Akamai Foundation could receive tax-exempt money from OHA,
whereas Na‘i Aupuni could not. But the apportionment of $2.6 million, ordered in the
Letter Agreement, was in accordance with Na‘i Aupuni’s projected budget. The contract
maintained that OHA would provide a grant to the Akamai Foundation for the benefit of
Na‘i Aupuni. In the Fiscal Sponsorship Agreement between the Akamai Foundation and
Na‘i Aupuni, the Akamai Foundation agreed to be Na‘i Aupuni’s fiscal sponsor, which
meant it would receive funds from OHA on behalf of Na‘i Aupuni. The next contract,
titled Grant Agreement Between the Akamai Foundation and the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs for the Use and Benefit of Na‘i Aupuni, is quite revealing. After echoing Chapter
10H of HRS, an agreement was struck for OHA to grant $2.6 million to the Akamai
Foundation for Na‘i Aupuni. The Scope of Services reads, “AF [Akamai Foundation] will
direct the use of the grant to NA [Na‘i Aupuni] so it may facilitate an election of
delegates, election and referendum monitoring, a governance ‘Aha, and a referendum to
ratify any recommendation of the delegates arising out of the ‘Aha…The scope of
services represents the internal affairs of the Hawaiian community and thus will not
exclude those Hawaiians who have enrolled and have been verified by the Native
Hawaiian Roll Commission.” Using the Akamai Foundation as a fiscal sponsor generated
separation between OHA and Na‘i Aupuni. This produced two degrees of separation
between the State of Hawai‘i and Na‘i Aupuni. Anxiously so, the bylaws and contracts
include conditions that Na‘i Aupuni is autonomous from the Akamai Foundation, OHA,
and the State of Hawai‘i. These legal documents unambiguously camouflaged a close
nexus across US settler-state entities in Hawai‘i. Indeed, Na‘i Aupuni was structurally
determined by the State of Hawai‘i not self-determined by the lāhui.
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A lawsuit in US federal court shows that this close nexus was disaggregated by a
liberal ruling that alibied colonialism with race. What I am demonstrating here is that
conservative and liberal legal arguments about Indigenous nation-building in Hawai‘i
work hand-in-hand for colonial dispossession. On August 13, 2015, a complaint was filed
in District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of Hawai‘i, OHA,
NHRC, Akamai Foundation, and Na‘i Aupuni. It stated, “Plaintiffs are individual
registered voters who seek declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin race-based,
viewpoint-based, and other restrictions and qualifications imposed by Hawaii law and
enforced by agents of the State of Hawaii on those seeking to register as voters on a list
(the ‘Roll’) maintained by defendants.” The plaintiffs alleged that qualifications for
registering on Kana‘iolowalu and restricting voting in Na‘i Aupuni to this roll violated
the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments of the US constitution as well as the
Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act in federal law. They sought, on one hand, a
declaratory judgement that registration qualifications and voting restrictions violate their
constitutional and federal rights and, on the other, a permanent injunction against
implementation of these qualifications and restrictions. Two plaintiffs asserted that their
names were registered on Kana‘iolowalu without their knowledge or consent. Two other
plaintiffs claimed that they could not register on Kana‘iolowalu because it required three
positive declarations on Native Hawaiian sovereignty, cultural connection to the Native
Hawaiian community, and identification as Native Hawaiian. The final two plaintiffs
posited that they were unable to register on Kana‘iolowalu because they could not satisfy
verification criteria for Native Hawaiian ancestry. The lawsuit altogether suggested,
“OHA and the NHRC attempted to shield themselves from legal responsibility for setting
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up race-based, viewpoint-based, and other restrictions on voters and candidates in the
proposed election based on the Roll by contracting with AF [Akamai Foundation] and
NAF [Na‘i Aupuni Foundation].” Put another way, this alleged that contractual
agreements that provided the Akamai Foundation with trust funding for Na‘i Aupuni’s
delegate election and ratification referendum, which were limited for participation based
on Kana‘iolowalu, shielded OHA from legal culpability as a State of Hawai‘i agency
instituting an election and referendum that were racially and politically discriminatory.
There are two noteworthy issues in the lawsuit that I want to stew on. First, the
conservative complaint presented a strong argument that there is a close nexus between
the State of Hawai‘i, OHA, NHRC, Akamai Foundation, and Na‘i Aupuni. This argument
supports my own that the close nexus illustrates how Na‘i Aupuni was a product of statedetermination. For instance, the lawsuit reproduces the written minutes from an OHA
Board of Trustees meeting on February 26, 2015 wherein trustees questioned the legality
of funding Na‘i Aupuni. In it, Trustee Peter Apo “believes that this is a very tricky
navigation required. He is overly cautious that if we keep tying ourselves to this, we are
going to get sued.” The solution for OHA was a “simple trick of contracting with
nonprofits,” the lawsuit argued. “By signing, and paying for, agreements with AF and
NAF to carry out the very purposes that OHA has expressly stated it wants to achieve,” it
continued, “OHA has affirmed, authorized, encouraged, and facilitated the wrongful
action that is the subject of this lawsuit, thereby rendering AF and NAF state actors.”
Considered action on behalf of the State of Hawai‘i, Na‘i Aupuni appeared to be in
violation of the US constitution and federal law. Second, the complaint alleged that
defendants were in violation of discrimination based on race. Relying on the decision in
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Rice v. Cayetano (2000), the conservative complaint argued that ancestry qualifications
for Kana‘iolowalu and voting restrictions based on the roll were racially exclusionary.
While I disagree with this argument—the category Native Hawaiian is not a racial
classification but a political status—this became a key issue in the District Court’s ruling.
On October 29, 2015, the District Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for an injunction in
Akina v. Hawaii (2015). Cunningly, the court’s decision disaggregates the close nexus of
settler-state entities vis-à-vis refutation that Na‘i Aupuni’s election and referendum are
not racially exclusive and discriminatory. It counters that Na‘i Aupuni is not an arm of
the State of Hawai‘i on the basis that it is a private nonprofit seeking to independently
reorganize a NHGE through a private election. Citing case law on tribal sovereignty, the
opinion points out that an analogous yet separate relationship with the federal
government exists that affords Native Hawaiians a similar political status as Native
Americans not based on race. Parroting the importance of Indigenous sovereignty, the
District Court affirmed the self-determining rights of Na‘i Aupuni to reorganize a NHGE.
The court believed that the registration qualifications and voting restrictions were tailored
for a compelling federal and state interest—the facilitation of Indigenous selfdetermination for self-governance—which ultimately meets strict scrutiny for equal
protection. Although the lawsuit’s argument that a close nexus exists between the State of
Hawai‘i and Na‘i Aupuni, demonstrating how it came to be state-determined not selfdetermining, I disagree with the weaponization of this argument to claim Na‘i Aupuni
was racially discriminatory. Rather, I am arguing that Na‘i Aupuni was not selfdetermined by Kānaka Maoli, nor was it racially discriminatory. The District Court, and
subsequent Circuit Court decision in Akina v. Hawaii (2016), appropriately claimed

193

Native Hawaiian as a political status not racial classification. However, both federal
courts employed a discussion of race that erases the US settler-state’s colonial imperative
for dispossessing Hawai‘i. By refuting the attack on what they regarded as affirmative
action protections, the federal courts were able to manipulate the conservative argument
into a liberal defense of the political standing of Kānaka Maoli that could defer the
colonial relationship within a state-determined process for reorganizing a NHGE to be
federally recognized. In sum, American conservativism and liberalism work hand-inhand to stymie the ea of the ‘āina.
In the final part to this section, I interrogate the Constitution of the Native
Hawaiian Nation, which was adopted on February 26, 2016 in the ‘Aha sponsored by
Na‘i Aupuni. The Constitution of the Native Hawaiian Nation can signify Kanaka Maoli
acquiescence to federal recognition and ultimately US settler sovereignty. The preamble
of the constitution provides a duplicitous framework for the Native Hawaiian Nation. The
preamble concludes by stating, “UA MAU KE EA O KA ‘ĀINA I KA PONO.” Based on
the arrangement of Na‘i Aupuni and its ‘Aha, this phrase represents two significations.
On one hand, the phrase signifies an older expression uttered by Kamehameha III
Kauikeaouli. In 1843, Richard Charleton, the British consul to Hawai‘i, became

involved in a dispute with ali‘i over a small house lot in Honolulu.417 Against the
wishes of ali‘i and at odds with Hawaiian Kingdom law, Charleton expanded the
physical structure of the home and was charged to pay easement, break down the
expansion, or demolish the entire home. He sent word of this to George Paulet, a
commander of a British warship. On February 10, 1843, Paulet traveled to Honolulu
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and moored his warship to investigate Charleton’s claim. He then demanded that
Charleton be given legal rights to property over his land, all British citizens in
Hawai‘i only be held to British law, and Charleton receive $100,000 as an indemnity
payment. Paulet suggested that Kauikeaouli’s failure to comply would result in war.
Kauikeaouli informed the commander that he sent an official to settle this affair with
Queen Victoria in England, under the basis that Paulet’s demands were “contravening
the law established for the benefit of all.”418 Once Paulet threatened to fire upon
Honolulu harbor, Kauikeaouli provisionally ceded national sovereignty under protest.
The protest called on Queen Victoria to “e ho‘iho‘i mai i ke ea o ka ‘āina [return the
ea of the land].” She quickly disavowed Paulet’s actions and the protest was
forwarded to admiral Richard Thomas who sailed from Chile to Hawai‘i to reprimand
Paulet and restore the Hawaiian Kingdom’s national sovereignty. After 5-months of
British occupation, sovereign authority returned to the ‘āina and Kauikeaouli on July
31. The day became celebrated as a national holiday and named Lā Ho‘iho‘i Ea, or
Sovereignty Restoration Day. That day Kauikeaouli uttered: ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i
ka pono.
On the other hand, the constitution’s reiteration of this older expression
symbolizes US settler-state geontopower in Hawai‘i. Although “ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina

i ka pono” was originally articulated to celebrate the restoration of ea to the land,
people, and nation of Hawai‘i, it became co-opted by the State of Hawai‘i. On May 1,
1959, the territorial legislature’s Joint Resolution No. 4 codified “ua ma ke ea o ka
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aina i ka pono” as the State of Hawai‘i’s official motto. The formal maxim of the
Hawaiian Kingdom after Kauikeaouli’s decree, Silva writes that it “then (strangely or
perversely) was appropriated as the motto of the State of Hawai‘i.”419 This complex
enunciation, linking sovereign relations between the ‘āina, Kanaka Maoli, and lāhui, has
been distorted from a “dynamic order of human-land relations into the given political
order.”420 Now, it is incorporated into the Constitution of the Native Hawaiian Nation.

It is unclear whether or not delegates that designed the constitution intended to signify
Kauikeaouli’s expression or the State of Hawai‘i’s motto. Nevertheless,
reorganization of the Native Hawaiian Nation was a state-determined process, and it
is clear that the invocation of ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i ka pono operates to position
the Native Hawaiian Nation as an heir of the Hawaiian Kingdom to be federally
recognized as an authentic and legitimate government. But this claim to juridical
sovereignty is blighted because federal recognition will subsume it within US settler
sovereignty, cleaving the ea of the ‘āina. It is both a strange and perverse
appropriation that illustrates settler-state geontopower not the geontology of aloha
‘āina.
The Constitution of the Native Hawaiian Nation conveys aloha ‘āina in ways
that distinguish forms of life, separating the ea of Kānaka Maoli from the ea of ‘āina.
Differently put, it purports to produce sovereignty and life for Kānaka Maoli but not
the ‘āina of Hawai‘i. This is distinctly dissimilar from Kauikeaouli’s expression that
centered the ea of the ‘āina. In the Declaration of Rights, Article 7 discusses
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obligations to the ‘āina. It states, “The Nation has a right, duty, and kuleana, both
individually and collectively, to sustain the ‘Āina (land, kai [water], wai [fresh water],
air) as an ancestor, source of mana, and source of life and well-being for present and
future generations.” Citizens and the government of the Native Hawaiian Nation have
rights and responsibilities to sustain the ‘āina not just as an ancestor but source of
power, life, and futurity. ‘Āina is rendered a source for the proliferation of human
power and transmission of human life. Although acknowledged as an ancestor, the
‘āina appears to be a resource to provide human life that, simultaneously, is without
human life. The power of the land, water, and air is indexed through an
anthropocentric ability to empower Kānaka Maoli to exercise self-governance and
achieve a sovereign future. In other words, the defense of sovereignty for Native
Hawaiians forecloses the ea of the ‘āina.
Beyond a set of discourses and affects, the constitution’s territorial jurisdiction
reveals legal tactics of US settler-state geontopower. “This constitution says that, in
terms of land,” Osorio contends, “the Hawaiian government will take, not what it
deserves and not what it is still entitled to; rather, it will take what it can get.”421
Article 1 of the constitution charts internal jurisdiction over territory and land. Section
1 claims, “The territory of the Native Hawaiian Nation is all lands, water, property,
airspace, surface and subsurface rights, and other natural resources, belonging to,
controlled by, and designated for conveyance to and for the Hawaiian Nation.” In this
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passage, the land-base includes everything belonging to, controlled by, and
designated for the Native Hawaiian Nation. Although this seems to be a radical right
to everything, the following section suggests that territorial jurisdiction is everything
and nothing at the same time. Section 2 notes that “the Native Hawaiian people have
never relinquished their claims to their national lands,” insofar as to instruct, “[t]o the
maximum extent possible, the Government shall pursue the repatriation and return of
the national lands, together with all rights, resources, and appurtenances associated
with or appertaining to those lands, or other just compensation for lands lost.” While
the citizens of the Native Hawaiian Nation, not all Kānaka Maoli but only those
qualified Native Hawaiians in the Kana‘iolowalu registry, are animated by a
purportedly sovereign life through State of Hawai‘i reorganization and US federal
recognition, the same cannot be said for the ‘āina of Hawai‘i. Section 2 of Article 1
describes there is essentially no land and territory under jurisdiction of the Native
Hawaiian Nation. While Article 23 later identifies that Kaho‘olawe is the only landbase available to the Native Hawaiian Nation, Section 2 details that citizens and the
government of the Native Hawaiian Nation will need to repatriate lands through
protocols of the settler-state. The Constitution of the Native Hawaiian Nation
promises sovereignty through self-governance for an exclusive group of Kanaka
Maoli life. It also codes the ‘āina without life and sovereignty in ways that could
relinquish Kanaka Maoli claims to territorial sovereignty over national lands.
Aguon’s thorough criticism of federal recognition in the context of international law
supports this. He posits that the Apology Resolution’s claim that Kānaka Maoli are a
sovereign people who have never surrendered their national lands is evidence of non198

acquiescence. “Under international law,” Aguon says, “this is a material admission
against interest. As such, any international tribunal seized today of the ‘Question of
Hawai‘i’ will take judicial notice of this admission and most likely consider it as
evidence of Hawaiian non-acquiescence to U.S. rule.”422 “Why, if the 1993 Apology
Resolution in effect provides a solid case for the non-acquiescence of the Hawaiian
people to U.S. rule,” he bemoans, “would anyone thereafter pursue federal recognition as
a quasi-sovereign nation vis-à-vis the United States given the likelihood that the
international community will read acquiescence in said recognition?”423 The Constitution
of the Native Hawaiian Nation puts on display the difficulties of asserting juridical and
territorial sovereignty within a state-determined process for reorganizing a government to
be federally recognized. The US settler-state’s geontopower, passing through Kānaka
Maoli who participated as delegates in Na‘i Aupuni and the ‘Aha, has animated the
Constitution of the Native Hawaiian Nation as a governing document to quite literally
constitute consent to federal recognition and therefore acquiesce to the juridical and
territorial sovereignty of the US settler-state.
‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina
In this concluding section, I track the formation of ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina, an
alternative project for Kanaka Maoli nation-building that centered aloha ‘āina to counter
state-determined nation-building for federal recognition. On August 3, 2015, Na‘i Aupuni
sent election notices to the 95,000 qualified Native Hawaiians certified on
Kana‘iolowalu. They advertised an election to determine delegates for the constitutional
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convention and included information about registering to become a delegate candidate.
Initially, Na‘i Aupuni suggested that 40 delegates would be elected to participate in the
‘Aha. After registration closed, Na‘i Aupuni released the names of 209 delegate
candidates on September 30. Community meetings sprang up under the banner of
Hālāwai Aloha ‘Āina (Meeting for Aloha ‘Āina) to organize against and protest Na‘i
Aupuni. This was reminiscent of the late 19th century emergence of Hui Kālai‘āina and
Hui Aloha ‘Āina that I explored earlier. Meetings were held across the islands of O‘ahu,
Maui, Hawai‘i, and Kaua‘i. The Hālāwai Aloha ‘Āina discussed how the ‘Aha would
harm Kanaka Maoli self-determination and possibly disassemble Hawaiian sovereignty.
During this time, the plaintiffs in Akina v. Hawaii (2015) filed a motion for an emergency
injunction to halt the election of Na‘i Aupuni’s delegate candidates until their appeal of
the District Court ruling could be reviewed in Circuit Court. On December 2, the US
Supreme Court published order 15A551, granting the motion for an emergency
injunction. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy, who authored the majority
opinion in Rice v. Cayetano (2000), ruled, “Respondents are enjoined from counting the
ballots cast in, and certifying the winners of, the election described in the application,
pending final disposition of the appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.” Na‘i Aupuni’s election was stalled. Instead of counting ballots and
certifying the winners for 40 seats at the constitutional convention, Na‘i Aupuni offered
seats to everyone. This abided by the ruling and swerved it altogether. Although some
dropped out in the process, Na‘i Aupuni invited 196 candidates to participate as delegates
in the ‘Aha. The Akina plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the defendants in civil contempt
for noncompliance with the order, but the Supreme Court denied the motion. The ‘Aha
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was finally set. But when Na‘i Aupuni’s ‘Aha convened 154 delegates at the Royal
Hawaiian Golf Course in Maunawili, O‘ahu on February 1, 2016, so too did Kanaka
Maoli activists.
‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina was born out of protest against Na‘i Aupuni. Before the ‘Aha
convened, Kānaka ‘Ōiwi met in the Hālāwai Aloha ‘Āina to plan tactics for stopping Na‘i
Aupuni. Longtime po‘e aloha ‘āina Healani Sonoda-Pale organized meetings, panel
presentations, demonstrations, and much more. She was instrumental in doing the
research, referenced in Chapter 2, to determine that 95% of Kānaka Maoli who provided
oral testimony for the DOI’s ANPRM said no and ‘a‘ole to the offer of federal
recognition. On November 13, 2015, Sonoda-Pale stood in front of the State of Hawai‘i’s
capitol building in downtown Honolulu with a sign reading: DON’T VOTE NA‘I
AUPUNI (see figure 13). Demonstrators there even burned ballots that they received in
the mail for the delegate candidate election. The message, from her and other Kanaka
Maoli activists, to those qualified Native Hawaiians enrolled on Kana‘iolowalu was to

Figure 13. DON’T VOTE NA‘I AUPUNI. Source: Honolulu Star-Advertiser.424
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refuse voting for delegate candidates of the constitutional convention. Na‘i Aupuni did
not just receive pressure from the federal lawsuit and Supreme Court order but also
activists like Sonoda-Pale. As I mentioned, Na‘i Aupuni canceled the election but invited
all candidates to be delegates in the ‘Aha. In response, Sonoda-Pale and others created
Protest Na‘i Aupuni, a coalition to protest against Na‘i Aupuni’s state-determined nationbuilding tied to federal recognition. When the ‘Aha first convened in Maunawili on
February 1, 2016, participants of Protest Na‘i Aupuni convened as well. Activists lined
the main road to the Royal Hawaiian Golf Course where the ‘Aha would be held in a
convention hall. Their messaging to delegates approaching the ‘Aha was unmistakable.
Refuting the assertion that Na‘i Aupuni promised sovereignty and life, there was a large
sign, bolded in red letters, that stated: NA‘I AUPUNI IS THE DEATH OF HAWAIIAN
RIGHTS (see figure 14). Protest Na‘i Aupuni minced no words; they interpreted

Figure 14. Na‘i Aupuni is the death of Hawaiian rights. Source: Protest Na‘i Aupuni.425
http://www.staradvertiser.com/2015/12/15/breaking-news/nai-aupuni-cancels-nativehawaiian-election.
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state-determined nation-building for federal recognition as the death of Kanaka Maoli
legal rights and claims to sovereignty. Over social media, Na‘i Aupuni became mocked
as “Ma‘i Aupuni,” meaning governance disease. As I have argued, this project for Native
Hawaiian nation-building was contaminated and ailed by state-determination for federal
recognition. Members of Protest Na‘i Aupuni continued to show up and demonstrate in
Maunawili as the ‘Aha rolled on. Na‘i Aupuni’s ‘Aha culminated with 88 votes in favor,
30 votes in opposition, and one vote in abstention to adopt the Constitution of the Native
Hawaiian Nation. But it also ended with the arrest of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi activists, some of
who went on to found ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina, an assembly for aloha of ‘āina.
‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina organized as a coalition to envision and practice Kanaka Maoli
nation-building beyond the settler-state and its legal apparatus. The coalition’s work
surpassed State of Hawai‘i legislation and law as well as the US federal government’s
executive administrative rule. In this sense, their nation-building was non-statist and
extra-legal. On February 22, the day that the ‘Aha concluded by adopting a governing
document, Kanaka Maoli activists attempted to enter the premise where the constitutional
convention was being held and eight of them were arrested (see figure 15). Those
arrested were charged with trespassing on private property.426 Settler capital reared its
ugly head and became the rationale, in the form of private property, for criminalizing and
incarcerating Kānaka ‘Ōiwi that opposed legal procedures for colonial dispossession. In
Hawai‘i, the US settler-state has been animated by settler colonial capital, and its agents
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have done what is necessary to defend settler capital at the expense of Kānaka Maoli and
our national and Indigenous sovereignties. Healani Sonoda-Pale was among those

Figure 15. Aloha ʻĀina. Source: ʻAha Aloha ʻĀina.427
arrested. Another enduring kanaka aloha ‘āina, Kalamaoka‘āina Niheu was also detained
by police. Throughout my research, I talked with Niheu and discovered that she is a
descendent of Kala‘iokamalino from Ni‘ihau who wove the moena pāwehe makana
analyzed in Chapter 1. Sonoda-Pale and Niheu became crucial organizers of ‘Aha Aloha
‘Āina. According to their official website, “The ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina began as a response to
the resounding community feedback from the Department of Interior (DOI) 2014
Hearings and Hālāwai Aloha ‘Āina informational meetings that Hawaiian leaders held
from October to November, 2015 throughout Hawai‘i. A key unifying concern was
protest to the State of Hawai‘i sponsored initiatives to undermine the Hawaiian
sovereignty movement and rights to Self-Determination and Independence (i.e.

427

“‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina,” ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina.
204

Kana‘iolowalu and Na‘i Aupuni).”428 The response to opposition expressed during DOI’s
ANPRM was unification against federal recognition that the State of Hawai‘i attempted
to facilitate through OHA, NHRC, Kana‘iolowalu, and Na‘i Aupuni. None of these
organizations could be trusted with fostering genuine unity because they were regulated,
and the Kānaka Maoli working in them disciplined, by the US settler-state. ‘Aha Aloha
‘Āina identified that unification was located in the political struggle to secure
sovereignty, self-determination, and independence. In doing so, the coalition fashioned
two principal declarations. The first declaration reaffirmed Hawaiian independence from
the US settler-state and protested against Na‘i Aupuni and federal recognition. It asserted
a commitment to rebuild the lāhui in seven ways:
1) the reclamation of our gathering rights;
2) the spread of ‘ōlelo Hawaii and the re-envisioning of our educational systems;
3) the revitalization of our traditional resource stewardship that assured food
sustainability through responsible stream, estuary/reef management as well as
kalo farming and fishpond upkeep;
4) resistance of the perils of climate change via the pursuit of a truly independent
economic system free from the strangle-hold of transnational corporations;
5) the re-invigoration of traditional means of healing such as ‘ai pono,
ho‘oponopono, lomilomi, and the protection of wahi pana like Mauna Kea,
Waipi‘o, and Haleakalā;
6) the expansion of scholarly research to uncover the full range of traditional
knowledge that our kupuna gifted us;
7) Finally, we shall Unify all efforts to create an Independent Hawaii, and to [sic]
restore Ko Hawai‘i Pae ‘Āina to the descendants of the Hawaiian Kingdom for a
better future for generations to come.429
This mapped out a future-dawning agenda for Kanaka Maoli nation-building that was
unregulated and undisciplined by the settler-state. Independence became the focus of
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growing and cultivating the lāhui. The second declaration rejected and condemned Na‘i
Aupuni’s ‘Aha. It exclaimed, “We, the undersigned, firmly reject the illegitimate Naʻi
Aupuni ‘Aha objective to create a Native Hawaiian government. We stand in opposition
to any governing documents and governing body that is produced through this ‘aha. We
continue to stand for the unification of our people through a transparent process, free
from any state or federal interference, control, or prescribed destiny.”430 These became
governing documents of ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina that centered a firm stance against the settlerstate and its legal milieu. ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina did not demand participation in statedetermined nation-building for federal recognition, nor did it desire to work within the
constraints of the settler-state apparatuses and law. It was ea in motion on-the-‘āina.
With Na‘i Aupuni perverting the ea of the ‘āina, ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina set out to
advance healthy governance for the lāhui. Turning away from the settler-state, the
organization describes its main purpose: “‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina is a coalition of more than 40
Kānaka Maoli (aboriginal Hawaiian) organizations, businesses, and Hawaiian leaders
dedicated to collectively determining the path forward for the healthy governance of our
people.”431 This system of governance was premised upon not just aloha ‘āina, as the
coalition’s name signals, but a particular framework. “We,” they detail, “have undertaken
this process through a series of public meetings that utilize the traditional framework of
Kino Kālaimoku; a process that is independent of control by the State of Hawai‘i.”432 An
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‘Ōiwi ontology of life and epistemology for governance, Kino Kālaimoku pivots on
regenerating Indigenous life and governance in Hawai‘i (see figure 16), which ultimately
refuses settler-state control. Kino means body whereas kālaimoku literally translates to

Figure 16. The KINO: The Civil Polity. Source: ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina.433
managing islands. The kino became an embodied way to think about managing and
governing the Hawaiian islands, without instituting liberal mechanisms for democractic
governance like Naʻi Aupuni. During an ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina workshop in Hilo on Hawai‘i
island, po‘e aloha ‘āina Lākea Trask, who testified against federal recognition in Chapter
2, explained the historical significance and contemporary importance of Kino
Kālaimoku.434 When students at the University of Hawai‘i in Hilo organized the
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Movement for Aloha ‘Āina (MAA), they turned to David Malo’s seminal text Hawaiian
Antiquities for mo‘olelo on Hawaiian systems of governance.435 More than unearthing the
idea of kino, Trask said that the kino found them. Malo wrote, “The word kalaimoku
related to the civil polity, or government, of the land. The government was supposed to
have one body (kino).”436 As an older configuration of government, ʻAha Aloha ʻĀina
adapted it and advanced Kino Kālaimoku. “The locality of traditions does not have to be
static, fixed, or marked as a moment in time that has passed,” Mishuana Goeman asserts,
“rather, traditions migrate through time, ideas, and places.”437 Breaking the divide
between categories of “traditional” and “modern,” this system of governance has four
representative parts. The first part represents the poʻo (head), which positions the Mōʻī
and ʻĀina at the head of government. Trask elaborated that the last Mōʻī of the Hawaiian
Kingdom, Liliʻuokalani, would remain at the poʻo alongside Papahānaumoku, our Earth
Mother, and the ʻāina of Hawaiʻi. This reiterated a perspectival shift to code the lāhui not
necessarily as a Kingdom but more so a Queendom. The second part signifies the lima
(arms) with Kahuna and Kālaimoku, the spiritual, cultural leaders and political leaders,
respectively. The third part symbolizes the wāwae (feet). In particular, this is emblematic
of two groups: Nā Koa as well as Mahiʻai and Lawaiʻa. Nā Koa are on-the-ʻāina
protectors of the people and nation. Mahiʻai and Lawaiʻa are the farmers and fisherman,
those that cultivate the ‘āina and that which feeds. The fourth part is the māno wai
(circulatory system) and represents communication, networking, and media and
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technology specialists. Kānaka Maoli participating in Kino Kālaimoku are not siloed into
a single part or one representative role. Rather, multiple roles within various parts can be
performed within this structure of governance. Oftentimes Kānaka Maoli perform all of
them, according to Trask, since each makes up the kālaimoku but also the kino—poʻo,
lima, wāwae, and māno wai—of Kānaka Maoli.
ʻAha Aloha ʻĀina became transoceanic and included off-island Kanaka ‘Ōiwi in
the diaspora. From October 2015 until November 2015, there were 2,289 total attendees
of the meetings, panel presentations, and workshops put on by ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina,
including the early Hālāwai Aloha ‘Āina (see figure 17). This number was astounding
and much larger than the number of delegates, whom were unelected, attending Na‘i
Aupuni’s ‘Aha. ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina participants were informed about the coalition’s two
declarations and educated on Kino Kālaimoku. ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina sincerely integrated the
geontology of aloha ‘āina into imagining and practicing ea in a way that sidestepped
state-determined nation-building for federal recognition. One vivid example was an
emphasis on holding meetings on moku honu (turtle island), the continental United
States. These meetings were held in six major cities across four different states. There
were a total of 199 attendees, which consisted of Kānaka Maoli that were off-island in the
diaspora as well as non-Kanaka Maoli people. This was uniquely dissimilar to how Na‘i
Aupuni’s ‘Aha operated. For instance, there were delegates from the American continent
that attended and participated in Na‘i Aupuni’s ‘Aha. However, the numbers were much
lower than ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina, and non-Kanaka Maoli were never targeted educational
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Figure 17. ʻAha Aloha ʻĀina attendance totals. Source: ʻAha Aloha ʻĀina.438
outreach like the meetings that ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina hosted on moku honu. The alternative
convention for Kanaka Maoli nation-building traveled to the American continent to reach
Kanaka ‘Ōiwi off-island and rally allies. ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina crossed the waters of the
Pacific Ocean to discuss nation-building with Kānaka Maoli on other islands, not just
O‘ahu like Na‘i Aupuni, and even traveled to America to do so. This is what genuine
nation-building looks like. ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina’s coalitional work offered a model for
Kanaka Maoli nation-building that centered aloha ‘āina to counter state-determined
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nation-building for federal recognition. The alternative convention was organized by
Kanaka Maoli activists who offered, what Maile Arvin has termed, regenerative
refusals,439 integrating political refusal with the regeneration of Indigenous life and
governance, which I suggest presented new gifts of sovereignty.
Na‘i Aupuni canceled the ratification referendum of the Constitution of the Native
Hawaiian Nation; it was a critical victory for ‘Aha Aloha ‘Āina. Nevertheless, former
delegates of Na‘i Aupuni’s ‘Aha, as a group of Kānaka Maoli that claim to not be
working with the settler-state, are currently working to raise funds in order to hold a
private ratification referendum that could enable the Native Hawaiian Nation to federally
recognized. The threat of colonial dispossession in Hawai‘i has ballooned further through
settler colonial capitalism in the struggle against astronomy industry development.
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Chapter 5
The Neoliberal Crisis of the Thirty Meter Telescope

In a Los Angeles Times article published on March 18, 2001, professor of
astronomy at the California Institute of Technology Richard Ellis opined, “It annoys me
to see astronomers portrayed as tyrants who come in to exploit Mauna Kea. That’s very
unfair.”440 He retorted, “We’re searching for truth and knowledge, the kinds of things that
have motivated countries for centuries. We don’t need to apologize.”441 Ellis’
exasperation regarding opposition to development of the astronomy industry at Mauna
Kea was not new, nor was his unapologetic position that the pursuit of truth and
knowledge has been a fundamental feature for state operations of imperialism and
colonialism. The Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) is proliferating this legacy in Hawai‘i
after more than 50 years of opposition to developing the astronomy industry at Mauna
Kea, a sacred mountain to Kānaka Maoli also known as Mauna a Wākea on Hawai‘i
island. When efforts to construct the TMT ramped up in 2015 but were stopped by
Kānaka Maoli, the scientific discourse to rationalize astronomy on Mauna a Wākea
shifted. At the time, a young wahine came forward in support of the TMT. Aspiring to
become a professional astronomer, Mailani Neal said, “Why not put this monumental
telescope that’s going to be a worldwide honor in Hawaii? I think it’s one of the greatest
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ways to raise Hawaiian culture and show it to the world.”442 Neal proclaimed that
Hawai‘i is a suitable location for the TMT because the international attention on the
telescope would garner global honor for Hawai‘i. This argument suggested that Hawaiian
culture would be elevated through the globalization of astronomy. Extending this
rationale, Mauna a Wākea became discussed as a place for the world. Harry Kim, the
Mayor of Hawai‘i County where the mountain is located, reflected, “I believe that Mauna
Kea can be a place of a pursuit of knowledge to make us a better people and better
stewards of the land. Mauna Kea can be or should be a monument for the world for peace
on earth.”443 These are three distinct yet corresponding discourses that have been
produced and circulated to justify construction of the TMT at Mauna a Wākea.
In this final chapter, I investigate the political economy of the TMT, which is a
development project for the astronomy industry at our sacred mountain Mauna a Wākea
in Hawai‘i. I track the shifting political economy that organizes institutional and
individual rationale for TMT. In particular, I look at the production of social relations for
selling TMT. Doing so, this chapter addresses a few questions: How has the proposed
construction of TMT been promoted and sold?; In what ways have Kānaka Maoli
challenged and stopped the TMT from being built by refusing to buy into multiple forms
of liberalism? Critiquing the TMT’s political economy, I make a few main arguments.
First, the TMT is animated through scientific liberalism, which established a foundational
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order and ideology of liberalism for astronomy industry development at Mauna a Wākea.
Aiding the liberal power of scientific knowledge production, I suggest secondarily that
liberal multiculturalism emerged as a tactic to incorporate Kanaka ‘Ōiwi culture into
representations of TMT. When liberal multiculturalism failed to absorb ‘Ōiwi Indigeneity
as a strategy to build the TMT, another approach bloomed. Third, with the TMT
promising economic and educational opportunities in Hawai‘i, neoliberal
multiculturalism exploded as a way to sponsor and encourage construction of TMT.
Unique and interrelated, these are TMT’s liberalisms. As corporate, international, and
state incentives to build TMT linger, interrogating the political economic rationale for
TMT is a necessary and pressing task. This is exceedingly true given that nagging desires
persist to begin building the telescope observatory as soon as possible.
There are three primary sections in this chapter. In the first, I delineate my
approach to the political economy of TMT by tracing Jodi Melamed’s framework to
liberalism. Her framework on official US state antiracisms, representing difference to
destroy it, offers a historically materialist genealogy and conceptual orientation for my
analysis. In the second, I analyze public relation documents, management plans, a
petition, and news articles that promote TMT, as well as complementary data like State of
Hawai‘i law, policy, and court cases to sketch the ways that scientific liberalism enlisted
liberal multiculturalism and then consolidated under neoliberal multiculturalism. I
interrogate TMT’s political economy to critique how liberalism transforms to coerce
subjects, subdue resistance, and rationalize construction of the massive telescope
complex at Mauna a Wākea. In the third and final section, I examine how Kanaka ‘Ōiwi
refusals of astronomy industry development interrupt the neoliberalism of TMT and
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wonderfully disrupt US settler sovereignty in Hawai‘i. I close the chapter with some
preliminary thoughts on the neoliberal crisis within settler states of exception.
In Chapter 4, I contend that the political economies of scientific liberalism, liberal
multiculturalism, and neoliberal multiculturalism, which have transformed over time
through settler colonial capitalism in Hawai‘i, work uniquely but in concert to rationalize
construction of the TMT. Yet, Kanaka Maoli refusals of TMT, through diverse kinds of
legal activism and direct-action blockades, throw it into a financial crisis that disrupts the
temporality of the development and, ultimately, exposes the precariousness of the US
settler-state in Hawai‘i as it tries to exercise settler sovereignty through astronomy
industry development.
Represent and Destroy
In Represent and Destroy, Melamed historicizes and theorizes the emergence of
liberalism,444 which provides conceptual tools to analyze the liberalisms of TMT. For
Melamed, a new order of racial capitalism was born out of geopolitical consolidations
throughout World War II and the Cold War. It was a time of global crisis for white
supremacy, exposing its connections across European fascism, racial segregation, and
colonial rule. “White supremacy,” she writes, “had provided unification for the political,
economic, and ideological structures of colonial capitalist modernity, and its loss of
credibility as a racial discourse and a racial order also ruptured this world-historical
formation.”445 What resulted was a shift from the allegedly explicit racism of white
supremacy to an “antiracist, liberal-capitalist modernity determined by and shaping the
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conditions of U.S. global ascendancy.”446 The global goal of US hegemony required
restructuring political economic power, in the wake of international liberation
movements, to produce a liberal edict that could claim and be identified as antiracist.
Liberalism became a political economic regime and ideology to address overt forms of
racism through performances of antiracism. When the US claimed leadership of
transnational capital in the beginning stages of the Cold War, it ushered in an official
state-sanctioned antiracism that promised equality, freedom, and justice.
Melamed demonstrates racial liberalism, throughout the 1940s and 1960s,
inaugurated fresh forms of violence. Claiming to combat the racisms of white supremacy,
liberalism weaponized race while disassociating racial difference from its material
conditions. As a concept, liberalism helps me to think through how racialized violence is
structured and exacted. Melamed turns to James Baldwin. Examining his novel Uncle
Tom’s Cabin, she suggests Baldwin critiques thes race novel, or novels coded non-white
for their authors, genres, plots, narratives, and characters, insofar as they established
ways of knowing that allowed white subjects to learn, confirm, and sympathize with
ideas about racial difference. This functioned to excuse white subjects, consuming such
cultural technology, from exacting racism. Commenting on protest novels detailing
African-American resistance, Baldwin illustrates the crux of racial liberalism. He says,
“‘As long as such books are being published,’ an American liberal once said to me,
‘everything will be alright.’”447 Such argumentation posits that the mere production,
distribution, and consumption of racial difference could resolve racism. Race novels
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established an epistemological system that apprehended racial formations to serve
whiteness, whereas the protest novel incorporated racialized resistance into the
progressive machinery of postwar American modernity for US global ascendency. The
effect was an absorption of antiracism into US nationalism, producing the liberal white
US citizen-subject as distinct from their prejudiced and intolerant counterpart, which
ultimately preserved and hid the white power emanating from white supremacy. This is
the historical-material process wherein representations (of race) could destroy (racial
difference). It is destruction via normative violence, “whereby legitimate violence has
been increasingly exercised through norms that impose legibility and illegibility and
attach punishments to transgressions of norms.”448 Melamed’s antiracist critique of
capitalism and anticapitalist critique of racism herein solicits queer of color criticisms on
normativity. She argues, “I propose that official antiracisms—the freedoms they have
guaranteed, the state capacities they have invented, the subjects they have recognized,
and even the rights they have secured—have enabled the normalizing violences of
political and economic modernity to advance and expand.”449 Melamed’s
conceptualization of liberalism, as an exceptionally antiracist imperative, is useful for my
analysis of the TMT, wherein liberalism in Hawai‘i employs similar yet different
techniques of racialization in service to astronomy development.
When racial liberalism ruptured in the 1960s because of civil rights activism,
and when the US could not secure identification as the global savior with decreasing
tensions from the Cold War, liberalism gave way to multiculturalism. The regime of
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liberal multiculturalism “incorporated and abstracted the materialist antiracisms of the
new race-based movements.”450 As emerging social movements across the world
radically politicized racial difference for activisms, the limits of racial liberalism were
revealed. Liberal multiculturalism, during the 1980s and 1990s, recalibrated those
limitations. US universities played a substantial role in doing so. At American
universities, Melamed contends, “Knowledge about minoritized difference—especially
racial and cultural difference—was made to work for post-Keynesian social and
economic policies.”451 Such university regulation and discipline included training
students to be multicultural citizens, commodifying cultures, managing cross-cultural
solidarities, and manufacturing differential orders of humanity. Institutional diversity
became universalized as progress. A new market surfaced for racialized cultural property,
and multicultural books published in the canon of literature stood-in for material
activisms. This “did not antagonize but furthered racial capitalism.”452 As the second
stage of official state antiracism, liberal multiculturalism masqueraded institutionalized
diversity as a mechanism for biopolitical management, ideological control, and
unrelenting US hegemony. For my analysis, liberal multiculturalism manufactures
conditions of possibility for TMT to appropriate, incorporate, and share not just ‘Ōiwi
Indigeneity but also Hawai‘i in a process that suppresses opposition and encourages
astronomy industry development.
In the 1990s, under the weight of capital’s rapid globalization, liberalism
mutated into neoliberal multiculturalism. Melamed describes that neoliberal sovereignty
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dominated at this time as an economic system that integrated governance of biological
and social life on the centrality of markets rather than nation-states. Neoliberal
sovereignty “not only indicates a constellation in which governments function in the
interest of capital maximization but also signifies that neoliberal calculations have come
to govern biopolitical life, to rationalize, engineer, and organize forms of humanity.”453 In
this view, neoliberalism exercises power and force over the rationality of social practices.
Melamed suggests examples of these practices are resource extraction, dispossession,
building infrastructure, lending, and land privatization. Building on this, astronomy
industry development is yet another kind of this social practice. As the third chapter of
liberal antiracism, she claims, “Neoliberal multiculturalism is my term for the unifying
discourse that neoliberalism has used to exert a monopoly of rationality over the practices
that impact its constitution.”454 She crucially goes on to identify, “Whereas in the
previous two phases official antiracisms were sutured to US governmentality and
leadership for global capitalism, in this third phase official antiracism has attached to
neoliberal sovereignty, which increasingly incorporates segments of US governmentality
and economic activity.”455 Multiculturalism operates as a spirit of the financialization of
everything. In this configuration, the economy is believed to be the horizon of freedom
from racism and other forms of oppression. Economic freedom appears to be justice.
“Concepts previously associated with 1980s and 1990s liberal multiculturalism, such as
openness, diversity, and freedom, have now been recycled, and now open societies and
economic freedoms (shibboleths for neoliberal measures) and consumerist diversity
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signify multicultural rights for individuals and for corporations,” according to
Melamed.456 Like liberal multiculturalism, universities were an institutional site wherein
neoliberal multiculturalism thrived. For instance, the university fabricated a citizenry of
multicultural global denizens. Extending ideas about the race novel and protest novel,
Melamed asserts that this new regime of antiracism is what animated global literature as a
field for the discipline of literary studies, whereby neoliberal subjects can consume
difference for the purpose of assigning racialized, gendered, and sexualized value to
expand capital across the planet. Neoliberal multiculturalism “has valued its beneficiaries
as multicultural, reasonable, law-abiding, and good global citizens and devalued the
dispossessed as monocultural, backward, weak, and irrational—unfit for global
citizenship because they lack the proper neoliberal subjectivity.”457 As the final official
regime and ideology of state antiracisms, neoliberal multiculturalism is an important
concept to orient my analysis to how the TMT gets rationalized through expenditures, the
market, and other economic determinisms, while also packaged for global citizens and
the promotion of planetary peace.
TMT’s Liberalisms
In the first part of this section, I claim that the founding political economy of
TMT is scientific liberalism. The Thirty Meter Telescope International Observatory
(TIO) organized as a nonprofit corporation in 2014 to construct a high industrial
telescope complex at Mauna a Wākea. Attempting to be built by the TIO, TMT would be
a wide-field, alt-az Ritchey-Chrétien telescope with a 30-meter diameter segmented
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primary mirror. As a result, the observatory complex requires a significant amount of
space. “In modern astronomy,” says Paul Coleman, a Kanaka Maoli astrophysicist for the
University of Hawai‘i’s Institute for Astronomy, “you must go with the biggest telescope
you can build to the tallest mountain you can find. That is the defining thing for
astronomical growth.”458 Proposals for TMT estimate that it would be 18-stories high at
184-feet in height, extend 20-feet down into the mountain, and have a footprint of five
acres.459 The development would excavate 64,000 cubic yards at the northern plateau and
also add a 3,400-foot-long road.460 The fact is that this is a large project. TIO purports
that TMT would be the largest telescope in the world. With 21 telescopes and 13
observatories already atop Mauna a Wākea, TMT would add to growing amounts of
waste by producing 120-250 cubic feet of solid waste every week, which will be stored,
along with hazardous chemical materials, in a 5,000-gallon underground storage tank.461
Despite these deleterious ecological impacts identified as “substantial, significant, and
adverse” in a 2010 Environmental Impact Statement by the University of Hawai‘i (UH),
constructing the TMT at Mauna a Wākea has been rationalized because of the mountain’s
value to science.
The dominant, western science community desires Mauna a Wākea as an optimal
site for producing knowledge about astronomy, astrophysics, and cosmology. The
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mountain offers “the best window on the universe.” TMT’s General Information
Brochure states, “To capture the sharpest images and produce the best science,
astronomers need more than an extraordinary telescope; they also need an equally
extraordinary location with just the right atmospheric qualities.” Mauna a Wākea is
rendered extraordinary because of its location with atmospheric settings conducive for
viewing the universe. Not only is the mountain valued for its ability to become
technologized, as a window to peer into the universe, but it is valuable specifically for the
conditions necessary to erect technological infrastructure for scientific knowledge
production. The brochure continues, delineating the rationale for pursuing Mauna a
Wākea as the preferred build-site, and contends, “After a rigorous five-year campaign
that spanned the entire globe, TMT scientists found such a site, Mauna Kea, a dormant
volcano in Hawaii that rises nearly 14,000 feet above the surface of the Pacific Ocean.
This site, which is above approximately 40 percent of Earth’s atmosphere, has a climate
that is particularly stable, dry, and cold. All of which are important characteristics for
clear seeing. This mountain in Hawaii is also home to some of today’s most powerful
telescopes, including the Gemini North Telescope, the Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope,
the Subaru Telescope, and TMT’s forerunners the twin Keck telescopes.” The elevation,
climate, and overall environment of the mountain appear ideal and exceptional for
astronomical inquiry. A “dormant volcano,” Mauna a Wākea gets normalized as asleep,
inanimate, and lifeless, providing a ripe stage for discovering and observing life
elsewhere. Moreover, this passage suggests since there are other telescopes already built
at the northern plateau of Mauna a Wākea that the newer, larger, and more powerful
TMT ought to be manufactured. The current technological infrastructure justifies further
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development in the name of science in general and astronomy in specific. This is the
context in which Richard Ellis, whom the prefaced this chapter, can shamelessly
proclaim, “We’re searching for truth and knowledge, the kinds of things that have
motivated countries for centuries. We don’t need to apologize.” This commentary bluntly
demonstrates a foundational premise of TMT’s scientific liberalism. It is the
possessiveness and impenitence of white supremacist authority, as Aileen MoretonRobinson and Linda Tuhiwai Smith have explored.462
TMT made a liberal pact to ameliorate scientific progress, which masks and
rationalizes various forms of violence. The project promises to “unlock new frontiers.”463
The unlocking of new frontiers signifies an allegedly successful conquest of Hawaiʻi, an
old frontier they allude, as well as the potential to open new frontiers throughout the
universe. This is a pernicious logic of Euro-American exploration that Byrd refers to as
“imperial planetarity,” or planetary imperialism.464 The promise mobilizes Frederick
Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis” that was and still is weaponized for the dispossession,
elimination, and genocide of Native Americans.465 Unlocking new frontiers in the
universe obscures how the opening and closing of frontiers has been historically sutured
to spectacular forms of violence against Indigenous communities.466 Wielded as rationale
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for TMT, the spectacular violence from the American frontier diffuses across the Pacific
Ocean to Mauna a Wākea. The TMT’s liberal promise of scientific progress transmits US
empire through the abjection of Indian Country and Indianness. Although seen as a
contemporary phenomenon, the TMT is co-constitutive of a techno-scientific order that
has always already attached liberalism to scientific knowledge production in a process
that restructures state power and reconfigures its exercise of force. For instance, Byrd
posits, “Transit refers to a rare astronomical event, the paired transits of Venus across the
sun, that served in 1761 and again in 1769 as global moments that moved European
conquest toward notions of imperialist planetarity that provided the basis for
Enlightenment liberalism. The imperial planeterity that sparked scientific rationalism and
inspired humanist articulations of freedom, sovereignty, and equality touched four
continents and a sea of islands in order to cohere itself.”467 Seeking to measure the transit
of Venus and universalize Enlightenment science as the first arrangement of liberalism,
astronomy industry development emerged historically through the global dispossession
and elimination of Indigenous people by imperial nation-states. This is the structural
context informing how the scientific liberalism organizing TMT is connected to settlerstate power. When the State of Hawai‘i sanctions the TMT, it does not just flag how the
state entity constitutes itself on stolen lands via colonial dispossession. It demonstrates
further that support of astronomy industry development proliferates settler colonial power
so as to secure its institutionalization in the formation of Hawai‘i as a US settler-state.
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Settler-state power rides the liberalism of scientific progress in order to develop civil
society but also to conceal the TMT’s violence on the ‘āina and arm it with police force.
Aside from utilizing scientific liberalism as a smokescreen to conceal white
supremacy, transmission of the American frontier, and settler-state violence of astronomy
industry development, the assault against Kānaka Maoli has also been censored. TMT’s
promise of scientific progress for societal development eschews violence done to
Hawaiʻi, Mauna a Wākea, and ‘Ōiwi subjects. Specific scientific objectives reveal the
desire for liberal progress as a calculated camouflage. The project states, “As our level of
knowledge grows, the next level of questions that arise require facilities with even greater
capabilities to gather the observations needed to answer them.”468 The TMT claims to
provide new observations for every field in astronomy and astrophysics. There are “key
science areas” being targeted, “Spectroscopic exploration of the “dark ages” when the
first sources of light and the first heavy elements in the universe formed; Exploration of
galaxies and large-scale structure in the young universe, including the era in which most
of the stars and heavy elements were formed and the galaxies in today’s universe were
first assembled; Investigations of massive black holes throughout cosmic time;
Exploration of planet-formation processes and the characterization of extra-solar planets;
Discovery observations that push into the terrestrial-planet regime.”469 Traversing tenses,
from future “new frontiers” to past “dark ages,” TMT desires developing space (i.e.,
Mauna a Wākea) in order for deserving subjects (i.e., white settlers) to develop through
time toward modernity. Indigenous people have been restricted from progressing into a
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modern future since Indigeneity is temporally bracketed to an authentic realm of the past.
“Relegated to the ‘dark ages’ of tradition,” Iokepa Casumbal-Salazar explicates, “Native
peoples appear as the agonistic menace of the modern scientific state.”470 Additionally,
there are topical goals for TMT: fundamental physics, cosmology, early universe and
galaxy formations, intergalactic medium, supermassive black holes, milky way and other
nearby galaxies, stars, stellar physics, interstellar medium, formations of stars and
planets, exoplanets, solar system, and time domain science.471 These are technological
advancements and scientific objectives that come to symbolize progress for civil society.
Put another way, the techno-scientific order produced by the TMT is not a material form
of progress, much like Melamed suggests that reading race novels and protest novels is
not materially antiracist. Rather, the advancements and objectives of TMT stand-in as
symbols of progress in a signification system that imbues technological innovation paired
to scientific knowledge with supreme value. This is a crucial distinction because it opens
up analysis to the semiotics of scientific liberalism, which ideologizes the importance of
TMT in a discursive process that tries to mask and simultaneously works to exact
racialized, gendered, and sexualized colonial violence against Kānaka Maoli. For
example, a colossal telescope to be erected on Mauna a Wākea without affirmative
consent, the TMT is a phallic edifice of white supremacist and heteropatriarchal settler
colonialism, and Kānaka Maoli that oppose it are marked hordes of backward,
anachronistic, and primitive subjects that stand in the way of its so-called progress. This
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normative violence produced through making subjects (il)legible is a unique animus to
represent and destroy Kānaka Maoli. Casumbal-Salazar adds, “The urgency for another
telescope is less about progress or the human condition than maintaining control over
land and confining Native self-determination to a permanent state of deferral.”472
Casumbal-Salazar lays out an astute critique of TMT’s scientific liberalism. “Inclusion
might seem to remedy the problem of exclusion; however,” he says, “the problem is not
exclusion, but instead how settler subjecthood comes to signify humanity and draws the
limits of modernity from which Kanaka ‘Ōiwi are in permanent exile.”473 Scientific
liberalism masquerades inclusion as a solution to perceived exclusion. “The problem for
Hawaiians is not one of access to the field of astronomy or the legal process,” he
contends, “but how Western law, science, and the state together control the ways
humanity is imagined in the first place.”474 In the scientific liberalism of TMT, not only
are Kānaka Maoli dehumanized but the destruction of Mauna a Wākea and brutalization
of Hawai‘i attempt to be hidden yet are completely justifiable for progress.
As technological innovation and scientific advancement alone failed to
successfully sell the TMT project, scientific liberalism enlisted multiculturalism, which I
map out here in the second part of this section. Rather than relying simply on including
Kānaka Maoli, the political economy of TMT morphed to incorporate ʻŌiwi Indigeneity
within the project, claim cultural belonging, and share Mauna a Wākea to the world.
Instead of using the illusion of progress resulting from technology and science,
multiculturalism is a cunning ideology that enables the TIO corporation and its
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proponents to make claims to justice by institutionalizing and performing diversity.
Extending Melamed’s incisive critique of racial capitalism to account for settler
colonialism, the TMT symbolically represents ‘Ōiwi Indigeneity to materially dispossess,
eliminate, and destroy Kānaka Maoli. These moves demonstrate that the liberal
multiculturalism of the TMT is weaponized to promote astronomy industry development.
Put another way, institutions and individuals have employed liberal multicultural tropes,
narratives, and discourses as methods to market TMT construction.
The TMT project incorporates Indigeneity. In “Voices and Visions of Mauna
Kea: Mauna Kea Science Reserve Master Plan and Implementation Process Summary,”
published by UH in 2000, astronomy industry development on Mauna a Wākea is clothed
in Kanaka ‘Ōiwi perspectives, beliefs, and bodies. On the cover page of the Master Plan,
there is a quotation from Kalākaua where he states, “It will afford me unfeigned
satisfaction if my kingdom can add its quota toward the successful accomplishment of the
most important astronomical observation of the present century and assist, however
humbly, the enlightened nations of the earth in these costly enterprises.” Examining the
use of Kalākaua, Casumbal-Salazar corrects that this message came from an 1874 letter,
welcoming a British expedition to Hawai‘i for the purpose of observing the transit of
Venus. However, Kalākaua was not advocating large ground-based observatories. In fact,
Casumbal-Salazar suggests, “He was supporting four or five portable telescopes in
Honolulu, none bigger than ten feet long, and all temporarily positioned for the single
event. No permanent telescope was proposed for Mauna Kea.”475 In UH’s Master Plan,
this important context is abstracted to show that Kānaka Maoli have historically
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supported astronomy industry development in order to hail readers to apprehend and
consume it as a form of cultural difference. TMT gets represented as a product of
Kalākaua’s advocacy, which grossly manufactures presumptions that Kalākaua would
approve of TMT construction. That said, the TIO, whom received a sub-lease for the land
on Mauna a Wākea from UH who holds the master lease, continues this process of
playing Hawaiian. Recently, the TIO’s official website proudly displayed an image of
British astronomer George L. Tupman operating one of the telescopes commissioned by
Kalākaua in 1874. Despite being a small, portable telescope, this visual makes Kalākaua
and his telescope intelligible as a way to appropriate ‘Ōiwi culture for promoting the
TMT as institutionally diverse and culturally sensitive.
In the wake of this, a fictive kinship formed. Casumbal-Salazar argues that
TMT, and US universities that sponsor the project, conjures up a fictional kinship. While
it is true that “Hawaiians become suspect and subject to institutional anti-Native racism
yet fetishized as an archaeological remnant within multicultural society,”476 the TMT’s
liberal multiculturalism identifies astronomers and Kānaka Maoli as relatives. As an
ideology, it suggests that astronomers and Kānaka Maoli are not related through
genealogy but vis-à-vis cultures of astronomical skill and expertise. This is why
naturalizing astronomical aptitude as a characteristic of ‘Ōiwi cultural difference
becomes crucial, in the first place. Looking back at the Master Plan, another quotation,
proceeding Kalākaua’s line, is from Fredrick Chaffee who is a former director of the W.
M. Keck Observatory on Mauna a Wākea. Extending Kalākaua’s so-called support for
astronomy industry development, Chaffee’s quotation reads, “After all, the ancient
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Hawaiians were among the first great astronomers, using the stars to guide them among
the islands in the vast Pacific, centuries before anyone else had developed such skill.
Long before Europeans and mainlanders, Hawaiian astronomers were studying the
heavens with awe and wonder, the same feelings that draw modern astronomers to study
the heavens. At this very deep level, I feel we are brothers and sisters.” A few key
implications arise from this passage and how it is deployed to compel construction of
TMT. Casumbal-Salazar’s reading is incredibly instructive. “Chaffee’s statement
imagines a fictive kinship that recodes dispossession as inheritance by inventing a
temporal hierarchy that both racializes and genders difference,” he asserts, “[t]hrough
comparison with ‘modern astronomers,’ the move at once recognizes and trivializes
Kanaka ‘Ōiwi scientific achievements, rendered interesting but expired. The logic of this
rhetoric imagines astronomers as heirs to Hawai‘i and Mauna a Wākea by constructing a
modernity within a linear temporality in which ‘ancient Hawaiians’—‘long before’ and
‘centuries’ ago—are obsolete and thus inferior.”477 Complementing Casumbal-Salazar’s
critique of the Chaffee quotation, I suggest the shift from scientific liberalism to liberal
multiculturalism bolsters this fictive kinship. Scientific liberalism rearranges the
semiotics of the TMT in a process that ideologizes notions of progress to hide and
rationalize violence. These same scientific techniques of liberal power ideologize the
relationship between modern astronomers and ancient Kānaka Maoli, and thereby
conceal and cause the violence detailed by Casumbal-Salazar. The liberal multicultural
political economy of TMT, however, is what targets kin relations. Attempting to
incorporate Indigeneity through this relationship, the TMT becomes promoted and sold
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not just as institutionally diverse and culturally sensitive but also as maintaining familial
ties to Mauna a Wākea, extended through the Indigenous belonging that Kānaka Maoli
have to Hawai‘i. This is reminiscent of Judy Rohrer’s argument that settler subjects
Indigenize themselves through racialized notions of Indigeneity to colonize Indigenous
territories and resources.478 Astronomers stake a claim to Hawai‘i by racializing Kānaka
Maoli as ancient, inferior, and vanishing kin in order to indigenize themselves by which
to take white patriarchal possession of and rightfully continue developing Mauna a
Wākea. However, Casumbal-Salazar claims, “No, Kanaka Maoli and astronomers are not
‘brothers and sisters’ within this fictive kinship that imagines the expropriation of
Indigenous lands and desecration of sacred sites as a destiny and desire of the Hawaiian
people.”479 But what happens when this fictive kinship appears real and tangible through
TMT advocacy by Kanaka Maoli astronomers?
Magnifying the incorporation of Indigeneity and staking of claims to Mauna a
Wākea, liberal multiculturalism is mobilized to share Hawai‘i with the world through the
TMT. On April 13, 2015, Mailani Neal, the young wahine that I discussed in the
introduction, created an online petition in support of TMT. In the wake of legal
challenges and direct-action blockades against TMT, Neal’s petition galvanized support
to counter opposition, especially as online petitions against TMT began emerging.
Explaining her inspiration, she says, “I have created this document so that my belief,
which I share with others, will be heard. I am an 18 year-old, Native Hawaiian girl in
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high school with loving passion for astronomy and my culture.”480 Equipped with zeal for
astronomy and being Kanaka Maoli, Neal complicates the fictive kinship. “She sees
practicing astronomy on Maunakea as a way to connect with her wayfinding ancestors,”
according Tom Callis.481 Neal later became a board member of Perpetuating Unique
Economic Opportunities, a nonprofit organization that intervened as a legal party
alongside UH and TIO for a contested case hearing regarding the TMT’s building permit
in 2017. This illuminates how the project “adopted a multicultural model of inclusion,
locating Hawaiians who believe ‘a seat at the table’ is better than having no say at all.”482
To be clear, I am not claiming that Neal disproves or undoes the fictional kinship
between astronomers and Kānaka Maoli. Instead, I suggest that Neal’s petition and her
subject position issue a complicated foil, which does not counter critiques of fictive
kinship but indeed exposes liberal multiculturalism’s impulse to represent and destroy.
Representations of ‘Ōiwi astronomers supporting TMT enhance the normative
processes for destroying Mauna a Wākea and Kānaka Maoli. “I am Hawaiian. I know
how it feels,” Neal observes, “It’s kind of a sad truth that so many sacred places have
already been desecrated.”483 She goes on to suggest, “Why not put this monumental
telescope that’s going to be a worldwide honor in Hawaii? I think it’s one of the greatest
ways to raise Hawaiian culture and show it to the world.”484 For Neal, TMT offers
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another iteration of development that desecrates sacred places to her own people. But she
recodes the desecration and destruction of the mountain at the hands of astronomy
industry development as an honor. It is a “worldwide honor” for the exportation and
expropriation of ‘Ōiwi Indigeneity to “show it to the world.” The passage lucidly shows
that since sacred places have already been desecrated, TMT should be constructed
because it “raise[s] Hawaiian culture” to a global audience. In this sense, Mauna a Wākea
is a gift that can be unwrapped and consumed, even if it is razed. In 2014, Governor
Abercrombie, who advocated for state-determined Kanaka Maoli nation-building for
federal recognition in the last chapter, claimed that the mountain is “Hawai‘i’s gift to the
world.”485 This is not a gift of sovereignty that I am theorizing in this dissertation.
Instead, Neal’s argument to build the TMT aligns with Abercrombie’s phrasing whereby
both are structured by and bolster TMT’s liberal multiculturalism.
In the final part of this section, I show that the liberal multiculturalism of TMT
transformed into neoliberal multiculturalism. Tracking TMT’s liberalisms is crucial for
me to forge a political economic critique that considers conditions of possibility and
points of rupture. My arguments here offer interventions in three particular ways. First,
my political economic critique expands analysis of TMT in Hawaiian Studies. In
Casumbal-Salazar’s unprecedented research on TMT, he tracks the formation of liberal
multicultural discourses that propel settler subjectivities toward colonial-capitalist
modernity. Liberal multiculturalism operates, in his claims, as an ideology not simply to
build the TMT at Mauna a Wākea but also for settler colonial dispossession, elimination,
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and replacement of Kānaka Maoli. His arguments are crucial for my own. However,
Casumbal-Salazar does not explicitly consider the folding of neoliberalism into liberal
multiculturalism. While he posits that “the alignment of state agencies, private capital,
and big science suggests that the neoliberalization of governance in Hawai‘i, coupled
with the ideology of liberal multiculturalism, operationalizes settler colonialism,”486 there
is little elaboration on the process of how liberal multiculturalism coalesces with “the
state’s neoliberal vision of Hawai‘i.”487 Second, my analysis of neoliberal
multiculturalism extends current scholarship in Critical Indigenous Studies. Recent work
on neoliberalism in the field has flourished. For example, Goeman discusses how
neoliberal policies, like the North American Free Trade Agreement, consolidate global
capital in ways that map settler colonial violence onto Indigenous subjects through
individuation and individualism.488 In Indigenous Encounters with Neoliberalism,
Altamirano-Jiménez offers an in-depth analysis of the neoliberalization of place,
commodification of the environment, and violence against Indigenous women across the
geographies of Canada and Mexico.489 It is no coincidence that these authors launch
critiques of neoliberalism with Indigenous feminist theory. I follow this critically
Indigenous feminist lead, applying their frameworks on neoliberalism to the geopolitical
context of Hawai‘i. Third, I build on Melamed’s critique of racial capitalism. Although
Melamed provides a vital conceptual framework to examine historically material
transitions in liberalism, her work does not thoroughly interrogate how racial capitalism

486

Casumbal-Salazar, “A Fictive Kinship,” 12.
Ibid., 13
488
Goeman, Mark My Words.
489
Altamirano-Jimeñez, Indigenous Encounters with Neoliberalism.
487

234

can be animated by settler colonialism for neoliberalism’s “accumulation through
dispossession.”490 Admitting that “indigenous people across the globe over the last forty
years have experienced violences generated from the same underlying source, an
economic system of accumulation through dispossession,”491 Melamed eschews how
neoliberal violence against Indigenous people has been conditioned vis-à-vis settler
colonial capitalism, as Coulthard, Day, and I have ventured to show. Indeed, settler
colonial capitalism underpins the TMT’s neoliberal multiculturalism.
TMT possesses enormous funding from across the globe. The total estimated
cost for the project is $1.5 billion.492 Funds have been pledged from an international
group of institutions. They include the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, California
Institute of Technology, University of California, National Astronomical Observatory of
Japan, National Astronomical Observatories of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Indian
Astronomy Research Institutes, and Canadian government. This motley crew of funders
is paying the bill for TMT. The international funding of TMT demonstrates a global
financialization of the desecration and destruction of Mauna a Wākea, as a form of settler
colonialism that partners US and Canadian settler-states while cajoling nation-states like
Japan, China, and India. Indeed, neoliberalism has meant the worldwide financialization
of Mauna a Wākea. On the mountain, settler colonialisms fuse under the pressure of
neoliberal capitalism. In other words, settler colonization of Indian Country by the US
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federal government and settler colonization of First Nations by the Canadian Crown
provide necessary capital for funding the TMT’s violence against Hawai‘i and Kānaka
Maoli.
Mauna a Wākea has been thrust into an international market for astronomy
industry development, commodifying the mountain for techno-scientific infrastructure in
a process that requires the settler-state divest control to global capitalism. In 1968, the
State of Hawai‘i’s Land Board issued a general lease to UH for the purpose of building a
single telescope complex at Mauna a Wākea. Upon doing so, multiple telescope
complexes began developing, and public protest emerged with claims that new
development violated the initial general lease, especially as sub-leases were bestowed for
building more observatories. After UH submitted an application in 2011 for a
Conservation District Use Permit (CDUP) to acquire the appropriate permitting for
building TMT, a petition was filed with the Board of Land and Natural Resources
(BLNR) for a contested case hearing. However, the BLNR steamrolled ahead, approving
the CDUP before holding the necessary contested case hearing. But on December 2,
2015, the State of Hawai‘i Supreme Court ruled this was “putting the cart before the
horse.” A violation of due process, the decision invalidated the building permit and
remanded the case back down to the BLNR to hold a new contested case hearing.493 This
contested case hearing concluded on July 26, 2017 with the hearing’s officer making a
recommendation for the BLNR to approve the building permit for TMT.494 On September
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28, 2017, the BLNR voted in favor of granting a CDUP for TMT.495 The petitioners
appealed and recently lost in Supreme Court.496 This brief legal history details how the
settler-state has played a pivotal role in authorizing land leases, sub-leases, and building
permits in order to legally sanction the project and accelerate the flow of global capital.
In return, the settler-state receives a secret weapon: international competition and
globalization. David Harvey asserts that international competition and globalization “can
be used to discipline movements opposed to the neoliberal agenda…If that fails, then the
state must resort to persuasion, propaganda or, when necessary, raw force and police
power to suppress opposition to neoliberalism.”497 The global market for astronomy
industry development drives and dictates the rationality for governing what should occur
atop the mountain, from the settler-state’s encouragement of TMT to its deployment of
police forces to quell opposition. To date, there have been 59 unique arrests of protectors
of Mauna a Wākea. This is an example of Melamed’s neoliberal sovereignty, which
governs “on the belief that the market is better than the state at distributing resources and
managing human life.”498 “If the market knows best,” Dian Million laments, “then
governments should give capitalism room to work; nations should deregulate those social
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practices (state institutions and legislative measures) that seek to control the markets.”499
Elaborating these thoughts, Harvey writes, “Neoliberalism has become a hegemonic
discourse with pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices to
the point where it is now part of the commonsense way we interpret, live in, and
understand the world.”500 It is the neoliberal commonsensicality, packaged in a
multicultural ethos, for selling TMT that I have set out to unpack.
Although neoliberalism pervades the TMT project, the neoliberalization of Mauna
a Wākea weaponizes multiculturalism. Multiculturalism has been articulated as the spirit
of neoliberalism in three interconnected ways. First, the TIO suggests TMT provides
economic opportunities that would benefit the local economy and individual residents of
Hawai‘i, including Kānaka Maoli. For direct operations, TMT would require 140 fulltime employees “including cultural and education outreach specialists.”501 They argue
there are also indirect employment impacts, stating that “the project would result in the
creation of additional employment opportunities by contracting for work and services
with local companies for a variety of services ranging from precision machine shop work
to website design.”502 As a result, an estimated $13 million is budgeted for labor with
approximately $13 million budgeted for non-labor costs per year. TIO thus purports to
contribute about $26 million each year to the local economy. It plans to establish an
Instrument Development Office in Hawai‘i that would manage the development of new
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techno-scientific instruments worth $20 million. Additionally, the TIO contends that
TMT will even increase tourism revenue, which in 2017 totaled $1.96 billion from state
taxes on $16.78 billion in tourist expenditures.503 “As the TMT Observatory would be the
most powerful ground-based observatory on Earth,” they speculate, “it is anticipated that
it would generate interest and could lead to increased tourism related to the observatories
and astronomy.”504 Lastly, the TIO plans to institute a Workforce Pipeline Program to
train a highly qualified pool of workers for employment opportunities on the TMT
project. Marking an interest in cultural sensitivity to actualize economic opportunities,
they note, “The scope of these investments will include strengthening language and
culture programs and their integration with science and engineering.”505 Although reports
suggest economic opportunities will be reserved for Kānaka Maoli,506 the TIO does not
confirm this and instead flags TMT’s employment benefits mainly for residents of
Hawai‘i, which would de facto include Kānaka Maoli. An impudent reduction, increasing
economic opportunities for State of Hawai‘i residents might improve those for Kānaka
Maoli. The promised economic opportunities have persuaded individuals like science
reporter Kelly Dickerson to claim, “From my vantage, colonialism is a separate issue
from TMT: The corporation has taken so many steps to acknowledge the sleights of the
past and ensure that the telescope’s construction will benefit native Hawaiians.”507 Driven
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by the invisible hand of global capital and the labor market, the proposed financial boom
magically erases histories and contemporary conditions of colonialism.
Second, the TMT project offers educational programs for students. Commenting
on the link between economic opportunities and educational programs, Keahi Warfield
identified, “Hawaii’s [sic] high cost of living and students’ lagging test scores as signs
that training youth to be ready for high-tech jobs at the telescope is crucial for the state’s
economic future.”508 As the president of Perpetuating Unique Economic Opportunities,
Warfield has worked closely with UH and the TIO to tout TMT’s economic opportunities
by centering the needs of youth and students in Hawai‘i. He believes that TMT remedies
the high cost of living in Hawai‘i as well as student underachievement by providing
youth training for work on the project, which subsequently secures the settler-state’s
political economic future. One program that Warfield and his nonprofit highlight is the
TMT’s THINK (The Hawai‘i Island New Knowledge) Fund that pledges $1 million per
year “to better prepare Hawaii island students to master STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering and Math) and to become the workforce for higher paying science and
technology jobs in Hawaii’s [sic] 21st century economy.”509 THINK Fund money,
however, is not being distributed by the TIO. TIO recruited two other foundations to
distribute scholarships and grants: the Hawai‘i Community Foundation and Pauahi
Foundation. Both of which are delineating their own criteria for awarding resources.
Despite given some autonomy, TIO is allocating $750,000 for the THINK Fund at the
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Hawai‘i Community Foundation and $250,000 for the THINK Fund at the Pauahi
Foundation. The Organizing Committee for THINK has also discussed specifying
opportunities for Kānaka Maoli, recognizing that “an emphasis be given to improving
opportunities for STEM education for Native Hawaiian students, not as an exclusive
preference, but focusing on addressing the needs of Hawaii’s host culture.”510 Similar to
the way in which TIO promises economic opportunities for Kānaka Maoli as one group
of Hawai‘i’s residents, the educational programs promised flag an emphasis on ‘Ōiwi
students but without action. This maximizes the symbolism of TMT benefiting Kānaka
Maoli while admitting to be materially indeterminate. Economic and educational
freedoms for all residents of the State of Hawai‘i supplant the TIO’s policy to
appropriate, perform, and share Indigeneity. The THINK Fund’s language overtly
consolidates TIO’s economic and educational opportunities specifically for Kānaka
Maoli as only accessible by treating Kanaka ‘Ōiwi as an ethnic or racial minority. Selling
TMT through imagined economic and educational benefits, neoliberalism chokes ‘Ōiwi
Indigeneity through an ideology of multiculturalism that suggests Kānaka Maoli are an
ethnic or racial population, erasing Indigeneity as a form of difference organizing
relations to Mauna a Wākea, and thereby are US citizens, which destroys the unique
political status of Hawaiian Indigeneity with legal claims against the US settler-state.
Abhorrent also, the trope of “Hawaii’s host culture” is folded into the equation to eschew
how settler colonization of Kānaka Maoli operationalizes global capital. Claiming to
focus on addressing the needs of ‘Ōiwi students, which are educational concerns and
issues resulting from more than 175 years of settler colonial capitalism, tints the
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neoliberalization of Mauna a Wākea in multicultural veneer that propels TMT
construction.
Third, the settler-state plans to develop Mauna a Wākea for global peace to
promote TMT. On June 29, 2017, Hawai‘i County Mayor Harry Kim pitched an idea to
OHA’s Board of Trustees to turn Mauna a Wākea into an international peace park. In the
meeting Kim stated, “I believe that Mauna Kea can be a place of a pursuit of knowledge
to make us a better people and better stewards of the land. Mauna Kea can be or should
be a monument for the world for peace on earth.”511 Elaborating more, he suggested the
mountain could be “a living museum for the first nations people of Hawaii” that would
“teach the world that you people [Kānaka Maoli] were wronged.”512 Othering for sure,
Kim sees the “wrong” done to “you people” as UH’s ongoing mismanagement of Mauna
a Wākea. Balking at questions from trustees during the meeting, he shifted to propose the
peace park as “an international monument of indigenous people all over the world.”513
For Kim, the international peace park offers a grand vision for managing the mountain.
However, Kānaka Maoli at the meeting testified against Kim’s plan. Many opposed the
peace park as a distraction, voicing concerns over whether or not the TMT would be
included in the plan. A prominent supporter of TMT, Kim has previously said, “I met
with the governor, the attorney general, almost all of the observatories, I met with people
funding TMT. I believe TMT is an opportunity for Hawai‘i Island, good for mankind,
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good for Hawai‘i, good for students, good for the economy.”514 Although the peace park
plan has not explicitly included the TMT, Kim believes in the promised economic and
educational opportunities and also that the TMT project is not just good for Hawai‘i but
for “mankind.” He further alleges, “Mauna Kea can be and should be a monument for the
world, for mankind’s quest of knowledge to make us a better people.”515 Connecting the
white supremacist and heteropatriarchal roots of scientific liberalism, TMT and a peace
park on the mountain appear important for “mankind.” Kim finally asserts, “Because of
the Hawaiian being the first people of the nation of Hawaii, from that they developed into
the cosmopolitan race of Hawaii, meaning people belonging to the world. This whole
mountain symbolizes all those things.” The Indigeneity and national sovereignty of
Kānaka Maoli become raw material for development of a post-racial ideology that
attempts to piece together claims over Mauna a Wākea staked for all people and nations
of the world. It is an astonishing set of logical leaps that depend upon and strengthen the
TMT’s neoliberal multiculturalism. “Not surprisingly,” Melamed writes, “neoliberal
multiculturalism is one of the most useful discourses functioning today to dispossess
indigenous peoples of their lands and resources and to make such dispossession appear
inevitable, natural, or fair.”516 Kim’s enunciation of neoliberal multiculturalism “justifies
the removal of indigenous peoples from their lands by describing the entire world as the
rightful potential property of global multicultural citizens.”517 The neoliberal
multiculturalism, here, praises prospects for planetary peace by gifting Mauna a Wākea to
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the world in a process that elides and obfuscates how globalized racial capitalism in
Hawai‘i is co-constitutive of settler colonialism. In a letter of support written to Kim,
State of Hawai‘i Governor David Ige says, “I could think of no better person than you to
lead and organize a working group of like-minded individuals to create a Living
Monument of World Peace on Mauna Kea.”518 As a quasi-governmental institution,519
Kim’s working group continues to plan developing Mauna a Wākea into an international
peace park. Backed by the TIO and Ige who both strongly desire selling TMT, the peace
park would harm Kanaka ‘Ōiwi relations with the mountain and then claim it not just for
astronomers or the settler-state but the entire globe.
Neoliberal Crisis
I conclude my investigation of TMT’s liberalisms by considering how Kanaka
Maoli refusals of TMT unravel the neoliberal crisis in settler states of exception. My
objective in this chapter has been to scrutinize “the historical-geographical record of
neoliberalization for evidence of its power as a potential cure-all for the politicaleconomic ills that currently threaten us.”520 I have explored the ways in which scientific
liberalism recruits an ethos of multiculturalism before relying upon neoliberalism in the
record of political economies to sell TMT. In each stage, representations of Indigeneity
work to destroy Mauna a Wākea, Hawai‘i, and Kānaka Maoli. But these are social
relations produced by institutions and individuals, containing instabilities and fissure
points. Rather than arguing that TMT has absolutely represented and destroyed, its

518

“Governor Ige to Mayor Kim on Living Monument for World Peace on Mauna
Kea,” Big Island Now, October 30, 2017, http://bigislandnow.com/2017/10/30/governorige-to-mayor-kim-on-living-monument-for-world-peace-on-mauna-kea.
519
See Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 76.
520
Ibid., 154.
244

project to represent and destroy has actually failed. It fails because Kānaka Maoli have
refused to buy into the ideological force of scientific liberalism, liberal multiculturalism,
and neoliberal multiculturalism. ‘Ōiwi resistance has, in fact, succeeded in stopping all
TMT construction, and the TIO and settler-state have certainly been shaken. TMT is still
an idea, something to promote and not yet sold. In this failure, the attempts to provide
political economic cure-alls have laid bare the weaknesses of TMT’s liberalisms as well
as US settler sovereignty in Hawai‘i.
Kanaka ‘Ōiwi refusals of TMT produce alternatives to neoliberalism. On one
hand, Kānaka Maoli and allies have challenged the legality of TMT. Bringing lawsuits
against the TMT’s building permit and sub-lease, legal activisms have challenged the
project’s temporality. As the BLNR granted both the building permit and sub-lease
before holding contested case hearings for public input, the State of Hawai‘i has
partnered with the TIO and UH to build TMT in a timely manner. There is a demand and
pressure to begin construction so as to secure the transmission and will of global capital.
However, unremitting legal actions to pause and end TMT construction have interrupted
the rapidity of its development and tempo. Harvey observes, “But it is costly and timeconsuming to go down legal paths, and the courts in any case heavily biased towards
ruling class interests, given the typical class allegiance of the judiciary. Legal decisions
tend to favour rights of private property and the profit rate over rights of equality and
social justice.”521 For him, “The frequent appeal to legal actions, furthermore, accepts the
neoliberal preference for appeal to judicial [power].”522 While I agree that neoliberalism
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impels subjects into courts to fight for legal rights, courts are biased toward ruling class
interests, and rulings tend to favor private property and profit in the end, I disagree with
his analysis of time. Time is not simply a commodity to be (over)consumed; it is
produced in social relations and can be disturbed. Kanaka ‘Ōiwi interruption of the
TMT’s rhythm, cadence, and tempo—a temporality to break ground as soon as possible
and complete construction quickly to look into past dark ages and future new frontiers—
is an important strategy. Legal action against TMT can be seen as an alternative tactic to
engaging the temporal frame of reference for neoliberalism. Although lawsuits against
TMT have differently won in court, praising rulings as uncomplicated victories does
accept the neoliberal preference for judicial appeal and its juridical power to subjugate
under US settler sovereignty, as Harvey cautions. Rather, I argue that legal activisms
have the capacity to disrupt the normative development of TMT, forcing the TIO to look
elsewhere despite possessing an uneven and unfair access to financial resources. TIO has
indeed reported that it could move the project to a backup site at Observatorio del Roque
de los Muchachos on La Palma in the Canary Islands.523 This is a temporal triumph for
Kānaka Maoli and Mauna a Wākea. But it is one that must be followed up by sustained
antagonisms of TMT, wherever it might be constructed. Otherwise, the alternatives to
neoliberalism in Hawai‘i allow global capitalism to continue flowing, business as usual.
On the other hand, Kānaka Maoli and allies have engaged in direct-action
blockades to stop TMT construction. Blockades have been occurring for years, and most
notably between 2014 and 2016 when construction crews and infrastructure for TMT
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began being transported to the northern plateau of Mauna a Wākea. Discussing this kind
of direct-action, Coulthard contends that blockades are negating and affirming. He writes,
“They are a crucial act of negation insofar as they seek to impede or block the flow of
resources currently being transported from oil and gas fields, refineries, lumber mills,
mining operations, and hydro-electric facilities located on the dispossessed lands of
Indigenous nations to international markets.”524 Blockades also obstruct the
transportation of construction crews and infrastructure for astronomy industry
development. “These forms of direct action,” he says, “seek to negatively impact the
economic infrastructure that is core to the colonial accumulation of capital in settler
political economies.”525 Indigenous blockades of settler colonial capital are
simultaneously affirming. According to Coulthard, “They embody an enactment of
Indigenous law and the obligations such laws place on Indigenous peoples to uphold the
relations of reciprocity that shape our engagements with the human and non-human world
– the land.”526 Kanaka ‘Ōiwi blockades against TMT construction negatively impact the
neoliberal pulse of settler colonial capital, while also affirming kinship relations and
responsibilities to protect Mauna a Wākea. These affirmations have been enunciated
through aloha ‘āina and demonstrate further how it is an ‘Ōiwi geontology that is both
anti-colonial and anti-capitalist. The blockades themselves embody alternatives to
neoliberalism. They also create a neoliberal crisis. Harvey states, “The internal economic
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and political contradictions of neoliberalization are impossible to contain except through
financial crisis.”527 One element for detecting financial crisis for neoliberalism is capital
flight. Capital flight, for Harvey, occurs when oppositional movements organize against
(capital) accumulation through (settler colonial) dispossession. Investors have grown
weary of legal activisms and blockades to interrupt the construction of TMT. This is
evinced by TIO’s suggestion that TMT might move to the La Palma in the Canary
Islands. The capital fright and flight indicates a neoliberal crisis for TMT.
The neoliberal crisis also impacts the State of Hawai‘i. As oppositional pressure
placed onto global capital weighs heavy, the neoliberal multiculturalism supported and
articulated by the settler-state dims and becomes unstable. The US settler-state of
Hawai‘i cannot control global capital in the same way that it is controlled by global
capital. As global capital backing the TIO for development of TMT coerces the settlerstate into legal and extra-legal advocacy, some power is given up in return for
international competition and globalization. But what happens when international
competition stops? What is the status of settler sovereignty when global capital flees?
The neoliberal crisis produced by Kanaka ‘Ōiwi opposition to TMT is a settler state of
exception. Settler sovereignty is an empty signifier that fretfully coheres only by making
Indigenous people appear peculiar, in an anomalous status, within the geopolitical terrain
of settler colonial biopower. As previously mentioned, a settler colonial state of exception
“emphasizes the coercive imposition of domesticity on Native peoples who neither
sought nor desired it, foregrounding the ways the narration of Indigenous polities as
subjects of domestic law depends on a process of exceptionalization,” whereby, “they
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axiomatically are consigned to a ‘peculiar,’ and thus regulatable, internality that forcibly
disavows their autonomy and self-representations.”528 As the US settler-state in Hawai‘i
attempts to shore up its sovereignty in Hawai‘i by legally sanctioning astronomy industry
development on Mauna a Wākea, it attempts to cohere power by funneling development
and defense of the mountain into its juridical orbit as a way to signify territorial authority.
This process renders Kānaka Maoli peculiar and anomalous in the landscape of what has
been designated for the astronomy industry. However, when global capital pulls the TMT
elsewhere, as a result of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi alternatives to neoliberalism, the geopolitical
landscape designated by the settler-state becomes precarious. Kānaka Maoli temporally
interrupting the development of TMT through legal activism induce capital flight
whereas Kānaka Maoli blockading TMT construction crews and infrastructure re-occupy
and re-claim Mauna a Wākea. These are tremendous gifts of sovereignty that allow us to
view the diversity of strategies, whether legal activism or direct-action blockade, against
TMT as a unified front for ea. They expose the insecurity of US settler sovereignty over
Mauna a Wākea, Hawai‘i, and Kānaka Maoli. These alternatives to the neoliberalization
of Mauna a Wākea can be understood and utilized as alternatives to US settler
sovereignty in Hawai‘i. It is an alternative worth buying.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
“The state reinforces a system that produces criminals
out of those it has dispossessed.”
–Macarena Gómez-Barris529
The State of Hawaiʻi was founded on land stolen from Kānaka ‘Ōiwi. It is a US
settler-state. It formed initially in the wake of the illegal US overthrow of the Hawaiian
Kingdom in 1893. As the Republic of Hawaiʻi, it granted the unlawful annexation of the
Hawaiian islands and transferal of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s national lands to the US
federal government in 1898. After being the Territory of Hawaiʻi, the US federal
government manufactured the “State of Hawai‘i” in 1959 and institutionalized it as the
so-called fiftieth state, without consent from Kānaka Maoli.530 The legal, economic,
political, and social processes for settlement of Hawaiʻi are ongoing to this very day. One
pivotal way that settlement has continued, which I have gestured throughout this
dissertation, is through the criminalization of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi. Particularly, the US settlerstate in Hawai‘i turns Kānaka ‘Ōiwi into criminals to be detained, incarcerated, maimed,
removed, murdered, and disappeared. The criminalization of Indigenous people—from
Hawai‘i to the Americas, Palestine, and elsewhere—is an eliminatory technique for
colonial dispossession. For instance, Kānaka Maoli have been labeled threats of violence
to be criminalized for defending our sacred mountain Mauna a Wākea from the Thirty
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Meter Telescope. Water protectors of the Mni Sose, the Missouri River, have also been
labeled threats of violence to build the Dakota Access Pipeline. Accusations of violence
were used to unleash dog attacks, strip search women, bag heads in hoods, rip flesh from
bone with water cannons. The assault on Indigenous life, land, and water at on the
territory of the Standing Rock Sioux Nation clarifies how “in the United States, the
Indian is the original enemy combatant.”531 The criminalization of Indigenous
populations, across Oceania and America, is an original feature of settler sovereignty.
Ford writes, “The exercise of jurisdiction over indigenous crime performs the myth of
settler sovereignty over and over.”532 What she refers to as legal myth Rifkin calls the
empty sign of settler sovereignty,533 which, performed obsessively over and over again,
reveals a hollowness in settler-state power to be targeted and antagonized. I conclude this
dissertation by exploring how Kanaka Maoli activists, protecting our sacred mountains
from astronomy industry development, expose the incoherence of settler sovereignty in
Hawai‘i. Their activisms present kuleana and responsibility to protect the ʻāina.
How does the state materially reinforce a system that produces criminals out of
those it has dispossessed? I argue it is through the management of threats of violence. To
support this claim, I look at settler-state policing from the primary vantage of Kanaka
Maoli opposition to the TMT. Analyzing three material objects—an emergency rule,
bullet hole, and knee—I track how symbolic threats of violence are manufactured to
obscure and exact concrete violences. But, what can an administrative law, image of a
hole in a door, and body part of a police officer tell us about threats of violence? Indeed,
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these legal, visual, and fleshy objects are quite revealing. Interrogating discourses
mingling through and amongst them, I argue ‘threats of violence’ is a discursive
formation produced by the settler-state and dispersed through its institutions of media and
police. Weaving scholarship from Indigenous Studies and Hawaiian Studies together with
Critical Police Studies, I demonstrate ‘threats of violence’ maintains a dual function.
First, suggesting that Kānaka Maoli who defend Mauna a Wākea from the TMT threaten
acts of violence, and are violent threats themselves, rationalizes police intervention by the
US settler-state. In other words, figurative threats of alleged violence from kia‘i, the
guardians and protectors of our mountain, condone material violence against them by
police. Second, ‘threats of violence’ defers and tries to erase not only the colonial
violence animating the US settler state in Hawai‘i, and its deployment of police and their
militarized interventions, but also the diversity of violence that TMT does. In what
follows, I mine three material objects, offer two interventions, and conclude with one
mo‘olelo—a story that lays bare how settler-state policing of Kānaka Maoli is a
performance of precarity.
Traversing temporalities, the TMT project purports to explore dark ages of the
universe and unlock new frontiers for mankind. As Casumbal-Salazar has written, TMT
seeks to develop more land at the northern plateau of Mauna a Wākea, which already has
twenty-one telescopes and thirteen observatories, in order for deserving subjects—white
settler men—to progress toward modernity.534 This mission is backed by approximately
$1.5 billion pledged by national astronomy organizations from China, Japan, and India
and also the Canadian Crown, University of California, and California Institute of
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Technology. As discussed in Chapter 4, North American settler colonialisms marry
through global capital, and the international funding of TMT neoliberalizes Mauna a
Wākea, a worldwide financialization of the desecration and destruction of our sacred
mountain. The TMT promises economic benefits—jobs, expenditures, tourism—and
educational opportunities like scholarships for students in science, technology,
engineering, and math fields. Aroused by vows of technological advancement, scientific
progress, economic benefits, and educational opportunities, the State of Hawai‘i has deep
desires to build TMT and a vested interest in astronomy industry development. When it
sanctions the TMT, it does not just flag how the State of Hawai‘i is constituted on lands
stolen and seized from our lāhui Hawaiʻi. It also puts on display how State of Hawai‘i
support of astronomy industry development proliferates settler colonial power so as to
secure its institutionalization in the formation of Hawai‘i as a US settler-state. Calculated
yet unstable, this juridical order demands to be secured from Kānaka ʻŌiwi resisting
TMT, or, as astrophysicist Sandra Faber described in a leaked email, “a horde of native
Hawaiians who are lying about the impact of the project on the mountain and who are
threatening the safety of TMT personnel.”535
Emergency Rule
An emergency rule was approved by the Board of Land and Natural Resources
(BLNR) in 2015 to criminalize the kia‘i who were re-occupying Mauna a Wākea to
protect it against TMT (see figure 18). This administrative law created a few rules: the
mountain’s access road and 1-mile on either side of it are “restricted areas”; “transiting”
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means traveling-through in a vehicle at reasonable speeds with regard to hazards;
possession of “sleeping bags, tents, camping stoves, and propane burners” in restricted
areas is prohibited; and entering or remaining in restricted areas from 10:00 PM to 4:00
AM is banned, unless transiting through the access road or entering, within, and exiting
an observatory or UH facility. On one hand, these rules regulated kia‘i as criminals to
police by disciplining them as trespassing campers. On the other hand, the rule declared a
state of emergency to swiftly make blockading TMT construction unlawful. With short
notice, the BLNR met on July 10, 2015 and sought public testimony on the emergency
rule. Douglas Chin, the Attorney General of Hawai‘i at that time, gave testimony.
Targeting kia‘i, he claimed there was “[an] imminent peril to public health, safety, and
morality” for four reasons: rocks and stone structures have been placed on the access
road; presence of people there has increased; those people have disregarded authorities;
and they have harassed and made violent threats to workers of the visitor center,
observatories, and construction crews.536 For example, a surveillance log filed by rangers
of the Office of Maunakea Management alleged there was a bomb threat—that one kia‘i
threatened a suicide bombing. Of course, this was unsubstantiated but nevertheless the
story the settler-state told itself. Urging the BLNR, Chin exclaimed the rule should be
adopted to “mitigate these threats.”537 BLNR board member Stanley Roehrig agreed this
was a “clear and present danger,” and subsequently recommended rangers be given
police powers.538 After over eight hours of testimony, the emergency rule was passed by
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the BLNR in a 5-2 vote. Four days later, Governor David Ige signed the emergency rule
into law, codifying it as Hawai‘i Administrative Rule 13-123-21.2. An advocate for
deploying the National Guard to quell protests,539 Ige noted, “We cannot let some people
put others at risk of harm or property damage.”540 Put another way, the executive branch
cannot let kia‘i and Kānaka Maoli harm state workers or damage private property. The
settler-state will do what is necessary to protect capital’s bottom line of property, profit,
and dispossession.

Figure 18. HAR 13-123-21.2 public notice. Source: Office of Hawaiian Affairs.541
In the early morning on July 31, 2015, during Lā Hoʻihoʻi Ea, police forces
slithered up the mountain to detain and remove kia‘i (see figure 19). With executive
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authority from the emergency rule, officers from the Division of Conservation and
Resource Enforcement cited six and arrested seven kia‘i, whom were found in violation
of prohibited activities like camping in the restricted area. Exercising executive powers of
the Land Board, attorney general, governor, and police, the settler-state has marked
Kānaka ʻŌiwi, guarding our mountain from desecration and destruction, as threatening
acts of violence. It defends TMT as a project of settler colonial capitalism that works to
dispossess territory in Hawai‘i, alienate relations with Mauna a Wākea to eliminate
Kānaka Maoli by eradicating our kinship to ‘āina and wahi kapu (sacred places), and thus
replace us to develop the astronomy industry for techno-scientific progress. David
Correia and Tyler Wall summarize, “Ain’t no colonialism and ain’t no capitalism without
cops.”542 Later in September, eight more kia‘i were arrested. Grossly ironic, the
Department of Land and Natural Resources commented that the second set of arrests
under the emergency rule aided in “establish[ing] safe conditions on the mountain for
protestors.”543 Since 2015, there have been 59 different arrests of kia‘i. Accusing kia‘i of
violent acts thereby operationalizes the criminalization of Kānaka, a racialized colonial
violence, and functions concomitantly to conceal the violence of TMT.
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Figure 19. Division of Conservation and Resource Enforcement arrests. Source:
Department of Land and Natural Resources.544
In October of 2015, an Environmental Court of the Third Circuit invalidated the
rule, pursuant to Hawai‘i Revised Statute 91-7, because the State of Hawai‘i improperly
implemented an emergency rule that sidestepped requirements for public notice to enact
new administrative rules with the explicit purpose of stopping protests. This decision
suggested the emergency rule created an unlawful exception, which declared new
administrative law by suspending existing procedural regulations—what some may call a
state of exception but what I suggest is a settler state exception. E. Kalani Flores, who
brought the suit against the BLNR and also testified against the DOI’s ANPRM in
Chapter 2, remarked delightedly, “The State can no longer arrest innocent people who are
on Mauna Kea at night for cultural or spiritual reasons.”545 It was an important tactical
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victory. But, ‘threats of violence’ as a discursive formation is not just constructed in law.
It is also normalized and dispersed from imagery circulated in media.
Bullet Hole
One month before the emergency rule was put into law, media reports alleged
that a bullet hole was found on a door of the Subaru Observatory (see figure 20), an
existing telescope complex on Mauna a Wākea. When workers of the National
Astronomical Observatory of Japan operating the Subaru Telescope discovered the hole
in the door, they quickly called police. Patrol sergeant Paul Kim stated, “When officers
responded to the scene, the employees had found something appearing to be a bullet hole
in one of the doors.”546 Local media pounced fast. In the following days, news articles
surfaced containing titles from “Police investigating possible bullet hole in Mauna Kea
observatory”547 to “Bullet Hole Found In Door of Mauna Kea Observatory.”548
Speculation transformed into fact. Kia‘i were blamed immediately—not just for
puncturing the door but also possessing and using guns. Kia‘i Kaho‘okahi Kanuha
replied, “We do not condone that kind of action by anybody for any reason at any time,
especially on Mauna a Wakea, the place that we know is sacred.”549 Without any
evidence except images circulating in media, kia‘i re-occupying the mountain haunted
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observatories, their employees, and the settler-state. “Declaring something or someone a
threat,” Correia and Wall suggest, “is one of the most normalized of all powers internal to
the police function.”550 Forged into spectral ghosts, apparitions of astronomy industry
development, kia‘i presence on Mauna a Wākea was reason enough to conjure blame, as
if the threat of such violence, a loaded gun fired at an observatory, was always already
present in kia‘i and Kānaka ʻŌiwi.

Figure 20. Bullet hole on door of Subaru Observatory. Source: Hawai‘i Police
Department.551
But in a statement made by the director of the Subaru Observatory, the damage
to the door was confirmed to not be from gunfire (see figure 21). There was a “confirmed
match between this hole and an intake manifold cover on the [adjacent] wall.”552 Police
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concluded that the damage had been there for approximately six months.553 The damage
was only uncovered and investigated when blockades against TMT ramped up. This was
a cunning sleight of hand. In a proceeding news article, “Kaho‘okahi Kanuha said he was
glad to see the matter resolved but also was disappointed that protesters, a few of whom
remain camped on the mountain, were being accused on social media of being
responsible.”554 Although dispelled, the circulating imagery of a “bullet hole” naturalized
the bodies of those protecting Mauna a Wākea as persistent threats of violence.

Figure 21. Hole on door of Subaru Observatory. Source: Honolulu Star-Advertiser.555
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Police Knee
Examining a final object, I contend the discursive formation ‘threats of violence’
has become incapacitating. It is not simply embodied, as in mapped onto the bodies of
kia‘i and Kānaka ʻŌiwi. It is also debilitating, a rationale for crushing force—produced
by settler-state law, circulated in media imagery, and meted out by the knee of a police
officer. In 2017, more than a hundred kia‘i blockaded crews transporting a 3-ton mirror to
complete assembly of the Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope on Haleakalā, a different
sacred mountain on Maui island. Applying new techniques for detainment and removal,
adapted from lessons learned on Mauna a Wākea, police arrested six kia‘i. settler-state
policing of Kānaka Maoli is not unique to the case of TMT. After all, astronomy
development in Hawaiʻi is an industry not one telescope. On July 30, 2015—the night
before emergency rule arrests on Mauna a Wākea—heavily militarized police arrested
twenty kia‘i demonstrating against the Solar Telescope on Haleakalā. Kai Prais was
arrested then. Subsequently on August 2, 2017 (see figure 22), he was arrested again, but
in a spectacular display of violence. Prais was viciously detained and lost consciousness
when a police officer pressed his knee into Prais’ skull. He shrieked in pain for help but
the cop “continued to keep his knee on his head.”556 The knee jammed into his skull “was
overkill,” says Kaukaohu Wahilani who was next to Prais during the blockade.557 Kāko‘o
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Haleakalā, a coalition that organized the blockade, commented that they called an
ambulance while police “just stood there and did not assist.”558 The coalition and kia‘i
claim police used excessive force, whereas police suggest Prais “resisted arrest” and
“officers did what they’re trained to do.”559 Labeling kia‘i as threatening acts of violence
and violent threats rationalizes and defers this visceral violence. From Mauna a Wākea to
Haleakalā, the discursive formation that I have tracked here justifies police violence to
secure settler capital for astronomy industry development in Hawai‘i. Conversely, settler
capital bolsters the policing of Kānaka Maoli. This is especially true in a moment
wherein the State of Hawai‘i’s Attorney General Clare E. Connors, discussed in the
introduction, is attempting still to secure $2.5 million from the legislature to fund “state
security operations” for assisting astronomy industry development.

Figure 22. Blockade against Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope on Haleakalā. Source:
Department of Land and Natural Resources.560
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Precarious Performances
Weaponized in these ways, US settler sovereignty has unraveled in its
proliferation. My analysis offers new insights for a Critical Hawaiian Studies on the
relationship between policing and sovereignty by illustrating how policing Kānaka ʻŌiwi
is a precarious performance of US settler sovereignty in Hawai‘i. It is a spectacle
attempting to piece together jurisdictional authority and territorial control. Never legally
whole as the emergency rule elucidated, far from material truth in the case of the “bullet
hole,” and brutally insecure as signified by the police officer’s knee. Nevertheless, while
criminalizing Indigenous people has historically been a legal domain for anxiously
asserting settler sovereignty, other populations of Black, migrant, refugee, queer, and
trans subjects are differently marked ‘threats of violence’ for the US settler-state to
police. Indeed, this discursive formation is not exceptional to Indigenous people. I hope
that my analysis might encourage Critical Indigenous Studies to build coalitional bridges
on the relationalities produced across imagined ‘threats of violence’ for intersectional
alliances against the corporeal violence exacted by settler-states.
I want to end the project with a final moʻolelo. This moʻolelo elucidates how gifts
of sovereignty disidentify with time to antagonize the settler-state’s juridical recognition,
intelligibility, and violence. Kaleikoa Ka‘eo reported to trial in Maui District Court on
January 24, 2018 and was issued a warrant for speaking ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i. Charged with
three petty misdemeanors from blockading the Solar Telescope at Haleakalā in 2017 (see
figure 23), Ka‘eo identified himself to Judge Blaine Kobayashi, “Eia nō wau ke kū nei
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ma mua ou.”561 This meant: I am here indeed, standing in front of you. Kobayashi
replied, “I don’t know what that means, Mr. Kaeo.”562 Ka‘eo responded again in the

Figure 23. Kaleikoa Ka‘eo arrested during blockade at Haleakalā. Source: Bryan
Berkowitz.563
Hawaiian language, as he has done in previous trials for blockading the Solar Telescope
as well as TMT. Kobayashi then issued a bench warrant on the basis that “the court is
unable to get a definitive determination for the record that the defendant seated in court is
Mr. Kaeo.”564 Not only had Kobayashi presided over former cases with Ka‘eo, making it
reasonable to assume he himself recognized “the defendant seated in court,” but
Kobayashi literally refers to Kaleikoa by name saying, “I don’t know what that means,
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Mr. Kaeo.” Moreover, ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i is recognized as a language co-equal to English
according to Article 15 Section 4 of the State of Hawai‘i’s Constitution. Nonetheless,
Kobayashi had granted a motion filed by the prosecution that claimed compelling the
court to hire an interpreter would be an impractical and unnecessary expense.565 The
precedent was dangerous. Judicial review of policing Kānaka Maoli could further police
ʻŌiwi language and life, our ea. The Hawaiian language could be disregarded in court
and Kānaka Maoli speaking it would vanish from the record. This would be a three-fold
technique for elimination. Outlaw speaking ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i in courts, disappear the
presence of Kānaka Maoli facing charges, and decimate Kānaka Maoli with bench
warrants for being allegedly absent at trials. This, at the same time, would institute new
mechanisms for dispossessing ‘āina sacred to Kānaka Maoli, for the development of the
astronomy industry, by increasing criminalization to boost removal of Kānaka Maoli onthe-‘āina protecting wahi kapu like Mauna a Wākea and Haleakalā.
However, the State of Hawai‘i’s judiciary sensed the shaky rationale, and it
pressured Kobayashi to recall Ka‘eo’s bench warrant. Kobayashi followed orders. The
judiciary then amended policy to provide and permit interpreters, in general, and also to
allow defendants to operate as their own interpreter.566 This was a procedural change that
judicial agents of the settler-state openly admit resulted from lacking control over the
situation. What is clear in this story is recalling the bench warrant and amending
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procedural policy demonstrate that issuing the warrant created a perilous precedent with
an uncertain legal foundation. The tricks have been revealed. Most importantly, this was
instantiated by Ka‘eo (see figure 24), who has done what is necessary to challenge

Figure 24. Kaleikoa Ka‘eo representing himself in Maui District Court. Source: Maui
Now.567
astronomy industry development and launched legal defense in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i. In this
way, ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i offers a final gift of sovereignty. Like the emergency rule, “bullet
hole,” and knee, the bench warrant was yet another performance of precarity antagonized
by Kānaka ‘Ōiwi on the ‘āina specifically in our ‘ōlelo makuahine, our own mother
tongue. This was ea in practice, refusing astronomy industry development and protecting
the ‘āina and, in the same step, and articulating Indigenous temporal sovereignty in
settler-state court. Kaʻeo’s spatial presentation in ʻōlelo Hawaiʻi exposed the limits of
settler sovereignty. It is clear that Kobayashi saw and heard Ka‘eo in his court room, but
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he marked Ka‘eo to be absent because he articulated a different spatialized temporality
with the Hawaiian language. Although a language recognized as co-equal to English by
the State of Hawai‘i, ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i enunciates an odd and queer time, in the eyes of the
settler-state, that exercises territorial authority and obligations to defend the ‘āina in
Hawai‘i. Ka‘eo tested and demonstrated settler juridical time’s spatial shortcomings. In
other words, his present presence in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i was marked spatially absent because
of the Indigenous temporal sovereignty embedded within it. Ka‘eo issued a steadfast
responsibility to protect ‘āina by defending and perpetuating ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i. This was a
fantastic gift of sovereignty, and it continues to lift and guide others in practicing and
performing the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi politics of ea. As I have illustrated in this conclusion, the
precarious performances of policing continue to be irritated and interrupted as a way of
overturning the façade, myth, and emptiness of US settler sovereignty in Hawai‘i.
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